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Abstract

This thesis re-evaluates the concept of autonomy and the possibilities for trans racialized
youth to practice it in current health care decision making contexts. After discussing access to
health care in Ontario for this demographic using diverse research, an analytical foundation is
laid using legal pluralism, relational autonomy, transgender theory and disidentification theory.
The study uses Photovoice with trans racialized youth to produce visual texts analysed using
thematic network analysis. Secondly, the study considers how together, law and medicine
discursively work to encourage law-makers and health care providers to undermine the
autonomy of trans racialized youth. Authoritative diagnostic and clinical texts are examined
alongside decisions from courts and tribunals where trans racialized youth are present.
Despite the autonomy granted in Ontario’s Health Care Consent Act, structural vulnerability,
judicial paternalism, failure to mandate youth awareness of health care rights and professional
ignorance restrict the autonomy practice of trans racialized youth.
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Chapter 1: Searching for Trans Racialized Youth

Introduction
A timeline of the events that propelled me to research the autonomy experiences of trans
racialized youth in health care will give you, the reader, some perspective.1 In 2014, North
Americans were stunned when Leela Alcorn, a 16-year-old trans teen, walked in front of a truck
on the Ohio Interstate, because she could not bear her parents’ refusal to consent to her
transition. Her suicide note, posted to her Tumblr page, described the bleakness of her future as a
“man in drag”.2 Only one year before her suicide, the American Psychiatric Association
officially renamed Alcorn’s diagnosis of “gender identity disorder of childhood” as the less
pathologizing “Gender Dysphoria” in the latest version of its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders (DSM-V).3 In the same year as Alcorn’s death, Ontario added gender
identity and gender expression to its Human Rights Code as a prohibited ground of
discrimination in response to years of litigation and activism by trans communities.4 Then in

1

Since race is constructed socially, I use race as a process, the Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the
Ontario Criminal Justice System defined racialization “as the process by which societies construct races as real,
different and unequal in ways that matter to economic, political and social life.” Ontario Human Rights Commission
& Ontario Human Rights Commission, Policy and guidelines on racism and racial discrimination. (Toronto:
Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2005) at 11.
2
Alcorn’s original Tumblr was deleted at her parents' request but was retrieved and posted on Leela Alcorn, “Leelah
Alcorn’s Blog (Lost 2014 Tumblr Webpage)”, (30 December 2014), online: Lost Media Arch
<http://lostmediaarchive.wikia.com/wiki/Leelah_Alcorn%27s_Blog_(Lost_2014_Tumblr_Webpage)>.
3
American Psychiatric Association & American Psychiatric Association: DSM-5 Task Force, Diagnostic and
statistical manual of mental disorders: DSM-V, 5th ed. (Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Association, 2013);
American Psychiatric Association, DSM V Update Supplement to Diagnostic and Statistical Manual Of Mental
Disorders, Fifth Edition (American Psychiatric Association Publishing, 2016) at 19.
4
An Act to amend the Human Rights Code with respect to gender identity and gender expression, 20120619, 2012
2012 C 7 [Toby’s Act (Right to be Free from Discrimination and Harassment Because of Gender Identity or Gender
Expression)]; Ontario Human Rights Code, RSO 1990 [Ontario Human Rights Code].
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2015, Ontario passed a statute banning the use of conversion therapy by mental health
professionals on LGBTTQ and questioning minors in Ontario.5 Later that year, Toronto’s Centre
for Addictions and Mental Health (CAMH) closed the youth wing of its Gender Identity Clinic
(GIC) to new patients after an independent review was conducted amidst a trans community
outcry over conversion therapeutic practices deployed against gender questioning youth. 6 The
Clinic had built its international research reputation through treating over 650 patients.7 Then in
2016, the amended Regulation 552 of the Health Insurance Act improved OHIP delivery to
allow more classes of healthcare practitioners to recommend trans people for gender affirming
surgeries thus reducing the years long wait lists at the CAMH GIC.8 Taken collectively, these
were considerable legal and social policy reforms that would ostensibly improve conditions for
Ontario trans youth in the same situation as Leela Alcorn.
Indeed, mainstream LGBTTQ activists and allies celebrated provincial and federal human
rights recognition for gender identity and gender expression and the availability of punitive
sanctions for hate crimes.9 Yet, critical trans scholars and activists called these reforms symbolic

5

An Act to amend the Health Insurance Act and the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991 regarding efforts to
change sexual orientation or gender identity SO 2015 C.18.
6
While CAMH’s External Review was removed from their website, Emily Colero, “CAMH removes external
review of Gender Identity Clinic from website”, The Varsity (8 February 2016), online:
<https://thevarsity.ca/2016/02/08/camh-removes-external-review-of-gender-identity-clinic-from-website/>; the
archived copy of the External Review was accessed through Cristan Williams, “The Rise and Fall of Disco
Sexology Part 1”, (2016), online: Rise Fall Disco Sexol <transdvocate.com/part-i-the-rise-and-fall-of-discosexology-dr-zucker-camh-conversion-therapy_n_19556.html> [Williams].
7
Erin Anderssen, “Gender identity debate swirls over CAMH psychologist, transgender program”, Globe Mail (14
February 2016), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/toronto/gender-identity-debate-swirls-over-camhpsychologist -transgender-program/article28758828/>.
8
Health Insurance Act, 1990, RSO 1990 C H6 [Health Insurance Act], RRO 1990, 552.
9
An Act to amend the Canadian Human Rights Act and the Criminal Code, 19 2017, 2017 C 13 [An Act to amend
the Canadian Human Rights Act and the Criminal Code]; John Ibbitson, “With gender identity bill, Canada shows
leadership in advancing human rights”, online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/with-genderidentity-bill-canada-shows-leadership-in-advancing-humanrights/article35323583/>; Phil Heidenreich, “Senate
passes Bill C-16 which defends transgender rights”, (16 June 2017), online: Global News
<https://globalnews.ca/news/3532824/senate-passes-bill-c-16-which-defends-transgender-rights/>; “Bill C-16 more
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and even detrimental to marginalized segments of trans communities.10 Similarly, since the mid90s enactment of its health consent statute, Ontario celebrated the autonomy of the individual to
make decisions about their health, yet it seemed, from anecdotal evidence, that trans racialized
youth do not actually enjoy this autonomy.11 This is because they are not accessing genderaffirming treatments at the same rate as their white youth counterparts. My broad research
project is firstly to verify and understand the reasons behind this inequitable phenomenon by
examining the law and policy undergirding the medico-legal regulation of care to trans racialized
youth and secondly, to undertake to learn from their experiences about health care decision
making firsthand in their own words and photographs.
I began by mapping the terrain of existing academic literature about trans racialized youth.
Two challenges characterized this initial review: Firstly, the group at the heart of this research
embodies specificities of race, gender identity, ability and age simultaneously. Their lives are
constituted throughout these intersections and yet the literature concerning trans youth is
anything but intersectional. Research mostly pertains to white youth but is presented as
universal. Secondly, my research question compelled me to straddle several disciplines that
produce different and contesting knowledges about trans people and youth. Thus, with
intersectionality and interdisciplinarity in mind, I searched for overlaps through health and social
science research, legal theory, trans studies and medical history for information about trans

reason to celebrate for Toronto trans marchers”, (23 June 2017), online: CBC
<https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/toronto-trans-march-pride-bill-c-16-1.4176011>.
10
Viviane Namaste, Sex Change, Social Change: Reflections on Identity, Institutions, and Imperialism (Canadian
Scholars’ Press, 2011); Dean Spade, “What’s Wrong with Trans Rights” in Anne Enke, ed, Transfeminist Perspect
Transgender Gend Stud (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2012).
11
Health Care Consent Act, 1996, SO 1996, c. 2, Sched. A, Government of Ontario, 24 July 2014 [Health Care
Consent Act].
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racialized youth’s material conditions, health needs and autonomy practices.12 Furthermore, from
the outset of this project I affirmed the importance of using as much literature as possible by
trans racialized scholars and where that was not available, white trans scholars. Deliberately
then, my review begins with the work of a group of critical trans scholars who research how
sexual and gender difference is absorbed and mobilized by discourse producing institutions such
as medicine and law into Foucauldian “technologies of control”.13 Trans of colour critique seeks
to articulate the voices and interests of Black, Indigenous queer and trans communities of colour
(BIPOC). My project is necessitated by the ongoing dismissal of trans BIPOC lives from within
mainstream trans activisms, clinical research, and trans archives.14
My work is unique as it speaks across often disparate fields and does so in a coherent way that
shares new data and advances the thinking in each individual field. Specifically, my work
intersects Children and Youth Studies, Queer and Trans Studies, Critical Race Theory, Legal
Philosophy, and Health Equity Law, within overarching paradigms of Legal Pluralism
and qualitative research using arts-based/Photovoice methodology.

Defining “Youth”
There are many different terms that are used to discuss the age-ranges of the participants in
this research. Categories such as “children”, “adolescent”, “youth”, and “young adult” are

12

Kristin Luker, Salsa Dancing into the Social Sciences (Harvard University Press, 2009) at 81–83 describes the
bedraggled daisy method for conducting interdisciplinary literature reviews.
13
Jin Haritaworn, Adi Kuntsman & Silvia Posocco, eds, Queer Necropolitics (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2014) at
3.
14
C Riley Snorton & Jin Haritaworn, “Trans Necropolitics: A Transnational Reflection on Violence, Death and the
Trans of Color Afterlife” in Susan Stryker & Aren Z Aizura, eds, Transgender Studies Reader (New York:
Routledge, 2013) 66 at 67-69.

4

commonly used in law, medicine and social services to refer to, treat and govern young people.15
The way institutions and academic fields discursively deploy age categories and developmental
life stages reveals a lot about each institution’s prevailing values and practical goals. As I will
explain, these terms are not mutually exclusive nor are they standardized in provincial, national,
and international contexts.
Statutory law uses categories to make an age-based distinction between people. For example,
the term “minor" distinguishes younger people from those who have reached the age of the
“majority” which was once synonymous with attaining adulthood. In Ontario the Age Of
Majority And Accountability Act states the age of majority as 18.16 Interestingly, while 18 year
olds are allowed to vote they may not purchase cigarettes, alcohol or marijuana until they are
19.17 In the federal realm of criminal law the Youth Criminal Justice Act defines a “young
person” and a “youth” as between the ages of 12 and 17.18 Age of majority and health care
consent legislation in Canada varies across each province. The words "infant" and "child" and
“minor” are used interchangeably to refer to people under the age of majority for each province.
For example, in British Columbia, anyone under the age of 19 is a minor and the Infancy Act
regulates their health care consent.19
At the international level the United Nations has defined the term “youth” since 1985 as
people aged 15-24 years in its research, documentation and advocacy.20 However this does not

15

Soo Ah Kwon, Uncivil youth: race, activism, and affirmative governmentality (Durham; London: Duke University
Press, 2013) at 27–29.
16
Age of Majority and Accountability Act, RSO 1990, c. A.7, s.1.
17
Canada Elections Act SC 2000, c. 9 s.3; Liquor Licence Act, RSO 1990, c. L.19 s. 30; Smoke-Free Ontario Act,
2017, SO 2017, c. 26, Sched. 3 s. 3(1); Cannabis Control Act, 2017, SO 2017, c. 26, Sched. 1 ss. 7 and 10.
18
Youth Criminal Justice Act (SC 2002, c. 1 s 2(1).
19
Age of Majority Act [RSBC 1996] Chapter7 Ss. 1 And 4; Infants Act [RSBC 1996] Chapter 223 S.17.
20
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, “Youth - Definition”, (2017), online: What We
Mean Youth <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/youth/youth-definition/>.
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align with the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) where the category of “children”
extends up to, but not including, 18 years of age.21 This range is much wider than domestic
definitions of children, that stop at age 12, and is most likely deployed as a strategy to protect as
many young people as possible under the CRC’s provisions.
At the turn of the 20th century, psychology as a field led the move to establish adolescence as
a category denoting a physical and emotional stage of human development.22 By white/Western
externally measured standards, emerging out of adolescence involves exhibiting: physical
changes, developmental changes associated with values of independence, material independence,
established peer social groups, and romantic relationships of permanence.23 Similarly, in the
practice of pediatric medicine, the term “minor” is not used and paediatricians instead use the
medical term "adolescents" who are defined by their physiological stage as 12-18 year olds.24 In
medicine, “children” are people under the age of 12.25 The clinical term “adolescent” and the
legal term “minor” carry outdated culturally-loaded connotations yet they remain prevalent in the
medical and legal sources I examined for this thesis.26 The way both terms are used have limited
capacity to capture the experiences of trans racialized youth, such as transphobia, and racism that

21

Convention on the Rights of the Child General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989, Article 1.
G Stanley Hall, Adolescence: its psychology and its relations to physiology, anthropology, sociology, sex, crime,
religion and education (New York: Appleton, 1907).
23
Ibid.
24
D, Sacks, “Age limits and adolescents | Canadian Paediatric Society”, (reaffirmed 2016 2003), online: Can
Paediatr Soc <https://www.cps.ca/en/documents/position/age-limits-and-adolescents>.
25
Ibid.
26
Marlis Buchmann, The Script of Life in Modern Society: Entry Into Adulthood in a Changing World (University
of Chicago Press, 1989); James E Côté & Anton Allahar, Generation on hold: coming of age in the late twentieth
century (Toronto, Ont: Stoddart, 1994); Johanna Wyn & R D White, Rethinking youth (London: Sage Publications,
1997). Legal clinics serving people under 18 use the term youth not the value-laden term “minor” such as Justice 4
Children and Youth.
22

6

are not bound by age or physiological parameters.27 Minor youth may encounter specific barriers
related to parental consent to minor’s health care that overlap with the adolescent need for
puberty-related care. Yet as this chapter demonstrates, parental controls and financial and social
barriers to independent housing and secure employment extend to trans racialized and
particularly Indigenous youth in early adulthood even more than their white or cis counterparts
of the same generation.28
In contrast, the term “youth” connotes a transitional social concept of age that encompasses
both children and young adults, minors and people who have reached the age of majority.29 Yet,
in the Canadian operational administrative context, usage of the category of "youth" has
proliferated, and the category itself has broadened. For example, Employment and Social
Development Canada (EDSC) did not define youth but canvassed thousands of young Canadians
under 16 and over 30 years old for their 2018 Youth Policy. Older Statistics Canada surveys
classified youth as 16-28 years old, and young adults as 20-24 years old,30 however in its 2018
“Portrait of Canadian Youth” Statistics Canada considers youth to range from 15-34.31 These
expansions to the categorization of youth perhaps reflects the economic and social challenges
faced by a larger number of young adults in securing jobs, homes, and relationships that once

Carrie Davis, “Introduction to Practice” in Gerald P Mallon, ed, Soc Work Pract Transgender Gend Var Youth,
2nd ed (London: Routledge, 2009) 1 at 11.
28
Carrie Davis, supra note 27; see infra note Nicole Nussbaum, et al, Legal Problems Facing Trans People in
Ontario, TransForming Justice: Legal Needs Assessment of Trans People in Ontario Summary Report 1 (Toronto,
ON: Legal Aid Ontario, HALCO, Ryerson University, University of Western Ontario, University of Toronto, 2018)
in Youth Data Set.
29
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, supra note 20; Buchmann, supra note 26 at 82–
83.
30
Statistics Canada, “Children and youth”, (November 2012), online: Can Yearb
<https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/11-402-x/2011000/chap/c-e/c-e-eng.htm>.
31
Statistics Canada Government of Canada, “A Portrait of Canadian Youth”, (7 February 2018), online:
<https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/11-631-x/11-631-x2018001-eng.htm>.
27

7

signified adulthood.32 In the Ontario social services context, providers use similar broad age
ranges in some cases with an upper limit of 29.33 This range allows health and social services
providers to serve more trans people whose gender-affirming health needs do not end after the
urgency of the initial pubertal stage has finished.34 In particular, trans racialized youth often
access services later than white trans youth, due to these aforementioned socially determined
barriers that will be discussed in detail below.35
For my research I decided to employ the broad definition of youth because I wanted to focus
on how trans racialized people were accessing health related services offered in private and
public clinical sites regardless of being minors or not. I was trying to work less categorically and
more relationally and intersectionally as I explain in Chapter 2.36 In these sites the term “youth”
was used to refer to youth and adolescents over 18, perhaps because it is a term commonly used
by young people themselves.37
The presumption that Ontario minors have independent health care decision-making authority
was one I wanted to trouble with respect to trans racialized youth. Secondly, I wanted to
investigate whether trans racialized youth 18 and over were subjected to paternalistic and
infantilizing attitudes by health care providers and legal practitioners despite not legally being
minors.

32

James E Côté, Arrested adulthood: the changing nature of maturity and identity (New York: New York
University Press, 2000) at 3–5, 29.
33
Supporting Our Youth at the Sherbourne Health Centre http://soytoronto.org, and Planned Parenthood Toronto,
http://www.ppt.on.ca/. Central Toronto Youth Services programs apply age cut-offs based on the age ranges applied
by the Ministry which funds the program.
34
Websites for Justice for Children and Youth who work only with minors
35
Jake Pyne, The Temporality of Privilege: Trans Youth of Colour and the Trouble with Triage (PhD Dissertation,
McMaster University, 2018) [unpublished].
36
Wyn & White, supra note 26 at 96.
37
The Sick Kids Transgender Youth Clinic website uses the terms “youth” and “adolescent” interchangeably, see
http://www.sickkids.ca/AdolescentMedicine/transgender-youth-clinic.html
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Critical Trans Studies and Trans of Colour Critique
Several ruptures exist between the swiftly growing field of critical trans studies and the
mainstream trans and LGBQ movements. Some argue that mainstream successes in legal
recognition of gender identity and social inclusion have not changed material circumstances for
many communities.38 It is within this wave of resistances to material crises that I place my
research on decision-making autonomy for trans racialized youth. I will first define and describe
the foundational concept of “transnormativity”. I will then review the grouping of works that use
‘trans’ necropolitics as a theoretical container for trans of colour critique. Transnormativity is a
phenomenon through which the people who can most successfully be absorbed into existing
social power relations are recognized in law, dominate media discourses, and direct advocacy
choices while universalizing their experiences on to those who are deemed insoluble.39
The slow regulated death of the insoluble others is at the heart of Mbembe’s concept of
necropower.40 His was both a critique of and an extension of Foucault’s concept of biopower and
his theory of racism. Racism is a technology of biopower that categorizes populations into
scientifically determined subdivisions across which life and death outcomes are unevenly
allocated. This is an alternative way of understanding power in late modern societies.41 I will

Florence Ashley, “Don’t be so Hateful: The Insufficiency of Anti-Discrimination and Hate Crime Laws in
Improving Trans Well-Being” (2018) 68:1 Univ Tor Law J 1; Ido Katri, “Transgender Intrasectionality: Rethinking
Anti-Discrimination Law and Litigation” (2017) 20 Univ Pa J Law Soc Change [i].
39
Dan Irving, “Normalized Transgressions: Legitimizing the transsexual body as productive” (2008) 100: Special
Radic Hist Rev 38; Jena McGill & Kyle Kirkup, “Locating the Trans Legal Subject in Canadian Law: XY v
Ontario” (2013) 33 Windsor Rev Leg Soc Issues 96; Snorton & Haritaworn, supra note 14.
40
Achilles Mbembe, “Necropolitics” (2003) 15:1 Public Cult 11.
41
“Becoming subject therefore supposes upholding the work of death” at 14. Foucault Il Faut défendre la société at
228; Mbembe identifies the Atlantic slave trade and slavery as one of the first examples of biopolitical
experimentation and he calls plantations and colonies repressed topographies of cruelty Achilles Mbembe,
“Necropolitics” (2003) 15:1 Public Cult 11 at 21, 40.
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describe below how population level controls were supported by eugenics studies in Europe and
the United States based on “scientific” ontologies of race and sex.42
In Queer Necropolitics Haritaworn et al. inquire into what conditions make trans normative
political strategies, such as the expansion of hate crimes legislation, desirable.43 The editors also
follow the implications of inclusion-seeking strategies for trans people of colour.44 Queer
Necropolitics takes up Mbembe’s claim that new technologies of necropower continue to be
adapted and utilized.45 They push the practice of trans studies to “focus less on the grand
moments or processes of commemoration and more on the everyday and the ordinary.”46 Their
critical turn to the daily material realities of trans racialized youth guided my research.
Trans activists and academics remind cis feminists of the historical and current material
differences between them as women.47 They look beyond interpersonal experiences of
transphobia and racism to the institutional contexts in which those differences arise, for example
through the intersections of criminalization of trans status, citizenship status, sex workers’ rights

42

M. Foucault, Il Faut défendre la société, 58-70.
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36.
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Everything We’ve Got” in Eric Stanley & Nat Smith, eds, Captive Genders Trans Embodiment Prison Ind Complex,
2nd ed (Oakland California: AK Press, 2015) 21 is an example of such a multi-issue exploration.
45
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there is a thematic linkage between Mbembe, the project of Queer Necropolitics, and an earlier essay by Snorton and
Haritaworn titled “Trans Necropolitics” 45.
46
Haritaworn et al 2014 supra note 43 at 2.
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comparison of the work of Namaste and Judith Butler see also Trish Salah, “Undoing Trans Studies” (2007) 0:17
TOPIA: Canadian Journal of Cultural Studies 150; and see Jake Pyne, “Queer and Trans Collisions in the
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as workers, and the disabling of certain members of society.48 My research heeds this reminder
by placing trans racialized youth who do not actually benefit from recent transnormative policy
interventions and legislative reforms in the foreground of the picture.

The “Newness” of Trans Youth of Colour

What does race have to do with being trans?49 The obvious answer is that trans racialized
people exist, and as I explain in Chapter 2, they lead intersectional lives.50 The longer answer is
that trans racialized people only seem new to discourses that have so far erased them such as
histories of science, LGBT cultural histories, and media coverage of trans lives. I can begin to
answer that same question discursively if I look backwards for a medical history of
transsexuality that integrates “scientific” theories of race. The field of sexology emerged out of
endocrinology, eugenics, and the “psych” fields of study. Several scholars trace the development
of the field from the late nineteenth century through to early twentieth medical history of
transsexuality. They begin with European sexology and psychoanalysis and continue through
American sexology, endocrinology and psychiatry. These medical histories are useful because
they demonstrate how medical science laid the groundwork for the legal tendency I explicate in

48 Trish Salah, “Gender Struggles: Reflections on Trans Liberation, Trade Unionism, and the Limits of Solidarity”
in Dan Irving & Rupert Raj, eds, Trans Activism in Canada: A Reader (Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press, 2014);
and Nora Butler Burke, “Connecting the Dots: National Security, Crime Migration Nexus and Trans Women’s
Survival” in Yolanda Martínez-San Miguel & Sarah Tobias, eds, Trans studies: the challenge to hetero/homo
normativities (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2016) and also Nora Butler Burke, “Double
Punishment: Immigration Penalty and Migrant Trans Women Who Sell Sex” in Emillie Durisin, ed, Sex/Work
Regulation Agency and Resistance (British Columbia: UBC Press, 2018).
49
Nael Bhanji, “Trans/scriptions: Homing Desires, (Trans)sexual Citizenship and Racialized Bodies.” in Stryker &
Aizura, supra note 14, 512 at 519.
50
Nova Gutierrez, “Resisting Fragmentation, Living Whole” (2004) 16:3–4 J Gay Lesbian Soc Serv 69; Anneliese
Singh, “Transgender Youth of Colour and Resilience: Negotiating Oppression and Finding Support” (2013) 68 Sex
Roles 690 [Singh 2013a]; Anneliese Singh, Sarah E Meng & Anthony W Hansen, “‘I am my Own Gender’:
Resilience Strategies of Trans Youth” (2014) 92 J Couns Dev 208 [Singh et al 2014].
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Chapter 4, which is to normalize transsexualism by absorbing it into the established gender
binary.51 All scholars however, failed to acknowledge the connection between scientific
typologies of race and the creation of the category of transsexuality. Their related theories on law
and political economy branch out from incomplete histories of transexuality. 52 It is partly these
selective research gaps that facilitate the framing of trans racialized youth as new entities despite
their centuries-old existence.53 A parallel erasure in the official cultural history of transness has
been met by Black scholars and cultural workers who demonstrate that BIPOCs are not recent
add-ons to this current trans youth moment. In fact, Black and Latinx trans youth like Marsha P.
Johnson and Sylvia Rivera led 20th century LGBTTQ activism in the cities of New York and
Compton.54 This activism was necessitated by their structural vulnerability to the regulation of
race, gender, citizenship status, and by being targeted by law enforcement.55 And thirdly, trans
racialized youth have called attention to the media’s neglect of their lives as they responded to
the media eruption over Alcorn’s death. They write this: “No offense to Leelah Alcorn, may her
soul rest in peace, but where is the press coverage of the eight to 10 African-American
transgender girls that have been murdered this year?"56
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Returning to the role of race in the creation of transness, notably, the work of Julien GillPeterson uncovers the convergence of racial categories and sexological inquiries challenging
previous academic omissions. Most relevant to this project is Gill-Peterson’s genealogy of trans
children and youth. He also shows that racialized children have always been a focus for
sexological and medical research in the United States for eugenic reasons.57 Scientific racism
most obviously manifested itself in the study of eugenics throughout Europe and America.58
Eugenics was the pursuit of racial improvement premised on white supremacy and ableism by
normalizing deviant racial and sexual subgroups. And as Gill-Peterson concludes in his
genealogy of trans children:

The child’s body, then, is intrinsic to the genealogy of sex and race as bound by
endocrinology, even if the children being treated by endocrinologists did not
begin to be labeled as transsexual, like G.L., until the 1960s. The neglect of the
developmental function of childhood and the child’s body to some extent explain the
facile forgetting of the genealogy of the transgender child…It also accounts for
the apparent exogenous quality of race to transgender studies and the transgender child,
where, if broached at all, race is merely a matter of minority identity
and its intersection with sex and gender.59

He concludes that while in the 21st century trans and gender independent kids are reported on
as though they are a new phenomenon, the control of adolescence as a key developmental stage
in the life of the species was significant as early as the 1960s.60 Gill-Peterson’s earlier work also
focused on trans youth, puberty suppression through the use of hormone blockers and the

57

Julian Gill-Peterson, Queer Theory is Kids Stuff: A Genealogy of the Gay and Transgender Child Rutgers, 2015)
[unpublished] at 11, 24.
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discovery of the transsexual body’s plasticity from the study of hormones by endocrinologists
steeped in scientific racism.61 He frames puberty suppression as an example of modern trans
biopolitics developed from endocrinology’s interest in disrupting the body’s inherited racial and
sexual characteristics.62 Nineteenth and 20th century endocrinologists were interested in what
they termed “precocious puberty” associated with “tropical populations” i.e. racialized people of
the Global South.63 Rather than being an add-on to gender identity, race is a technical capability
of the body that can be manipulated to make it plastic and therefore to make it trans. GillPeterson remarked on the irony of the high cost of Lupron, a puberty blocking drug, reasoning
that cost functioned as a prohibitive barrier to trans and gender non-conforming pubertal age
racialized youth who are less likely to have Medicaid or Medicare or private health insurance.64
This is confirmed by U.S. research scrutinizing Medicare service claims data over 10 years.65
The study found that when a puberty-blocking implant called Vantas was prescribed for the
diagnosis of gender dysphoria the claimants were 74 per cent “white non-Hispanic” but when the
same drug was prescribed for “precocious puberty”, which is the labelled purpose of the drug,
the number of racialized recipients matched the number of white ones.66 This ratio indicates a
disproportionately high number of racialized youth billing for a drug to delay precocious
puberty, rather than to address gender dysphoria.

Julian Gill-Peterson. “The Technical Capacities of the Body: Assembling Race, Technology, and Transgender”
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62
Ibid at 408.
63
Ibid at 413. The role of tropical colonial studies in the development of psychiatry is explored later in Chapter 4.
64
Ibid at 414.
65
CMD Lopez et al, “Trends in the use of Puberty Blockers among Transgender Children in the United States”
(2017) 2:2 J Pediatr Encrinology 1.
66
Ibid at 4.
61

14

In Toronto, anecdotal evidence of low to zero numbers of trans racialized youth using trans
youth services and gender clinics prompted me to interview between 2016 and 2017 three
doctors who work in southern Ontario clinics specializing in offering gender-affirming
treatments to minors and older youth (12-25 years of age). I interviewed two pediatricians from
the Transgender Youth Clinic at the Hospital for Sick Children in downtown Toronto, and one
family doctor from Quest Community Health Care in Windsor who is a trans woman herself.
One of the physicians was a racialized gay man. Both of the well-resourced clinics treat gender
variance as a physical condition not a pathology, making them progressive clinics. All three
doctors described the importance of access to gender-affirming treatments for trans youth. All
three emphasized the life-saving effect that puberty blockers can have for youth between 10-15
years. Both clinics have long waiting lists and describe high volumes of patients demonstrating
need.67 All three told me however, that most of their patients were white, middle to upper-class
and most attended the clinic with families possessing employee health benefits. They could not
explain this racial disparity. Both white doctors surmised that it had to do with inadequate
support or lack of consent from racialized parents perhaps due to cultural or religious reasons.
The critical aim of this thesis then is to discover how and why, if race and transness are so
intertwined, trans racialized youth are erased from media reports, from research, clinical access,
and from jurisprudence. In the next section I will create a picture of trans racialized youth and
access to health in Ontario.

Adam Carter, “Hamilton a desert for transgender healthcare, but hope is on the horizon”, CBC News (1 March
2017), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/hamilton/transgender-healthcare-1.4003071>.
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A Research Portrait of Trans Racialized Youth in Ontario

Existing literature on access to health care for trans racialized youth is quite limited and the
brushstrokes of research depict an environment of professional ignorance and discrimination.68
The 2009 Trans PULSE study was the first Canadian research series about trans communities.
Trans PULSE hired trans researchers and used mixed-methods. As a result, Trans PULSE was
able to collect data about youth and racialized people and newcomers. Trans PULSE documented
that out of approximately 53,500 trans people in Canada, one-quarter of them identify as
racialized, while one out of 14 identify as Indigenous.69 Trans PULSE also found that 34 per cent
of trans Ontarians are 24 years and under, and detailed the unique vulnerabilities experienced by
trans youth compared to their LGBQ counterparts.70 For example, the study found that 67 per
cent of trans youth experienced significant family rejection71, homelessness and distressed
mental health resulting in much higher rates of suicidal ideation and actual attempts than both
their cis straight and cis queer counterparts.72 Furthermore their results indicated the particular
vulnerability of trans youth compared to trans adults. Trans youth (up to 24 years) were almost
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Services Among Transgender People in the United States” (2015) 16:2 Int J Transgenderism 68 at 72, 74–75. This
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twice as likely to seriously consider suicide as those over 25, and almost three times as likely to
have attempted suicide within the past year.73 Another key finding was that trans people avoided
primary care and emergency health services due to a striking lack of competent and sensitive
services.74 For example, Namaste’s pioneering research on trans people’s experiences with
Canadian Gender Identity Clinics (GICs) showed that endocrinologists refused cross-sex
hormone therapy for trans people when it was almost the same process as hormone replacement
therapy for cis people. Endocrinologists who did prescribe hormones to trans people refused to
monitor them or did not know how to dose trans people properly resulting in negative side
effects.75 U.S. studies of how trans people relate to health care access noted patterns such as:
concealing gender from health care providers and staff; educating health care providers about
health care needs and issues; avoiding primary care and relying on emergency medical care; or
avoiding health care services altogether.76 U.S. researchers also noted race as a correlate in
increased emergency medical use and increased discrimination when trans people of colour use
emergency services.77
While not intentionally attending to race or ethnicity, Hammond’s study of the social
organization of trans youth health care drew attention to the levels of autonomy of trans youth

Greta Bauer, et al, “Suicidality among Trans People in Ontario/ La suicidabilité parmi les personnes trans en
Ontario”, online: Trans PULSE <http://transpulseproject.ca/research/suicidality-among-trans-people-in-ontario-lasuicidabilite-parmi-les-personnes-trans-en-ontario/>; Kyle Scanlon et al, Ontario’s Trans Communities and Suicide:
Transphobia is Bad for Our Health, Trans PULSE E-Bulletin Vol 1, Issue 1 (Toronto, Ontario, 2010).
74
Ayden I. Scheim et al, “Reported Emergency Department Avoidance, Use, and Experiences of Transgender
Persons in Ontario, Canada” (2013) Trans PULSE, online: <http://transpulseproject.ca/research/reportedemergency-department-avoidance-use-and-experiences-of-transgender-persons-in-ontario-canada/>.
75
Viviane K Namaste, “Access Denied: The Experiences of Transsexuals and Transgendered People with Health
Care and Social Services in Toronto” in Invisible Lives Erasure Transsexual Transgendered People (Chicago,
Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 2000) 157 at 168.
76
Kattari et al. supra note 68 at 68.
77
J Grant et al, Injustice at Every Turn: A report of the National Transgender Discrimination Survey (Washington,
DC: National Center for Transgender Equality and National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, 2011) at 73.
73

17

within the two types of service delivery systems at The Centre for Addiction and Mental Health
(CAMH) and Sherbourne Health Centre (SHC).78 Secondly, her work explored how trans youth
identity formation defied categories imposed by the medical model of transness.79 Youth from
across Ontario detail the painful impacts of experiencing delays for appointments and treatment,
paying out of pocket for sexual deviance testing, having to participate in research to access
services, receiving transphobic and/or incompetent services or being denied services altogether.80
Youth discussed avoiding the CAMH GIC due in part to requirements to prove gender identity
through the real life test.81 Disaggregated research showed that transfeminine, racialized and
underhoused or homeless trans people in Ontario were more likely not to have a family physician
than other trans people.82 In order to survive, trans youth worked tenaciously to secure housing,
pool health information, share hormones, heal from family rejection or manage family
expectations, actualize their gender expression, and make a living.83 Hammond’s attention to
local resilience, agency and autonomy practices of trans youth influenced the direction of my
research. I geared my specific inquiry towards the ways that statutes, policy and authoritative
texts erode or foster agency and autonomy as forms of decision making in health.
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Yan retrieved the voices and experiences of Toronto trans racialized youth in her secondary
analysis of the 2008 Toronto Teen Sex Survey data, which had been disaggregated by race and
gender identity.84 Eighty-five per cent of the 1216 participants were Black and South Asian and
some of them were immigrant and newcomer youth whose voices are typically unrepresented in
Canadian research. Yan’s work highlighted the impacts of racism, language barriers and
conservative religious norms on newcomer and racialized youth who did not have the privilege
of “coming” out into an LGBTQ community that reflected or welcomed them. Yan’s work filled
in the picture of racialized youth who juggled religious and cultural expectations85 with meager
financial resources for transitioning,86 complicated family supports and a desire for services in
their languages that respected their confidentiality in sexual health decision making. Trans
youth-specific findings were: they were not actually being served for trans specific health needs
or in trans competent ways when aggregated with LGBQ youth (for example being
misgendered), they were assumed to be gay/queer, and there was a lack of sensitivity to trans
youth’s fear of being physically examined.87 It was significant that beyond simply enumerating
the negative interpersonal attitudes of service providers and continuing the institutional analysis
trend, Yan fleshed out institutional patterns in social services that created vulnerability to racism
and transphobia.88
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While researchers continued to mine the same 2009 data set for intersectional nuances,
subsequent national studies of trans youth were structured in ways that prevented the
participation of trans racialized youth and did not attempt to disaggregate data by race and
ethnicity.89 These oversights are troubling since research had suggested that trans racialized
youth were more structurally vulnerable to health neglect and secondly they understood
themselves to be phenomenologically different from white youth.90 Fortunately, more accurate
data about trans racialized youth in Ontario is available from two very recent studies that I will
discuss in turn. The Transforming Justice survey conducted identity-based focus groups between
2016 and 2017 for trans youth, racialized trans people, and Two-spirit people.91 The survey
found that medical problems were the second highest legal problem affecting 25 per cent of trans
people, compared to 2.6 per cent of Canadians.92 The biggest legal problem for trans people was
discrimination, which included discrimination in health care.93 Participants described multiple
layers of transphobia starting in their youth with abusive families and parents who blocked them
from getting name changes, hormone therapies and other trans specific medical procedures
despite the lack of an age threshold for decision making in the HCCA.94 Youth participants also
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described systemic discrimination in schools, and in child welfare institutions.95 Housing and
shelter systems were especially bad for example, because they are segregated by both natal sex
and gender presentation.96 When violence occurred in the shelter, trans victims were blamed for
it and staff held no one accountable.97 Trans youth, who have very high rates of homelessness in
the Greater Toronto Area,98 spoke about using street-based means to obtain hormones, money,
shelter and to build safety networks that replaced biological family support and protection.99
Racialized trans participants from Transforming Justice revealed the challenges of surviving
at the intersections of race and transness in the following ways: experiencing racism and
transphobia within mainstream and LGBTQ mainstream social services; and a lack of trust in the
legal system. They described making agentic choices to manage racism and transphobia such as:
avoiding medical services within their own cultural communities; looking outside their own
ethnocultural communities for housing and employment.100 In addition, Two-Spirit and trans
Indigenous focus group participants emphasized the ongoing effects of colonization such as
geographic and cultural dislocation. One example of colonialism and transphobia was the
deployment of Christian settler ideologies against Two-spirit people in white adoptive homes,
churches and through schooling.
Across all health care contexts, trans youth in the Transforming Justice study had experiences
of being outed as trans, being misgendered or dead-named. Delays in emergency medical
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treatment and urgent care or outright refusals were common as was the experience of having all
health issues viewed as trans-related or trans-caused all of which prompted trans people to avoid
seeking urgent or primary care.101 With respect to medical treatment, participants related the
following: denial of hormone replacement therapy and gender affirming surgeries and overall
lack of trans competent healthcare. Almost no participant sought legal advice let alone taking
legal action for any of the rights violations they experienced.102 Participants perceived legal
information spaces and staff as inaccessible and daunting. It has been established that in Ontario,
minors and older youth do not know their rights in terms of health law, often believing that
doctors are required to consult their parents/guardians about serious health decisions.103 The
stakes of ignorance of the law are higher for trans and gender-expansive youth who have more
reason for medical interactions, because fear of their parents finding out or blocking their choices
could result in delayed or missed care and severe mental health consequences as was established
earlier in this chapter.104 Given the finding that youth relied on health care providers to share
health rights information, rather than on school staff or peers, professional ignorance is troubling
given Pyne’s current research results, discussed below, about racial disparities in access to health
clinics serving youth. That even today, internet savvy trans racialized youth urgently need health
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consent law information will be borne out later on in the structural inadequacies of the HCCA in
Chapter 4 and the focus groups’ findings from trans racialized youth in Chapter 5.
The second recent study that focused on the attitudes of clinicians and community workers
who provide services to trans youth confirms that it is predominantly white trans youth who
benefit from the most progressive health services in Ontario.105 While Pyne specifically studied
the disparities between minors accessing puberty-blockers, his data does bring to light two key
generalizable findings about clinicians who treat trans youth: they do not integrate an anti-racist
approach to their practice with trans youth, and they assumed that racialized and immigrant
families’ communities were more transphobic than white communities.106 Both findings
reinforced my rationale for an inquiry into the relationship between trans racialized youth and
autonomy experiences in health care decision making.
Similar to the informal interview results with my three southern Ontario doctors, Pyne’s
analysis confirmed that “gender affirming” doctors treating youth did not notice the whiteness of
their patient demographics and when asked specifically about demographics, 100 per cent of
clinicians described their patients as “majority white”.107 Notably, clinicians attributed the
absence of trans racialized youth to deficiencies in racialized, immigrant communities with an
emphasis on those practicing Christian and Muslim faiths.108 In contrast to frontline youth
workers, clinicians were ignorant to the ways in which the after effects of colonialism, and
current consequences of globalization, war, immigration and migrant labour have affected the
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kinship structures of racialized families and communities.109 Parents and families of trans
racialized youth are more likely struggling to survive with far less time and financial resources to
support their child’s questioning or transitioning than middle class and white families.110
Now it is widely accepted that having supportive parents or even one supportive adult
improves the life chances and outcomes for trans and gender expansive youth.111 Claims from
the sparse and quantitative research about racialized and/or immigrant families’ attitudes towards
trans and gender expansive children and youth are inconclusive. U.S. Latinx youth reported
experiencing less acceptance from their families than white youth.112 While a national U.S.
survey found Black, Latinx, Asian and American Indian respondents scoring higher for family
acceptance of transness than white respondents.113
As we have already seen, particularly but not solely in the U.S. context, parents have been
documented as regularly preventing minors and youth from transitioning for a wide variety of
reasons.114 Yet if the HCCA allows capable people of any age to determine their treatments, how
have parents alone been able to prevent racialized youth from accessing transition services?
Foregrounding Pyne’s second finding let us return to consider the knowledge and practices of
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Ontario doctors, around consent law not just transness. Only two Ontario studies have examined
Toronto doctors for awareness of the law regarding minor youth.115 The first found in 1979 that,
of 29 surveyed, 41 per cent were unsure of the law, 14 per cent said they did not care about the
law, 28 per cent said they could not treat a minor without a parent’s consent and only 7 per cent
said they would treat a sufficiently capable minor.116 When asked to list and rank factors they
consider when treating minors, 52 per cent misunderstood health consent law, citing the
seriousness of the issue as the number one factor to consider, then age and then the dependency
of the youth on their family.117 Notably, these doctors felt that law was irrelevant to their practice
and their knowledge of law did not impact their delivery of services to youth.118 The study
concluded that youth, especially legally capable minors, were prevented from making treatment
decisions due to the ignorance of doctors, and resources were needed to teach doctors health
consent law to support autonomy of minors.119
If I connect these findings to the claims established in this chapter that trans racialized youth
are not accessing specialized clinics or most LGBTQ services, that clinicians do not deliver
services through an anti-racist lens, and that many local doctors serving minor youth do not
understand the health consent legal rights of youth, it appears that trans racialized youth face a
maze of obstacles on top of their structural vulnerability to poverty and being underhoused. They
must first find the clinic, access the clinic, have a doctor find them capable of decision making,
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and then convince a health care practitioner, most likely a psychiatrist, that they are “trans
enough” to get diagnosed with Gender Dysphoria. Furthermore, as I will explicate through my
analysis of authoritative clinical texts in Chapter 4, youth must prove that they are stable enough
financially, emotionally, psychologically and logistically to medically transition in order for
OHIP to cover the costs of drugs, hormones and surgeries. This final section below lays out the
background of the medical model of transness upon which the authoritative texts rely and against
which this research project positions itself.

The Medical Model of Transness

This house was never built for us, but we have been expected to abide by its rules.
(Chang, 2016, pp. 45-52)

While 19th century tropical medicine explicitly used racial ontologies to study the plasticity of
sex, in the 20th century clinical psychiatry took over as the site for sex/gender knowledge
production. The research-based GIC became the locus and the medical model of transness was
the result of this shift.
Trans historians have diligently chronicled the pathologization of transsexuality and
transgenderism along with the rise and fall of North American gender identity clinics (GICs),
including Toronto’s CAMH. The Clarke Institute of Psychiatry, which later became CAMH,
opened a youth GIC in 1968 as part of the Toronto Project to study transexualism for the first
time in Canada.120 Four hospitals took part in the Toronto Project including the Hospital for Sick
Children. Denny provided extensive documentation of the clinical selection for “true”
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transsexuals that was cissexist and deeply misogynist. Denny documents how the hopeful, if not
desperate, people of the 1960s onwards in the U.S. seeking treatment, mistook the GICs as
treatment centres, not clinical research centres, and secondly, that the GIC staff (made up of
psychiatrists, psychologists, internists and endocrinologists) did not recognize the needs of their
patients and certainly did not center services around those needs.121 Williams chronicles the rise
and fall of “disco sexology” – named for the outdated scientifically dubious and transphobic
knowledges – produced by cissexual mental health professionals whose prolific publications
influenced judges and policymakers.122 While they constitute rich sources of the interactions
between TSTG people and GIC researchers, until recently, accounts of clinical encounters were
presented as completely white and uncomplicated by racism.123
Trans academic Sandy Stone published “The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttransexual
Manifesto”.124 Stone critiques the term "wrong body", a term, she argues, doctors rely on to
define transsexuality as a disorder not a state of being.125 Stone remarks on the phallocentric and
gender binary fixation of physicians including American endocrinologist Harry Benjamin.
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Notably, Stone mentions the whitewashing explicit and implicit in the creation of the category
“transsexual” and its accompanying discourse.
Suddenly the old morality tale of the truth of gender, told by a kindly white patriarch in New
York in 1966, becomes pancultural in the 1980s. Emergent polyvocalities of lived experience,
never represented in the discourse but present at least in potential, disappear; the berdache and
the stripper, the tweedy housewife and the mujerado, the mah'u and the rock star, are still the
same story after all, if we only try hard enough.126
Also remarking on race-privileged access to GICs, Black trans activist Ms. Major remembers
Benjamin as someone who “didn’t like coloured girls”.127 Non-normative trans people
embodying non-Western white stories countered the limited clinical representations familiar to
cis doctors and researchers but were likely to be rejected from GICs.128 However as some
conclude, the outcomes of the clinics should not be totally dismissed. The work of the clinics
resulted in a diagnosis for Gender Identity Disorder in the DSM-V, the protocols of the Harry
Benjamin Standards of Care and a base of medical scientific knowledge (still not widely shared
or taught in medical schools) about gender-affirming treatments that had not existed before.129
The debate over the merits and drawbacks of listing “gender dysphoria” in the DSM-V as the
official diagnosis for transness turns on the pragmatic needs of marginalized trans people to
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access government subsidized services which require diagnoses versus the desire to not be
labelled with mental illnesses.130 The intricacies of the debate are beyond the scope of this paper.
As I explore in Chapter 4, if meeting the diagnostic criteria from the DSM-V and other official
clinical standards is the only way to get publicly funded treatment, then those rules determine
who is trans and by extension who can live in their felt gender and more likely access
identification and housing – but they also limit how a person might see themselves as trans.
Numerous scholars and empirical researchers have said: TSTG people were actually quite
well informed about the criteria in the Harry Benjamin/WPATH Standards of Care (SoC) and the
ways primary and gender-affirming health care was administered in Toronto.131 It is not
surprising then that studies reveal that transsexuals without employment-related health insurance
or independent wealth, or those who did not want to go through the painful rigours of the GIC,
which rarely conferred surgical recommendation, made agentic choices to achieve body
modification using income derived from sex work and/or D.I.Y. methods.132
In conclusion, from the literature, it appears that trans racialized youth feel unassisted and
even directly oppressed by medicine and law, two normative institutions of public life, that are
supposed to provide structure, support and avenues of healing and redress to members of society.

Namaste 2000, supra note 75; Pooja S Gehi & Gabriel Arkles, “Unraveling Injustice: Race and Class Impact of
Medicaid Exclusions of Transition-Related Health Care for Transgender People, 4 SEXUALITY RES. & Soc.
POL’Y 7, 12 (2007).” (2007) 4:7 SEXUALITY RES & Soc POL’Y 12; Madeline B Deutsch, “Gender-affirming
Surgeries in the Era of Insurance Coverage: Developing a Framework for Psychosocial Support and Care Navigation
in the Perioperative Period” (2016) 27 J Health Care Poor Underserved 386; Government of Ontario, “Gender
confirming surgery”, (7 March 2016), online: Ontario.ca <https://www.ontario.ca/page/gender-confirming-surgery>.
131
Sandy Stone supra note 125; Dallas Denny, “In Search of the ‘True’ Transsexual” (1996) 2:3 Chrysal J
Transgressive Gend Identities 39; Jay Prosser, Second Skins: The Body Narratives of Transsexuality (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1998); Namaste 2000, supra note 75; Spade 2003, supra note 52; Kai Cheng Thom,
“Not Born this Way: On Transitioning as a Transwoman Who Has Never Felt ‘Trapped in the Wrong Body’”,
XoJane Womens Lifestyle Community Site - XoJane (9 July 2015), online: <http://www.xojane.com/issues/im-atranswoman-who-never-felt-trapped-in-the-wrong-body>.
132
Namaste 2000, supra note 75 at 195. Namaste interviewed 19 trans people (17 MTFs and 2 FTMs, some of
whom were sex workers and a few of whom were racialized). Rotondi et al, supra note 83.
130

29

There are holes in the knowledge of health care providers, especially physicians about gender
affirming care and the health consent rights of minors and youth. Youth themselves seem
uninformed of their rights under the HCCA, despite the high stakes of not accessing care at a
pivotal transition time, which begs for an examination of the promises and mechanisms of the
HCCA. And finally, in order to understand the relationship of trans racialized youth to autonomy
in health care I need to create a space to hear from youth themselves.

Roadmap of Thesis

This chapter has provided the Canadian context for my research. There are barriers to being
able to undergo physical changes for trans youth (if desired). There are social, legal and financial
barriers to being able to live in one's gender identity and therefore fully actualize one's self socially in particular. There are barriers to obtaining material independence due to high levels of
discrimination. These barriers are heightened for racialized and Indigenous trans youth.
Against this backdrop, my research question then is how do trans racialized youth experience
autonomous and or agentic decision making in health care. To answer my research question, I
juxtaposed visual and interview data from focus groups against an examination of a selection of
legal materials. In Chapter 2 I explain the theoretical constructs I used including:
intersectionality and structural vulnerability; examination of a relational theory of autonomy as
well as the role of doctors, other health care providers and families with respect to that
autonomy. Chapter 3 explains my methodology. I share my selection of data sources, collection
and analytical methods for four categories of legal norms. I am committed to a pluralist
epistemology where voices of trans racialized youth are heard. This is because a focus solely on
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jurisprudence or statutes as sources, paints a picture of the lives of white mostly straight, adult,
educated professional trans people, and tells us nothing about the law’s effects on marginalized
groups like trans racialized minors or youth who rarely litigate. In Chapter 4 I examine the
attitudes of judges and decision makers towards autonomy in health care for trans minors and
youth through their interpretation of common law and the HCCA. I also analyse authoritative
diagnostic and clinical texts that determine who gets to be trans and assign the gatekeeping role
for trans care to mental health professionals instead of primary care providers. In Chapter 5 I
share the findings from my qualitative research with trans racialized youth between the ages of
18-25 years. Trans racialized youth have their own responses and strategies for navigating health
care in Ontario, some of which could be protective reactions and some that could enable
autonomous supported decision making. Chapter 6 contains my conclusions and policy
recommendations for future change.
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Chapter 2: Theory Frameworks and Analytical Tools

In this research project I rely upon theories that grapple with identity formation, visual
expression and social locations that are relative, temporal and contextual. This chapter also
investigates the concepts of selfhood, autonomy and agency that are central to my project, as
they have been developed by selective writers in the fields of philosophy, feminist legal theory,
social theory, anthropology and applied ethics. First, I begin with a brief discussion of
intersectionality theory as an approach to coalesce trans racialized youth’s multiple identities,
experiences and responses to health care inequities. I then connect intersectionality to the related
theory of structural vulnerability as a way to understand how institutions and systems relegate
trans racialized youth to subordinate positions. In the second section, I lay out the conceptual
groundwork for my argument about how to understand the decision-making experiences of trans
racialized youth by contrasting the ideas of autonomy and agency. I specifically focus on a
relational theory of autonomy. I consider how scholarship on relational autonomy accounts for
selfhood, collective identity, race/ethnicity and gender that are situated in sociopolitical
dynamics and also embodied. In the third section, I lay out Muñoz’s disidentification, a theory
for the artistic practices, products and interpretations by marginalized queers in response to lack
of cultural representation or misrepresentation.133 Disidentification will be used to analyze the
photographic essays created by trans racialized youth in Chapter 5. Lastly, in the fourth section I
describe Transgender Theory, developed by Nagoshi and Brzuzy in 2010.134 This theory builds
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on and challenges feminist and queer theories of gender, integrating as key features:
embodiment, socially-constructed gender, essentialism, and intersectional political solidarity. I
use this gender theory to guide my qualitative research methods as required by Singh in her
checklist for researchers which I explain in detail in Chapter 3.

Intersectionality

Patricia Collins, articulated the concept of intersectionality to mean “particular forms of
intersecting oppressions, for example, intersections of race and gender, or of sexuality and
nation”.135 An intersectional framework can result in a more accurate analysis of how social
factors determine health136 because it accounts for simultaneous as well as interacting
experiences of oppression.137 Using an intersectional approach means that experiences linked to
social identities can be understood as more than simply cumulative experiences.138 While an
“add-on” view of multiple oppressions assumes that people with multiple marginalized group
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identities experience oppression as a sum of the distinct discriminatory experiences,
intersectionality theory instead says that they experience oppression uniquely.139
Intersectionality as a hermeneutic has implications for methodology. As a theoretical
framework it can lift methodology out of the pitfalls of victimhood and oversimplified identity
politics.140 For example, rather than only comparing experiences of oppression or discrimination,
intersectionality requires the consideration of privilege and fortunate circumstances.141
Furthermore, intersectionality recognizes the qualitative differences between identities.142 To
illustrate, a person can become disabled by an accident or by aging, similarly a person’s class
might change through professional mobility, whereas their race and ethnicity will not change.
Intersectional research design then must attend to the fact that participants may not be able to tell
which of their characteristics is driving discrimination.143 Results of a national U.S. survey on
transphobia showed that white trans people experienced higher rates of transphobia than black
trans people in some healthcare contexts.144 The Trans Legal Needs survey is a local example of
this phenomenon, where trans participants of colour expressed difficulty in separating out racism
and transphobia when answering questions about experiences of transphobic discrimination.145
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Although it is not practical or possible to consider an exhaustive list of intersecting identities, if
research questions are designed and disseminated inclusively enough, all identity dimensions can
be accessed, acknowledged and analyzed throughout the project.146
Lastly, intersectionality is aware of the nuanced and shifting multiple identities of people,
which is critical for working with trans racialized youth who might transition more than once and
in more than one context (medical, social, legal).147 In conclusion, the theory of intersectionality
captures how all of the dimensions of one’s identity shape one’s understanding and experience of
a situation and affect the nature of the decisions and actions that follow. The conditions for
autonomous behaviour are deeply connected to our multi-dimensional identities. We will see
next how institutional, interpersonal and discursive structures produce vulnerability for trans
racialized youth that affect their practice of autonomy.

Structural Vulnerability

Structural vulnerability is a concept derived from Galtung’s theory of “structural violence”. 148
It describes a subordinated position in a hierarchical society caused by being a member of more
than one oppressed group, where multiple networks of power permeate social, personal,
environmental, and legal realms causing stress and shortening one’s lifespan.149 According to
medical anthropologists Quesada et al., cultural and social sources of stress include “(1) social
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hierarchies scaffolded by categories bestowing entitlement; (2) historically distinctive discourses
of normativity and ethics; and (3) the intersection of individual medical pathology and biography
with social exclusion.150 I will relate each of Quesada’s points to the structural vulnerability of
trans racialized youth. Firstly, categories like gender/sex, and race exist in law and medicine and
buttress sociopolitical hierarchies of capitalism, ableism and patriarchy by determining access to
housing, education, and health care. Secondly, professional norms for dealing with trans
racialized youth build on epistemologies of transsexuality and transness established discursively
over centuries through medicine and law. Thirdly, Quesada et al. also include as structural
vulnerabilities, the way a person’s individual appearance, affect, voice, medical conditions and
cognitive abilities are “read”, i.e. by professionals within institutions and public spaces.151 This
iterative and socially constructed element of an identity is extremely relevant for trans racialized
youth as they move through the world, being assessed by cisgender health care providers who
ultimately decide whether they can access the treatments they want. How the act of “reading”152
or ascribing race/ethnicity and gender categories to others can contribute to social exclusion and
divided selfhood, is explored in greater detail in the following section on relational selfhood.
Incorporating intersectionality theory, Quesada et al. explain that “Experiences of
vulnerability, however, are only partially shared across populations because they are shaped
unevenly by specific status attributes (i.e., gender, age, ethnicity, etc.), conditions (i.e., legal
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status, economic and living conditions, etc.), and individual serendipity.”153 For example, some
Black or Indigenous people may have grown up in foster care, and experienced different types of
violence or racism than counterparts who grew up with their families of origin. On the other
hand, someone who develops secondary sex characteristics that are closer to the gender
presentation they desire will have less trouble being “read” by others as the gender they feel. A
critical part of the intersectional approach is recognizing the heterogeneity of individual
biographies of social exclusion and vulnerability within identity groups.
Oppression is often internalized by multiply and historically oppressed people over
generations.154 For example, they may understand themselves, or in other words, form their
subjectivity, in relation to oppressive discourses that valorize productivity, heterosexuality,
ability and whiteness. Their own narratives may reflect a sense of deficit or failure. And as a
result, structurally vulnerable people often behave as though they deserve the ill health they
experience especially where the discourse of neoliberalism has told members of society that they
are responsible for all of their outcomes and that poverty or ill health is a result of their own
deficiencies as entrepreneurs.155 Structural vulnerability then, situates the pressures felt by
people addressing health and health care that may influence their choices. Understanding their
health care decision making process requires us to deconstruct the notions of choice and
voluntariness that are central to the now legislated practice of informed consent. To do this, in
the next section I will first unpack the concept of “autonomy” or self-governance through the
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lens of relational theory. I will then apply it to the health care context where autonomy is
presented by Ontario’s legislators and health care professionals as an animating principle.

Accounting for Autonomy

The principle of autonomy continues to infuse the field of bioethics currently affirmed by
Canadian statutes, jurisprudence and scholarship. Still, traditional theories of personal and
political autonomy have been widely criticized by feminists resulting in the reshaping of
autonomy by some who wish to retain it as a value.156 I map the development of a relational
theory of autonomy arising from specific conceptions of the self, the collective and augment
academic feminist relational theory with grounded theory by women of colour scholar activists
from reproductive justice movements. This discussion includes a consideration of the
relationship between reproductive autonomy and broader notions of autonomy for health care
decision making, as well as Black women’s and women of colour’s critiques of reproductive
autonomy in favour of reproductive justice. I use the reproductive justice movement as an
example to demonstrate that in order to achieve autonomy producing conditions for structurally
vulnerable people, we have to place equity and justice at the centre of autonomy struggles. In this
way I consider autonomy as a practice that is socially and politically enabled, not a final
destination for those with privilege.
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Traditional versions of autonomy are synonymous with either self-governance or liberty.157
Roberts ascribes the subsequent North American libertarian reorientation of autonomy to
Immanuel Kant’s moral philosophy.158 For Kant, rational independent agents still only follow
laws they have created themselves or that they judge to be acceptable, but preventing state
intervention is the central theme.159 Liberty as a value and a practice did not guarantee equality
for racialized and enslaved peoples. In this framework, rights act as negative liberty, in other
words, freedom from undue democratic state limitations on their actions or property. The
essential feature of personhood, in Kantian reasoning, was to be a rational, independent
individual. In fact, if libertarian autonomy was elevated as an ideal, it served to valorize the
choices of the most privileged who were white men with private property who constituted the
government.160
I will be examining a different conceptualization of autonomy derived from relational theory.
The liberal atomistic person, in theory, derives their sense of self purely from their individual
experiences and interests and ignorant to benefits or liabilities caused by their membership in
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social groups.161 The starting point for relational theory, on the other hand, is that humans are
constituted by their relationships. This includes relationships to oneself, and to family, friends,
society, institutions and nation. Relationships may foster or undermine autonomy. Because of its
implications for rights and justice, I use relational theory as a lens through which to argue that
gaps in the Health Care Consent Act and related policies block the formation and growth of
relationships of autonomy for trans racialized youth. Nedelsky, who theorized a relational
version of autonomy and later popularized the concept of rights as relationships, considers what
positive rights would mean for autonomy.162 Positive rights require governments and private
actors to do more than protect people from one another.163 For example if positive rights included
the right to housing or the right to live in one’s felt gender, governments would need to support
conditions that actualized those rights. This would require nourishing relations conducive to
practices of autonomy. To determine what those conditions are, let’s look at what Nedelsky
considers the ingredients for autonomy: self-determination, peace, security from oppression and
power, confidence, dignity, efficacy, and respect.164 It is easy to see how structurally vulnerable
people would struggle to practice autonomy given that they experience daily attacks on their
peace, security and confidence to say the least. The next section will focus on the formation of
selfhood as a critical ingredient of autonomy.

The Relational Self
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To govern oneself, one must be in a position to act competently in congruence with values,
desires, goals and interests that are one’s own.165 Therefore an awareness of one’s self is crucial
to the exercise of autonomy.166 A relational view of autonomy sees a person define their selfhood
partly through the relationships they have with family members, professionals, institutions,
cultural and political collectives and even non-human beings and also through their own internal
essence.167 Relationships that foster autonomy require equity, information exchange and personal
growth. And yet, many of our relationships are embedded in the systems of oppression that make
us structurally vulnerable. Therefore, relationships can also impede autonomy.
Selfhood also means being in touch with other building blocks of the self, such as by
developing an awareness of one’s cultural history, and group cultural practices. These augment
and sometimes conflict with one’s own individual values, needs, interests and goals.168 Yet
another way that the self is constituted is through social interactions where central traits such as
gender and race which, as Oshana argues, are mostly socially ascribed to us by others.169 Simply
put, we are “read” by other people and this is how we are racialized or gendered. Oshana
describes being alienated from a Blackness that is ascribed to her by others, and connects the
experience to her biracial self-conception and her professional identity as an academic.170
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Primarily, she argues that anti-Black racism has limited her autonomy.171 And Serano speaks of
her interrupted experiences of gender coherence and never taking her feminine gender for
granted as a result of dysphoria and transphobia.172 With intersectional identities in mind,
selfhood then, according to Oshana and Serano can be experienced as fragmented over race and
gender respectively with impacts on autonomy. How trans racialized youth manage fragmented
or cohesive selfhood in the context of health care is central to my analysis in Chapter 5.
While Shotwell and Sangrey agree that the self is neither purely socially constructed nor
emerging from a purely internal source, they go further.173 They theorize that while one’s self is
impacted by other people’s ascriptions, similarly other people’s selfhoods are impacted by our
expressions of ourselves.174 In other words, blackness shapes whiteness, and transness shapes
cisgenderness. Selfhood can also then be understood as fluid and a process of self-awareness,
rather than as a static state.175 Indeed the iterative dynamic between one’s self-conception (how
one sees oneself) and how one is “read” or “labelled” is significant for the analysis of autonomy
practices for structurally vulnerable trans racialized youth that I undertake in Chapter 5.

The Relationship between Oppression and Autonomy in Health Care
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Relational autonomy requires certain conditions to flourish: freedom from coercion, distance
from social expectations, and knowledge of self. How then does oppression176 impact one’s
sense of self, the selfhood that is so central to the exercise of autonomy? Choices and actions do
not exist in vacuums where judgments can be made through a Rawlsian ‘veil of ignorance’.177
This is because, as Serano and Nedelsky argue, people are situated in complex lived and
embodied contexts.178 Without the conditions that enable one to pull away from normative roles
and actions, it is challenging to make decisions that reflect one’s needs, wishes and desires.179 As
I described earlier in this chapter, structural vulnerability leads to an erosion of confidence in self
or self-trust which further undermines one's own autonomy.180 Sherwin insists that, “In both
health care and ethics the details of oppression must be prominently addressed.”181 This
statement is apt considering uneven power dynamics exist between health care providers and
patients, manifested through bureaucratic policies, specialized education, language, income,
social location and confidence.182 The earlier discussion of structural vulnerability illustrated
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how oppression determines one’s experience of health, through access to services, information
and treatment options.183 Multiply marginalized people often make choices that seem best given
the circumstances but in the long-run only seem to comply with oppressive policies or leave
oppressive systems in place.184
To explain why structurally vulnerable people make contradictory choices against their own
long-term interests or personal values, feminist theory has provided a helpful distinction between
agency and autonomy.185 At a basic level, autonomy has been described as making choices that
reflect your values and personal and collective interests.186 Whereas to exercise agency one need
only receive adequate information, exercise reasonable choice without direct pressure. This lines
up with bioethics requirements for informed consent, a discourse that equates agency (voluntary
choice) with autonomy (self-governance).187 In terms of agency, structural vulnerability factors
create parameters for the choices people are aware of, feel they deserve and ultimately make,
even as those choices are often judged by health care practitioners, social workers and academic
feminists to be faulty.188 Relational autonomy as I have explained it goes far beyond the
voluntary choice to consent or refuse treatment suggested by one’s doctor. Therefore, as I explain
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in more detail in Chapter 4, several feminist theorists argue that accepted bioethics procedures
and policies of informed consent actually describe agency not autonomy.189

From Autonomy to Justice
Autonomy has been one of the most influential concepts for feminist legal theorists and
feminist philosophers because of its implications for holistic health, personal wellness and
collective struggles for equity.190 In autonomy scholarship, we see the tension between the
individual and the collective.191 Social and political collectives can function as both nourishing
and threatening to one’s autonomy.192 If there is minimal autonomy where there are unjust social
conditions,193 Robert’s argument that autonomy must be achieved through justice, requiring
collective efforts to win rights protection or compel government action seems apt. Indeed,
Indigenous, Black and women of colour activists have written, agitated and organized
extensively in order to create the conditions for their own autonomy notably in the area of
reproduction.194 As Roberts emphasized, “the ‘choice’ rhetoric of the movement is problematic
because it is based on a set of assumptions that applies only to a small group of women who are
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privileged enough to have multiple choices.”195 The intersectional nature of BIPOC women’s
struggles for reproductive autonomy compelled the creation of an alternative theory and
movement that could simultaneously account for the differences made by racism, classism,
homophobia, and ableism.
Similarly, the constitutive and iterative relation between the self and others with respect to
gender, has been used by some legal feminists to support the need for gender affirming surgeries
for trans people who desire body modification for internal and external gender congruence.196
Shotwell and Sangrey dispute the idea that trans people are the only ones who have a gender
identity, and argue that both cis and trans people interact with each other’s gendered selfformation.197 Shotwell and Sangrey stress the point that the current research focus on the gender
identities of trans people flatten trans people’s experiences into a single dimension. Furthermore,
the mainstream trans movement’s single-issue quest for individual rights to gender identity and
gender expression rely on the libertarian atomistic view of autonomy.198 This individualism is
not the fault of individual trans people. Indeed, structurally vulnerable transsexuals are forced to
engage with medicine and its coercive pathology to achieve gender affirmation. Furthermore, as
we saw in the previous chapter, legal avenues for trans people to obtain identity documents,
marital benefits, parental rights and so on all force them to squeeze into individualistic rightsbased frameworks. However, I argue a relational theory of self, embedded in a relational
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understanding of autonomy would instead lead to a relational theory of rights. According to
Nedelsky, rights recognize and define relationships that foster certain values beyond democracy
and beyond autonomy. In Chapter 4 we return to rights as relationships as a useful concept for
health care autonomy for trans racialized youth.
There are ways to resist the impact of oppression on one’s health, and to minimize its
influence. Indeed, several feminists have framed autonomy as a set of skills to be practiced in
enabling circumstances and within supportive relationships.199 BIPOC trans health activists have
benefitted from the lessons shared by BIPOC feminist activists in the arena of reproductive
justice. The critical parallel lesson is that autonomy will not flourish without equitable living
conditions, and those conditions are partly achieved through collective struggle for justice. Now
returning to the question of how queer and trans people of colour navigate between autonomy
and agency through self-awareness practices and performance that critique culture, I will look at
the theory of disidentification.

Disidentification Theory

I use disidentification theory as a tool to analyse the meaning of the photographic essays
produced by youth in my focus groups. I needed an appropriate analytical tool for visual data
sources created by multiply marginalized youth whose autonomy is situated in a structurally
vulnerable position vis à vis society. As Lowe says, “Aesthetic representation is always…a
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debate about political representation.”200 In Disidentification, performance studies scholar José
Esteban Muñoz presented: a strategy, a hermeneutic and a cultural product acted out by queer
people of colour in public.201 Identification is a way of relating to one’s social and political
environments.202 To disidentify is not just to simply counter identify which is to see oneself as
the opposite or to totally reject available identity labels. To disidentify is to manipulate and
evoke themes without announcing oneself or one’s representation in the dominant culture’s
images and narratives.203 One example is flagging, whereby one dons a suit but has an undercut
hairstyle to mark one’s queerness. Muñoz defines disidentification as “descriptive of the survival
strategies the minority subject practices in order to negotiate a phobic majoritarian public sphere
that continuously elides or punishes the existence of subjects who do not conform to the
phantasm of normative citizenship.”204 Muñoz argues that queer people of colour are
marginalized and culturally invisible. This experience of invisibility and/or negative
representation increases the importance and the burden of visual representation.205 Margo
Machida says this about the importance of visual art by immigrant people of colour in the West,
“The symbolic assertion of presence through strategic acts of visual representations...provide a
previously neglected people with a powerful claim to place in a society where their images are
not the norm.”206 Therefore as performers, trans racialized youth disidentify in order to
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“[scramble] and [reconstruct] the encoded message of a cultural text in a fashion that both
exposes the encoded message’s universalizing and exclusionary machinations and recircuits its
workings to account for, include, and empower minority identities and identifications.”207
In addition to being a hermeneutic strategy, Muñoz also describes disidentification as a
process of cultural production.208 He sees disidentifying cultural production occurring between
the reception of dominant cultural codes and the opposition to them.209 Muñoz is careful to
acknowledge that as a counter-hegemonic strategy, disidentification is imperfect because of its
indirectness and ambivalence towards oppressive and dominant structures.210 Part of why
disidentification is so accurate as a theory however, is because it can hold the tension between
being inextricably part of late-stage capitalist society and resisting being defined by those who
hold power in our society.211 Judith Butler described agency as making voluntary decisions based
on circumstances even where they are embedded in subordination. Butler writes, “Where
conditions of subordination make possible the assumption of power, the power assumed remains
tied to those conditions but in an ambivalent way.” 212
Trans racialized youth can be and may have to be ambivalent about using pathologizing
diagnostic terms in institutional settings. They may have to be ambivalent about norms to take up
or discard in order to obtain gender and life supportive services. There are downsides to this.
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Once you identify with something you lose other possibilities in an attempt for stability. This is
what Butler calls the “cost of identification”.213 Butler in her theorizing of drag queen culture
also suggests that drag queens engage with unstable axes of power214 in terms of gender and
sexuality. Butler observes that drag queens perform tropes of femininity and oppression to mean
something different from white straight able-bodied cis femininity – something that might be
subversive. I would also add that drag interprets race, class and many other identities. For
example, the Toronto queer drag performer Patrick Salvani uses the horror genre to create antiracist revenge performances out of the histories and experiences of Filipinx people in the
caregiver role who flip the script on their sponsors in kitchen and cooking based scenarios about
servitude gone amok.215 This notion of ambivalence – which I use to describe the act of adopting
or amplifying stereotypes in an attempt to challenge dominant ideologies about race, gender and
sexuality from within dominant culture – is a core element of disidentification. Disidentification
is necessary for survival and it offers critiques, just not in predictable forms.216
The significance I take from Muñoz’s theory in application to my participants’ works is their
potential to re-make “real” worlds using their own values and references. The practice of
worldmaking establishes critiques and even suggests futures for “minoritarian” youth. As Muñoz
puts it, “Worldmaking produces creative perspectives by slicing into the facade of the ‘real’ that
is the majoritarian public sphere.”217 The components of the majority public sphere become the
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source materials for queer world reconstruction. So, while the state through its actors must
perform state power, marginalized or minoritarian artists build power through performance.
Muñoz emphasizes the doing as the important part of the disidentification method, not so much
the being or knowing.218 One example of doing disidentification is the youth of colour drag
performance culture in Toronto centered around the annual Asian Arts Freedom School Drag
Musical. The Drag Musical uses drag as a vehicle for intersectional critique by queer and trans
racialized youth of mainstream gay normativity through comedy and musicality.219 The Drag
Musical performers take on very familiar pop culture themes like “Christmas Holidays”,
“Requiem for a Dream” and “Eat Pray Love” and turn them into comedic and nuanced
commentary on modern life.220
Another way of attacking the “real” comes through Muñoz’s concept of “tactical
misrecognition”.221 Misrecognition entails, strategically, and often humorously, taking a position
as one's own and that one is not seen to own.222 This concept is related to the key disidentifying
act of connoting identity rather than demonstrating it through recognizable symbols. Those who
disidentify eschew familiar and acceptable forms of racial, ethnic, and gender representation.
They also avoid the familiar economy of resistance through positive or sanctioned multicultural
representations of their race or gender.223 They negotiate something else. Here is where
intersectionality is so key for queer people of colour and for trans people of colour as well: since
they exist in multiple identity positions, they focus on related differences within identities not
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just difference between identities. To return to tactical misrecognition, you might refuse to see
yourself in something coded as emblematic of your identity box, or you might insist on reading
yourself into materials not meant for your subject position. The works of the Femme Fatales
Burlesque Company offer several local examples of disidentification and tactical misrecognition.
The Company produces several themed shows each year featuring primarily racialized and Black
performers of a variety of body types, abilities, sexual orientations and genders.224 In a trilogy
titled Triple Goddess, “Virgin, Mother, Crone” performers complicated and disrupted these
universal female life stages. Furthermore, the poster cover girl for the Virgin show featured a
dark-skinned Black woman with floral attire and an innocent look. This is a role that dark Black
women are not typically allowed to perform. The cover girl was neither sexualized, lightened nor
mainstreamed. For the Crone section of the trilogy, Femme Fatales performer Betsy Spoon,
appears completely naked with rolling carry-on suitcase filled with Dollar Store plastic bags lipsynching to the song Bag Lady, as she returned to herself by giving away her baggage. A third
example appears in the poster for the Church-themed show where the concept of worship was
twisted by cover girl Axl Blows pictured as a stripper against a stripper pole as an icon of
holiness. Overall, I apply disidentification theory to trans racialized youth participants’
expressions to understand how they foster autonomy skills and deploy agency in the context of
their health. Next, we look at how intersectional identities, individual lived experience, collective
resistance and embodied gender all intertwine in transgender theory, the theoretical gender
foundation for this thesis.

224

Phone Conversation with Dainty Smith of Femme Fatales, March 9 th, 2018.

52

Transgender Theory

Over three decades of academic and non-academic theorizing about the nature of gender,
sexuality, sexual orientation and race have resulted in much polarizing debate.225 Despite the
difficulty of committing to a position, for a research project about trans racialized youth, I
needed a gender theory nuanced and robust enough to hold life experiences, embodiment,
intersectional identities and collective political associations. Furthermore, my methodology
explained in detail in Chapter 3, required that I integrate a theory of gender into my qualitative
methods. Ultimately, I chose transgender theory, developed by social work graduate students, to
use as a pluralist container for my research. To set the context for transgender theory, I briefly
summarize previous debates on the nature of gender from feminist and queer theory.
Through the 1970s and 1980s Western essentialist theories of gender locked our gender
identities and expressions onto our biological selves.226 Genital anatomy at birth defined one’s
sex with gender following from the natal sexed body.227 Only two oppositely sexed bodies were
accepted as normal.228 For some time science affirmed this view calling it “sexual

Emi Koyama, “Whose Feminism is it Anyway? The Unspoken Racism of the Trans Inclusion Debate” in Susan
Stryker & Stephen Whittle, eds, Mutilating Gender (New York: Routledge, 2006) at 704; Pyne 2016, supra note 47;
Talia Mae Bettcher, “Trapped in the Wrong Theory: Rethinking Trans Oppression and Resistance” (2014) 39:2
Signs 383.
226
Mary Daly, Gyn/ecology: the metaethics of radical feminism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1978); Janice G Raymond,
The transsexual empire: the making of the she-male (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979); Julia Kristeva, The Kristeva
reader, Toril Moi, ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986); Germaine Greer, The whole woman (New York, NY:
Doubleday, 1999); For critiques of gender essentialism see Bernice Louise Hausman, Changing sex: transsexualism,
technology, and the idea of gender (Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 1995).
227
J. Green, 2004 Becoming a Visible Man. In Chapter 4 I connect this belief to the legal category of gender/sex
using Sharpe’s term “the (bio)logic” in Sharpe 2002 supra note 51.
228
Harold Garfinkel, Studies in ethnomethodology. -- (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall, 1967).
225

53

dimorphism”.229 This meant that if a baby was born intersexed then its body was surgically
“converted” to anatomically match one of the binary sexes. Some feminists agreed with this
binary biology because it allowed them to claim that cissexual women possessed unique powers
and qualities.230 Masculinity was associated with the autonomy-enhancing behaviors of men and
femininity was either romanticized or denigrated. Through the 90s feminist and queer theorists
challenged the essentialism231 of sex determining gender, and gender as a a stable ideology and
an epistemology232 that predicted everything about one’s life.233 Instead of being “natural”,
gender could be theorized as socially constructed. If gender was socially constructed and a
product of hegemonic discourses, then it could be deconstructed and disembodied. In academic
feminist critiques of biological essentialism, heterosexuality and reproductive roles were
challenged, yet the universal category of “woman” was tacitly understood to be cisgendered,
able-bodied and white and often middle class. Anti-racist women of colour feminists and lesbian
feminists critiqued this universalized “woman”.234 Another strand of feminism also deployed
biological determinism to reject gender identity and in effect reject or block transsexual women
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and non-binary people from women’s spaces and women’s movements, while still attempting to
resist their version of an oppressive patriarchal construction of gender.235
Nagoshi and Brzuzy’s Transgender theory considers that some feminists and queer theorists
separated gender from sex while many trans people experience the two as a whole.236
Transfeminist Kate Bornstein argued that sex was made up of more than genital and reproductive
factors and preferred to refer to “sex” instead as “biological gender”.237 Nagoshi and Brzuzy also
attend to the problems with disembodying gender. For example, if gender is merely a series of
performative gestures and social artifice238, then the transsexual need to modify one’s body to
match one’s internal sense of gender can be framed as wallowing in old fashioned biological
determinism. This tendency to elide the specific medical needs of transsexuals and portray them
as backwards or unfeminist has been heightened in queer and transgender theorizing.239 In their
Transgender Theory, Nagoshi and Brzuzy however incorporate a sense of gender that is indeed
felt and lived through the body.240
While one of the hallmarks of the poststructuralist brand of queer theory is fluidity of
categories and the absence of a true self, this has been critiqued by trans and queer scholars of
colour as a privileged position and a dangerous analytical method.241 If there is no central self
how do we understand the uniqueness of individual lived experience? On the other hand, there
are difficult implications of deconstructing all social identities, for collective social movements
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and also for the formation of a cohesive sense of self for oppressed people. Identity can be the
foundation for self-empowerment that can propel anti-oppression movements.242 Single identity
movements are indeed problematic and therefore an intersectional theory of transgenderism is
necessary to recognize the leadership of racialized trans people and trans people who embody
more than just transness.243
Nagoshi and Brzuzy’s Transgender theory maintains a place for gender fluidity, non-binary
identities and positions of masculinity and femininity. They orient themselves to incorporate the
body as a social actor not just a container, the self and societal norms as shaping gender
identity.244 They refine feminist relational theory where embodiment is considered a crucial part
of self-awareness to express a dynamism between the self, the body and its lived experiences
within its social environment including social norms and material conditions.245 Nagoshi and
Brzuzy would consider this dynamism the basis for the autonomous self existing in relation to
these sources.246 Intersectionality energizes this theory of gender because of its insistence on
what we experience through our bodies and how we identify or disidentify with social
constructions of our identities. Namaste, for example, asks for scholars to consider how
narratives of criminalization, sex work and labour are told through the bodies of transsexual
women in Quebec.247 Salah emphasizes Namaste’s critique of the use of “citizenship” and
“personhood” in Salah’s comparison of Butler and Namaste.248 Namaste is clear that use of such
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terms to ground trans “liberation” entrenches trans struggles in imperialist and capitalist modes
of production and understanding. Similarly Nael Bhanji critiques the frequent use of the symbols
of “home” and “border crossing” within transsexual narratives asking what transsexual citizen
gets to speak for transsexual subjectivity in finding “home”.249 Bhanji points to the racism and
colonialism implicit in the transsexual search for home which cannot be accessed by racialized
and/or trans immigrants or refugees who are part of a diaspora250 or I would add, a dislocated
Indigenous person. Instead, in creating transsexual and transgender narratives he asks for a
greater attempt to disidentify with “home” as a metaphor for the body, and “journey” as a
metaphor for transitioning. These are but a few of the trans of colour critiques of academic trans
studies, feminist and queer theory and mainstream trans writings building on the discussion in
Chapter 1.

Conclusion

This chapter provided the conceptual groundwork for the analysis of pluralist sources of law
and original data from trans racialized youth in the following chapters. I described the theoretical
concepts of intersectionality, structural vulnerability, relational autonomy, and the analytical
tools of disidentification and transgender theory. I developed my own list of autonomy–
enhancing factors to apply to my analysis in Chapters 4 and 5. The factors are: information
sharing, access to justice, transparency of power in relationships, personal responsibility, selfawareness, and interdependence.
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These containers and tools allow us to better understand the ways in which the experiences of
trans racialized youth and their visual stories engage with the hegemonic narratives about health,
race, gender, body and self that are embedded in legal and medical culture and discourses
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Chapter 3: Methods & Methodology

Throughout my preliminary community consultations and literature review, I developed and
refined my choice of data sources and collection and analysis methods. I decided to use
traditional primary legal sources including legislation, Hansard debates, policy documents and
jurisprudence, with academic literature as a secondary source. I knew I had to get at trans
racialized youth’s experiences of health care decision making and use inductive reasoning to
draw conclusions. Therefore, I decided on a focus group Photovoice method to learn from group
discussions and obtain visual data.251
In Part I of this chapter I explain the methods of analysis I used on the legal source documents
I collected, based on a blended internal and external method articulated by Schwartz.252 In Part
II, I describe and problematize my two participatory qualitative fieldwork methods: feminist
participatory research (FPR) and visual arts-based methods, specifically Photovoice. I consider
the ethical considerations arising from using photography-based methods with a structurally
vulnerable population by applying relational and situated visual ethics. I describe why I chose
thematic network analysis as a focus group data analysis method and conclude with observations.
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Guiding Concepts

Underpinning my inquiry into the decision-making autonomy of trans racialized youth are
two concepts: legal pluralism and “laws as tactics”. Below, I describe how these two concepts
shape my legal research before turning to my analytical method.253

Critical Legal Pluralism

Contemporary legal pluralism explains law as a phenomenon fed by many sources beyond the
formal and experienced in different ways beyond statutes and courtrooms.254 I hoped to capture
how trans racialized youth experience decision-making in health consent law and I hypothesized
that as a group they are legally constructed through the regulation of gender, age and race. I saw
this regulation occurring in several places: the clinic, the emergency room, the courtroom, in the
Legislative Assembly and in community spaces. Applying a legal pluralistic approach to my
research question allowed me to mine four different categories of information for legal rules and
norms.255

Laws as Tactics
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Singh’s FPAR checklist for researchers (Fig. 1) asks us to clearly articulate a theory of gender
and show how it impacts our methodology. Spade’s notion of “Laws as Tactics” helped me
connect my gender theory to my method of legal analysis.256 Spade draws from Foucault and
Butler to push scholarship on gender’s interaction with the law into the consequences of
discursive subjectivity formation through the multiple elements that make up “the law”.257 Spade
references Foucault’s writings on the disciplinary and norm-producing function of law and
Butler’s writings on the performative nature of gender and its social construction, as discussed in
Chapter 2258 describing laws as tactics deployed to achieve the state’s population level aims.259
In a pluralist fashion, Spade also decentralizes “the law” noting the spread of law’s action
beyond what statutes say and into what elements of the law do, in the pluralist sense, to trans
people.260 As I demonstrated in Chapter 1, certain subjectivities benefit from norms produced by
law and medicine, and others are punished when laws tactically refuse to recognize them.261
Through “laws as tactics” Spade considers how trans people interpret laws locally to achieve
their desired ends and also to resist gender essentialism and the imposition of the gender
binary.262 I borrow from Spade’s approach to draw out the disciplinary functions of my four
sources.
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As theoretical tools used in tandem, critical legal pluralism and laws as tactics helped me
select and analyse my sources. These concepts took me to an inquiry of not just how laws and
subjects interact but how subjects might interpret, deploy and/or resist legal norms.

Part I Legal Sources and Methods

I selected four types of legal knowledge to answer my research question: how do trans
racialized youth experience autonomous and or agentic decision making in health care. Statutory
law is the first type of legal knowledge. As I demonstrated in the first two chapters, statutory
law currently defines sex as a legal category and confines the subjectivity of trans people
administratively limiting their life outcomes. I probe deeper into formal law by reading
legislators’ intentions and opinions about my chosen statues in Hansard debates of my selected
statutes concerning decision making in health, age and gender identity. Decisions of courts and
tribunals constituted the second form of knowledge. However, trans racialized youth are nonexistent in reported court decisions. Trans youth are the subjects of a small number of family law
cases and administrative tribunal decisions. In contrast, the case law on mature minors and health
care decision-making is rich. Between the two bodies of jurisprudence I can demonstrate the
opinions of judges and decision makers regarding gender identity, biology, legal capacity and
age-based decision-making autonomy. The third form of legal knowledge is health care
providers’ normative clinical and diagnostic practices, accessed through their authoritative texts.
Fourthly, the way that health care providers apply the common law and statutes is accessed from
published studies of health care providers and from the experiences of focus group participants.
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Kleinhan and MacDonald’s critical legal pluralism supported my choice to seek out the daily
experiences of trans racialized youth as law-creators who hold law within themselves.263
Through a Photovoice project, Trans racialized youth produced visual and textual narratives that
gave me an idea of what local law and autonomy/agency practices were, even if practices
differed from what the statute prescribed.264 This phenomenology of trans racialized youth
autonomy is shared in Chapter 5 through my fieldwork findings and analysis.

Internal and External Analytical Method

Webber notes two tendencies in legal pluralism, namely: deference to law in its social context
and the production of norms through the active choice of legal outcomes from a selection of
options.265 These tendencies will support my application of Schwartz’s interpretive methods, to
my analysis of law and policy impacting the autonomy of trans racialized youth in health care.
Unlike the internal analytical method, which seeks the intrinsic cumulative principles or logic
of law, external forms of legal analysis seek to get at truth and evaluate process. The external
method is not limited by acceptance of classic texts as authoritative sources or by the hegemony
of professional opinions266 and thus the external method can apply knowledge and methods from
other scholarly fields. Like other legal scholars, I use a combination of internal and external
analytical methods, as demonstrated in the four main sources I used.267
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Sources of Legal Norms

Ontario statutes dealing with health care consent were most clearly connected to my research
question. The primary statute for decision-making in health care is the current Health Care
Consent Act 1996 (HCCA).268 For historical background, I considered its antecedent the Consent
to Treatment Act 1992 (CTA), and the now repealed Advocacy Act 1992.269 I read these three
statutes together to see how in the last 25 years legislators dealt with freedoms and protections
for minors and other groups like disabled people who were perceived to be vulnerable in health
care. Regulation 552 of the Health Insurance Act 1990 (detailing provincial health insurance
coverage) was another key source because most youth access health care but especially genderaffirming treatments through OHIP.
A practitioner’s guide was helpful in understanding the practical uses and implications of the
consent, capacity, substitute decision maker and liability provisions.270 I used the Law
Commission of Ontario’s Final Report on Legal Capacity and Decision-making for wider
historical policy development information.271 Hansard debates over amendments to health care
statutes between 1990-1996 covered questions including mature minors and the appropriate age
for consent to treatment and included the deputations of parents, doctors and others. The
Affirming Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Act 2015 (ASOGIA) banned conversion
therapy on minors. Debates during 2015 about the private member’s bill that became ASOGIA
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involved many trans community members, activists and scholars. I also read the provisions of the
Criminal Code that ban medically assisted death for minors. Reading both the debates and the
Statutes helped to illustrate both what evidence had been considered and why the legislature
made certain choices. Tracking the opinions and reasoning of judges with respect to trans
racialized youth proved to be much more elusive.

Jurisprudence
I had hoped to find trans youth litigating their rights to gender-affirming treatments but this
proved very difficult. Where I did find cases, the race/ethnicity of the youths were not mentioned
at all. I also read one custody case from British Columbia involving the treatment of a racialized
non-binary child because I had access to the child’s lawyer who offered further insight into how
legal actors engage with the autonomy of trans minors.

Authoritative Texts
I returned to external methods by considering policy documents that impact the way health
care is delivered, accessed, or denied to trans racialized youth, choosing three policy documents
issued by health care providers and researchers from an international clinical association, a
provincial professional association and a local community health centre. Firstly, in order to
explore what rules the Ontario government requires health care providers to follow if providing
transition-related and gender affirming care to trans youth I examined the most current version of
The Standards of Care issued by the World Professional Association for Transgender Health
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(WPATH SoC).272 The Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care adopted these standards to
regulate the public subsidy of gender-affirming treatments.273 The SoC affirm the psychiatric
diagnostic criteria for gender dysphoria from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual Version V
and so they provided a view into narratives for transness generated by medical and government
institutions relevant to my research question.274 For contrast, I turned to the Sherbourne Health
Centre’s Guidelines and Protocols for Hormone Therapy and Primary Care for Trans Clients
(2015) for contrast with the international clinical standards. The SHC is notable because it is a
family physician and nurse-based health centre with close ties to Toronto’s queer and trans
communities. Some trans racialized youth go to the Sherbourne Health Centre for primary health
care and psychosocial programming. Finally, I read the College of Physicians and Surgeons of
Ontario’s official policy statement on Consent to Treatment updated in 2015.275 The HCCA
leaves several key processes to be determined by regulated health care professionals’ colleges
and this document was intended to fill a statutory gap. I compared this document and the
accompanying frequently asked questions section with opinions about consent practices and
autonomy expressed by the three Ontario doctors I consulted in 2016-2017. Secondary material
by psychiatrists and pediatricians about how to apply the HCCA with youth patients was helpful
in fleshing out the physicians’ identification of challenges and solutions, although none of these
sources dealt specifically with trans youth or racialized youth.276
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Part 2 Qualitative Research

Methodology

Paradigms and Feminist Participatory Research
The feminist participatory research method I employed in the second component of my work
is embedded in a transformative paradigm. Mertens described the transformative paradigm as an
improvement on the emancipatory paradigm because of its emphasis on the leadership of
marginalized research populations rather than their experience as objects emancipated by
researchers.277
FPR developed out of the body of work exists critiquing well-intentioned but damaging
community-academic partnerships. For as Koggel says, there is exploitation implicit in research
and simply focusing on marginalized and oppressed people does not ensure that equity is
achieved.278 To avoid the methodological pitfalls of traditional CBPR, I adapted methods of
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researcher Singh who added a feminist anti-oppression praxis to CBPR methods in her research
with trans youth to conduct feminist participatory action research (FPAR).279 Her use of FPAR
methods has made spaces for trans racialized youth to articulate barriers, agentic strategies and
long-term autonomy producing solutions.280 Singh’s studies rigorously consider the ethical
implications of cis adults researching with trans youth. Mirroring Merten’s move from
“emancipatory” to “transformative” paradigms for research, Singh et al. are skeptical of research
that claims to empower and know trans people.281 Singh insists that FPAR researchers must
examine all of their beliefs, expectations, and desires for their research before deciding on
methods and before undertaking fieldwork. To this end, I completed Singh’s thirteen-point
questionnaire for researchers as I prepared my research design and my ethics documentation.282

Photovoice
Photovoice is a form of participant-employed photography (PEP).283 PEP allows the
participant, along with the researcher, to determine both the subject and meaning of the
photograph, which is important to the power-sharing aspect of FPR.284 Additionally, the
participant’s captioning and explanation of their own photographs can also convey significant
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socio-cultural nuances.285 Wang describes it as a process for participants to identify, represent
and enhance their community through a specific photographic technique.286
Photovoice draws from two theoretical frameworks: 1) the critical popular education of
Freire;287 and 2) the feminist theory that lived experience creates expert knowledge,288 infusing
these theories into a community-based documentary approach to photography.289
In my view, the purpose of my fieldwork was not a concrete social change. I had seen from
the literature and from community consultation that many social action research projects fall
short on their promises of social change.290 Instead I would seek to encourage personal and
collective reflection on autonomy experiences and practices, interpret the resulting
phenomenological data and if possible, share policy recommendations at conferences and with
legal and health care providers in Ontario. In choosing to conduct qualitative research using a
phenomenological approach I was not trying to generalize from my sample to the broader
population.291 Working with 3-6 participants would allow for easier trust building, richer textual
and visual results, and easier data management.292
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The Photovoice focus group method was in keeping with the gender theory I articulated in
Chapter 2 that combined embodiment, social construction, performance and intersectionality; a
theory I contemplated through Singh’s checklist for research methodology.293 Photovoice
methods allow participants to express abstract relational concepts more than interviews, offer
participants time for creative reflection and create the possibility that their images could capture
nuanced experiences, feelings and meanings.294 Still, Singh’s checklist required further
reflection.

Representation, Truth and the Desire for Stories
All colonized and subjugated people who, by way of resistance, create an oppositional
subculture within the framework of domination recognize that the field of representation
(how we see ourselves, how others see us) is a site of ongoing struggle. (bell hooks,
2016, p. 57)

When carefully incorporated into legal research, first person narratives add direct relevance
and encouraged accountability to the group being researched.295 The danger in elevating first
person narratives to the truth comes from some of the power dynamics embedded in the research
method. Influences affecting participant storytelling include: the desire to please those in power,
the confines of discursive spaces for trans people, youth, and BIPOC, and the pressure of the
perceived expectations of researchers.296 I will show in Chapter 5 how trans people could
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become barely recognizable to themselves in their narrative attempts to access treatments and
services and this could also occur in research through participatory visual methods.
One example is found in Charania’s account of listener expectations of “coming out” stories
in anti-homophobia education.297 She describes the pressure to tell a linear coming out narrative
that ended in a “complete” gay subject, without contradictions and unanswered questions.
Charania describes how students required clear indications of “wholeness” and “arrival” in her
stories of becoming as a working-class Muslim.298 In their Photovoice project with queer and
trans youth Holtby et al. describe how queer and trans youth struggle with the complexities of
how they want to be seen as marginalized and historically misrepresented people and their fear
that their experiences would be taken by cisgender viewers as representative of all queer and
trans youth.299
Barriers to self-disclosure can come from within and without LGBTQ communities, for
example biphobia, transphobia and racism were named by Holtby et al.’s participants as
examples of oppressions replicated within LGBTQ communities.300 Wilson and Flicker’s
transactional sex Photovoice and digital storytelling project illustrated how structurally
vulnerable people might recreate stereotypes, or affirm attitudes they think researchers want to
hear, or that they feel are innocuous, while not revealing their true values and behaviours.301 In
their photographs, the young Black women did not self-disclose their own use of transactional
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sex and instead shared negative views of those who did.302 Relatedly, Prins writes about the
resistance to being photographed or even being seen taking photographs by participants from
communities that experience high levels of surveillance, rendering visual disclosure of one and
one’s community unsafe.303
In summary, researchers must realize that taking pictures does not mean that participants are
suddenly ‘‘free’’ to tell the “truth” about themselves. As these research accounts demonstrate,
taking and viewing photographs is situated in the histories and present conditions of local
LGBTQ spaces, research contexts and in unequal age, class, racial, and gender relations. I use
Photovoice to watch and analyze the image making process and to interpret the phenomenology
of the resulting images and discussions about gender, race, age, agency and autonomy in health
care.

Situated Visual Ethics
I applied for and received ethics approval from the York Research and Ethics Board (REB)
for my fieldwork in November 2016.304 I also engaged with relational ethics, based on the
principles of “engaged interaction, mutual respect, embodied knowledge, uncertainty and
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vulnerability, and interdependent environment.”305 Reducing autonomy and choice to an
individual issue of informed consent, as the REB guidelines tend to do, without regard for
context will obscure larger systems of power, privilege, and oppression.306
As a method, Photovoice in focus groups requires attention to ethical concerns due to several
factors: the creation, use and release of visual material in print and digital forms and the
structurally vulnerable intimate and familiar community of my participants.307 In situated visual
ethics (SVE) issues are addressed as they arise in the field. It encourages researchers to rethink
and adjust confidentiality, anonymity expectations, informed consent processes and include SVE
training for the participants and fieldwork team.308 In terms of the release of images made by
marginalized participants, considerations must include: the reluctance to self-disclose; the
appropriation of shared images by researchers or viewers; and misreadings by viewers. These are
risks for marginalized participants vis a vis privileged participants and researchers. Power
dynamics between the research team and the participants and also among participants will have a
significant impact on how and what to share and should be subject to ongoing consent
procedures.309
Conventional understandings of anonymity were challenged as most participants in my study
chose to photograph their faces, body parts and identifying features like canes, body
modifications and shoes. I did not assume that participants would want to hide their identity
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when they might seek to conduct advocacy through the subject matter of their images and by
disseminating the results.310 At the same time, I needed to be aware that participants might
change their minds later and regret revealing such personal details. This tension between
exposure to future harm and paternalism towards stigmatized participants required a discussion
with the participants about the risk of revealing personal information, not a unilateral decision
made by me to prevent them from doing so.311

Reflexivity
Because a relational ethics approach explicitly names power relations and imbalances, I knew
I had to be critically aware of my own power, biases and expectations in the process and attempt
to minimize restrictions or pressures on participants' decision-making autonomy.312 As part of
the imagined audience, the fieldwork team would inevitably influence participants’ actions in
unanticipated ways.313
The York University Human Participants Review Sub-Committee (HPRC) ethics approval
process positioned me as the expert, who would determine what would be ethical and safe for my
participants months in advance of meeting them.314 Specifically, the HPRC ethics protocol form
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asks researchers to commit to recruitment language, risk mitigation, interview questions, and
informed consent language without input from the participants. Yet to apply FPAR tenets to my
research study and using the transformative paradigm, I preferred to act as the facilitator of
ongoing information exchange and reflection.315 In Singh’s checklist for researchers, question #1
asks us to practice humility about one’s knowledge and assumptions, apologize as necessary and
make changes to the study based on this learning. I was not able to make changes to my study
during the field work stage because any changes required approval from the REB and if I had
postponed my focus groups, I would have lost participants.
Singh’s checklist for researchers asked me to describe my own intersecting identities.316 I am
a queer non-youth gender non-conforming cissexual woman of colour with deep roots in the
Toronto queer community. I am able-bodied. I am also a graduate student with a law degree and
therefore have access to much more information about trans health care and rights than my youth
participants did. The checklist also asks about researcher positionality vis a vis transgender
concerns. I have had significant volunteer and professional engagement with queer and trans
youth. My relationship to the youth participants was partly as a stranger researcher, however,
they might have known me through LGBTQ community events. I had to consider that we knew
many of the same people and we would likely continue to cross paths for years to come.
Ultimately, this awareness made me feel accountable to the participants and my co-facilitator. In
terms of my own preconceptions, I realised I might expect youth to have negative experiences
with health care professionals due to my own negative experiences. I also might be expecting

fast enough to address the issues that come up in the field. Susan Boser, “Ethics and Power in Community-Campus
Partnerships for Research.” Action Research 4, no. 1 (March 2006): 9–21.
315
Ponic et al., supra note 312 at 2010.
316
Singh 2013b, supra note 281 at 97 fig 1.

75

trans youth to have unsupportive families. Having identified positional privileges and
preconceived expectations, I could consciously bracket317 these things to help me view the
participants data as fresh and belonging to them.318 Finally, knowledge transfer and access to
research results were key considerations in Singh’s checklist and I am committed to ensuring
participants will have access to the completed thesis and a plain language summary of research
results. Participants have been invited to all conference presentations of this research as copresenters where possible.
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Figure 1. Checklist for participatory action research (PAR) feminist researchers working with
transgender communities from Anneliese Singh
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Methods

Recruitment
I looked for 8-10 participants between the ages of 18 and 25 years old who identified as trans
(transsexual, transgender, gender non-conforming, gender non-binary, gender fluid, genderqueer
and more) at any stage of their social, legal or medical transition and who also identified as
Black, Indigenous and/or people of colour. As 18+ they would not need parental consent but
would be close enough to being minors to be able to remember the experience of navigating
health care systems as minors and compare to their current experiences. The small number of
participants meant that the group would generate comfort and trust faster, and I would be able to
manage analysis of the data set by myself.
In putting together the method and the groups, I approached a number of community partners
for consultation.319 The participants were recruited through those community partners using
purposive snowball sampling methods.320 For example, youth were also solicited by email and
phone by youth workers from within their networks. I was available to present about the research
and focus group at the 2017 Youth Sexual Health Symposium and at other youth groups, so
some youth met me in person before deciding whether to participate.

Planned Parenthood Toronto – Director of Community Programming and Research, Cheryl Dobinson & TEACH
Program Coordinator David Udayasekaren; Supporting our Youth (Sherbourne Community Health Centre) Gender
Journeys Group facilitator Kusha Dadui; LGBT Youthline Outreach Coordinator and Service Coordinator Tamar
Brannigan and Noami Martey; Griffin Centre Executive Director Tai Vo; YMCA Sprott House LGBTQ Shelter
Manager Kate Miller and Case Worker Scout Bay; Gender Clinic at Sick Kids Hospital Drs. Miriam Kaufman and
Joey Bonafacio.
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Kiley May served as focus group co-facilitator and trans community consultant.321 Kiley
handled the photography training section of the focus group. Kiley is a Mohawk trans feminine
photographer and theatre artist. Working with Kiley fulfilled Singh’s recommendations about
how to determine community needs and about working with other people to provide
accountability mechanisms.322 I also thought the youth would feel more comfortable with her as
another trans person, and that they would be motivated to work with her as an artist.

Participants
Eight people agreed to participate in the workshop. Two youth cancelled the night before the
workshop citing work and family commitments, and two youth cancelled the morning of the
workshop giving health reasons. The group expressed a variety of gender identities: trans
feminine, trans, trans masculine and gender fluid. Their ethnic and racial identities were: AfroCaribbean, biracial white Filipino, Chilean, and Pakistani. One person identified as Muslim.
Class backgrounds and income levels varied, with the group including working class, working
poor and middle class. In terms of ability, one youth used a cane and required several
accommodations in the physical space; two youth self-identified as having anxiety. While some
participants were working, others were in non-university-based schooling, and were volunteering
in peer support groups for LGBTQ youth, another youth was running a trans youth of colour
group in the GTA.
Only one participant lived with their biological parents. Others lived with friends or partners.
One youth had experience with the CAMH GIC as a young adult. None of the others had been to
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a GIC. Two youths were on hormone therapies; one could not access them, and another was not
interested in taking hormones.

Focus Group Process
The workshop took place at Springtide Resources, a feminist non-profit organization in
Toronto that provided all-gender bathrooms, a kitchen and a fully wheelchair accessible private
space. I provided the participants with a list of external support resources.323 I provided the
participants with an honorarium, meals, snacks, and TTC tokens/taxi vouchers. All the youth
were given access to digital cameras and memory cards, camera bags and chargers for the
duration of the focus group. They also received legal information handouts about consent to
treatment and capacity law and gender-affirming treatment subsidies in Ontario (see Appendix
5). The entire workshop totalled 11.5 hours over the span of two days: April 22 and 29, 2017.
Unstructured discussion continued during mealtimes during which I took notes.
Image Creation
Photovoice training took place on Day 1 of the workshop after my introduction to the research
project and a detailed description of project parameters and the meaning of consent (see
Appendix 4). Kiley taught the participants a combination of situated visual ethics, image theory,
photographic techniques, and aesthetic styles.
Situated visual ethics training and discussion consisted of consent for people of different ages
and capacities and vulnerabilities, and techniques for how to protect people's anonymity, as well
as using historical examples of how Black and Indigenous and trans people of colour have been
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misrepresented in photographs since the 18th century as a way of exploring race and gender and
agency. We also discussed what it means to have a “reasonable expectation of privacy” and
where that expectation might apply and how the lines are blurred between public, and semiprivate spaces. We strategized about how participants could avoid invading people’s privacy and
how they could protect their own privacy with screens, staging, costumes and metaphors.
Finally, we discussed how public and private photography can become illegal due to subject
matter, invasion of privacy or the way the picture was taken and how to avoid those situations.
Participants also received general training on camera use including how to look, how to
capture a shot, flash and lighting, rule of thirds, composing a shot, saving pictures, deleting
pictures, utilizing different angles, zooming, considerations about nudity and undress and the
implications of taking and sharing pictures within the project. We came up with strategies to
photograph abstract concepts and protect anonymity by staging tableau photographs and using
actors.
Kiley and I had written creative prompts for the Day 1 exercises selecting open ended and
specific prompts. We also sent prompts for the week of shooting and gave the participants
notebooks to carry with them over the week in which to record observations, questions and ideas.
Between the two workshop days participants were expected to take their photographs and
record experiences in their journals. The second day of the workshop was held one week later.
Participants each sent me ten photographs they chose based on how well they thought the photos
related to the health care and consent related prompts in Appendix 2. We displayed the photos
they had taken using a digital projector and viewed them together, writing down our own
reactions and then listening to the photographers’ descriptions of the content and context of their
shots. We related each photograph to the image creation prompts. As a group, we examined the
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photographs using the rubric (Appendix 3) which I developed with Kiley. Our model shifted the
emphasis from identifying why certain conditions exist and doing something to change such
conditions, to asking about the photographer’s and viewers’ feelings, motives, representation and
context.
Kiley provided some instruction on captioning and combining photos to make narratives, in
which she recommended participants consider a series of questions to create their narratives. The
participants were given time to work on captioning and ordering their images. They then shared
their narratives and captions with the group.

Data Analysis
To begin my analysis, I immersed myself in the focus group data by looking at all of the
photographs with captions and listened to all audio recording as I transcribed. In addition to what
I heard and saw, I paid attention to what they did not show in photographs or say in discussion
(while transcribing I had noted silences and moments of laughter in focus group sessions).
I played with the organizing themes by making an interconnected thematic network (see fig
2). Through this work, global themes (higher-level evaluative categories that bring greater
interpretive meaning to the data themes) emerged.324
I used the same rubric Kiley and I offered to the participants (Appendix 3) for my own
analysis of the participants’ photographs. I borrowed five gazes from Lutz and Collins’s theory
as analytical tools.325 One way to understand gazes is as “lines of sight” of subjects,
photographers and viewers and that may intersect inside or outside a frame.326 These
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intersections of gazes and the presence of multiple points of view made the act of taking and
viewing photographs an interactive experience. The photographer’s gaze, the editorial gaze, the
subject’s gaze and the researcher’s gaze all offer insights.
I built my initial framework for coding transcripts and photos from themes in the extant
literature I reviewed in Chapter 1.327 Then I augmented those categories with new concepts and
themes emerging from the voices and images made by trans racialized youth as interpreted by
me. Therefore, what I discuss in Chapter 5 is a blend of deductive and inductive analysis. The
themes and sub themes that emerged from participant photographs and discussions will be laid
out in detail in Chapter 5 in relation to specific photographs and the thematic network map.

Verification of Findings
Member checking allows marginalized participants the opportunity to tell the researcher if the
transcripts are accurate, if analytic techniques used were effective, and findings reflect their own
understanding of their experiences.328 The member checking session on August 30, 2017 was
attended by all participants. I showed participants the themes that I had pulled from the
photographs using the thematic analysis method. Together they had an opportunity to evaluate
my grouping of themes for accuracy and suggest other themes. The group consensus was to add
two themes: lack of accountability from service providers and avoidance of medical care.

Doctors’ assumptions in Pyne 2018, supra note 35; Gatekeeping in Chang, supra note 120; and in X Sly
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After the checking session, I created a map working from the periphery inwards to the Global
themes,329 grouping the themes into three broader categories: those that reflected disruptions to
autonomy arising from doctors, health care providers and health care organizations; those that
constituted systemic barriers to autonomous decision making; and finally, themes that reflected
participants’ responses to these disruptions.

Reflections on Methods in Hindsight
As I learned, there is no magic formula for Photovoice focus group fieldwork success but
rather a gradual mutual testing of interactions and sharing of ideas between fieldwork cofacilitators and participants. I built critique of Photovoice on the work of Switzer, Holtby et al.,
and Wilson and Flicker 330 on participatory visual methods. I knew from the works of hooks and
Machida, that the method would be difficult for my participants because visual representation is
not simple for multiply marginalized people who are under or misrepresented in popular cultural
and scientific visual spaces. Therefore, the burden of self-representation can feel very heavy. The
very act of taking photographs was challenging for focus group participants.331 Taking
photographs was not totally enjoyable for two of the participants. One person felt unsafe placing
herself in a photograph in public or even being seen outdoors with a camera, and the other did
not like looking at images of their face in photographs.
Despite these limitations, most of which I anticipated, the image production process did
allow participants to use image production to challenge sameness within identity categories, and
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to portray their individual humanity, or to question the viewer’s assumptions about trans
racialized youth and health care decision-making.332 There were several moments during the
focus group process where I sensed that the participants felt what it could mean to experience
autonomy in a world that erodes their autonomy. The image production process and the focus
group sessions were at times a place where relationships of autonomy were fostered.

Conclusion

My methods attend to issues of epistemology, ethics and pluralism in legal, sociological, artbased and health science scholarship. The guiding concepts of legal pluralism and the notion of
laws as tactics informed my methods, sending me to four categories of legal information. The
role of trans racialized youth as legal actors animates my analysis in the next Chapter. In the
Photovoice portion of this project, I was able to integrate anti-oppression praxis and relational
principles using Singh’s FPAR checklist and by integrating situated visual ethics into my use of
Photovoice. Through this combination I was able to consider and adjust to meet the dynamic
needs of the structurally vulnerable and trans racialized youth focus group participants as I
attempted to answer my research question in the field.
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Chapter 4: Consent to Treatment in Normative Legal Sources

What truth claims does the law make about trans racialized youth? How do the processes of
racialization in health care identified in Chapters 1 and 2 also interact with cisnormative
processes found in authoritative clinical and diagnostic texts? How do the white/Western
foundations of authoritative texts compromise the gender transitions of trans racialized youth?333
What can be revealed about decision makers’ attitudes towards youth autonomy beyond the
aspirational declarations of legislators? Recall that in Chapter 1 I argued that for trans racialized
youth the barriers to attaining adult markers are so significant they find themselves in a
stretched-out period of non-adulthood that has become "youthhood", extending well into, if not
to the end of their 20s.
To answer these questions, I begin a pluralist examination of multiple sources of law using
the list of factors affecting decision-making autonomy emerging from my exploration of
relational autonomy in Chapter 2. The rationale behind my selection of these sources was fully
canvassed in Chapter 3. Together, these sources form the pluralist legal container in which trans
racialized youth attempt to develop and practice autonomy in health care contexts creating their
own law as they share in their own words and photographs in Chapter 5. Part one begins with
common law principles of autonomy, informed consent and legal capacity. I then zero in on
doctrines developed specifically for minors. These doctrines foreground the period of statutory
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consolidation presented in the next section. In section two I introduce the Health Care Consent
Act (HCCA) and evaluate whether it creates the conditions conducive to a relational autonomy
experience of health care for youth that I discussed in Chapter 2.334 In the third section I will
contrast actual treatment of trans minors’ and youths’ health care interests in courts and tribunal
decisions with the autonomy promises of the HCCA. In Part 2 I examine how health policy in the
form of two authoritative texts, indirectly diminishes the selfhood and health of trans racialized
youth. I show how the application of ostensibly neutral health insurance regulations fail to
address the intersectional realities of trans racialized youth. The section ends with conclusions
about whether the law lives up to its aspirations of autonomy in health care for trans racialized
youth given its adherence to paternalism, binary gender categories and colour-blind language.

Part 1 Ontario’s Legal Frameworks for Health Care Consent

Common Law Principles
The common law rule of consent to treatment is linked to the principle of autonomy. The
leading case Fleming v Reid stated:

The common law right to bodily integrity and personal autonomy is so entrenched in
the traditions of our law as to be ranked as fundamental and deserving of the highest
order of protection. This right forms an essential part of an individual's security of the
person and must be included in the liberty interests protected by s. 7. …Indeed, in my
view, the common law right to determine what shall be done with one's own body and
the constitutional right to security of the person, both of which are founded on the belief
in the dignity and autonomy of each individual, can be treated as co-extensive.335

334
335

HCCA, supra note 11.
Fleming v. Reid, 1991 CanLII 2728 (ON CA), <http://canlii.ca/t/1p78q>.

87

Thus, the right to bodily integrity and autonomy were affirmed as values that extended
beyond physical security and protection of life to include the autonomy protecting and enhancing
rule of consent to medical treatment. The case of Malette v Shulman, established that a
physician's duty is to take instructions from capable patients even if they do not agree with the
patient’s treatment decision.336 Legal capacity is codified in statute and is comprised of two
elements: the ability to understand the information about a treatment and secondly, the ability to
appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of taking or refusing a treatment.337 Because
I argue that judicial attitudes towards minors extend to non-minor youth and influence the
attitudes of health care providers, a brief description of the development of the mature minor
doctrine is necessary.

The Mature Minor Rule

The mature minor rule reflects a judicial attempt to recognize a form of gradual autonomous
health care decision making for a person under the age of majority.338 The doctrine permits a
minor to make most decisions about health care without consent from parents, guardians or
courts when a health care practitioner finds they have sufficient cognition and understanding. 339
Recorded mature minor cases have primarily addressed the right to refuse invasive but life-
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saving treatments, on the grounds of religion or culture.340 In Ontario, the trend has been for
judges to negate the decision-making autonomy of minors who want to refuse lifesaving
treatment by endorsing the use of child protection laws.341 Overall judges seem to find capacity
where they agree with a minor’s decision and find incapacity where they do not. While Canadian
jurisprudence pre-2009 allows for a minor to be sufficiently capable to make most decisions, the
judicial reluctance to encourage minors to develop autonomy skills, and to make decisions
incurring significant risk, seems to be a sticking point driving litigation up to and including A.C.
v Manitoba.
In C. (A) v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services) the Supreme Court addressed
the constitutionality of deploying child welfare legislation when doctors disagree with parents’
and minor’s refusal of a life-saving treatment. 342 A.C. clarified the national position at common
law but did not formally change, or even mention, the legal situation in Ontario where no age
threshold exists.343 Justice Abella interpreted the impugned provisions using a "best interests"
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analysis imbued with the mature minor rule.344 While she said345 minors must be given a chance
to demonstrate their capacity, she did not unequivocally state that capable youth’s wishes would
determine their health outcomes.346 Therefore A.C. leaves loopholes allowing for the judicial
overriding of mature minors' wishes.
The decision eshews the typical atomistic understanding of autonomy and prefers to frame
autonomy as a process that requires support to develop much like my application of relational
autonomy. A.C. shows concern for religion, culture and parental pressure as external forces
undermining independent decision making. The Court does not however, recognize that religion
and culture can be part of a youth’s development of selfhood. It failed to acknowledge systemic
forces that impact decision making for racialized youth such as poverty, citizenship statutes and
racism.347 Yet rather than encouraging fostering of conditions conducive to relational autonomy
such as information sharing, or supportive decision making, the Court chooses protectionism.348
This protectionist attitude from the highest court influences other decision makers even where

their own capacity assessed and their reasoning considered even for decisions in life-threatening circumstances.
Minors under 16 years still fall under the Child and Family Services Act and therefore have much more limited
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the HCCA specifies that age is not a determining factor in Ontario and vis a vis other groups such
as trans racialized youth who have reached the age of majority.

Paternalistic Decision-making post A.C.

Family court judges emboldened by A.C., continue to ignore minor's autonomy, even that of
capable 13 to 17-yr-olds. In Cates v Kendall349 parents with joint custody disagreed over the
treatment of their son Ryan who was 19 years old but had the mental functioning of a 7-year-old
and was considered incapable for this decision.350 Ryan wanted to take growth hormones
recommended by his doctor, to improve the quality of his life. Ryan’s father consented to the
treatment, but his mother did not.
Judge Wilkinson reviewed both the Starson test for capacity and A.C. factors for assessing the
capacity of a minor under 16 years old. It was clear Ryan understood the principle of informed
consent and that he could withdraw his consent at any time.351 While the judge affirmed Ryan’s
wishes, his ruling was based not on finding him to be a capable minor but on the Judge’s own
assessment of what was best for Ryan. This discussion demonstrates a judicial application of
A.C. in which a court prefers a best interest analysis to a capacity to consent to treatment
approach. In section three I will show the same pattern in Ontario cases involving the health
rights of trans and gender non-confirming minors, that mirror the experiences of non-minor trans
racialized youth in Chapter 5. Now I will evaluate the health care consent statute and whether it
fosters autonomy practice for trans racialized youth.
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The Health Care Consent Act

HCCA has been described as "balancing competing interests of liberty and welfare".352 The
preamble states the following objectives: the provision of consistent rules across all health care
settings, to enhance the autonomy of persons facing treatment, to promote communications and
understanding between health care providers, patients, clients and to ensure a significant role for
supportive family members when a person is incapable with respect to a treatment. 353
A brief genealogy of the Health Care Consent Act is necessary to contextualize my critique of
the gaps and inadequacies in Ontario’s legislative and regulatory framework that undercuts
autonomy for trans racialized youth. The HCCA is part of a suite of four statutes developed
together over 15 years subject to the conflicting philosophies of three successive ruling political
parties. The group of statutes created or amended by the Consent and Capacity Statute Law
Amendment Act, 1992, were: The Consent to Treatment Act, the Mental Health Act, the
Substitute Decisions Act, and the Advocacy Act.354 Subsequently Bill 19, Advocacy, Consent and
Substitute Decisions Statute Law Amendment Act, 1996 repealed the Advocacy Act and the
Consent to Treatment Act. In 1992 these statutes were enacted and amended by the Liberals to
clarify the common law on consent and substitute decision making in health care which had
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become confusing even to legal experts for constituents and health care professionals and by the
NDP to increase advocacy for vulnerable populations.355 In the 1996 amendments the PC
government’s objectives were to streamline consent and capacity procedures and to cut costs.356

The Period of Legislative Health Care Reform: 1989-1996

In the mid to late 1980s, at the behest of a Liberal government, three committees reviewed
health statutes and health policy with a focus on vulnerable populations including youth.357 Their
findings informed the legislative overhaul of the early to mid-1990s.358 The Committee on the
Enquiry on Mental Competency, was asked to develop standards for determining mental capacity
in minors.359 Its findings, known as the Weisstub Report, elevated the principle of autonomy and
also expressed the need for best interests analyses to remain in future health care consent
legislation vis a vis minors out of respect for family caregivers.360 The Report integrated both
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concepts into a set of standards to guide legislators that eschewed age-based markers as reliable
indicators of capacity.361

The Health Care Consent Act of Ontario

The Presumption of Capacity
The HCCA codified the common law on consent and the two-part capacity test. There is no
age threshold for capacity.362 S. 11(1) outlines the four elements of consent. It must relate to the
treatment, it must be informed, it must be voluntary, and it must not be obtained through fraud or
manipulation. The meanings of “voluntary” and “misrepresentation” are not explained and are
left up to regulatory colleges to explain to providers. As I detail below and in Chapter 5, this
leaves room for providers to overlook coercive external factors acting on patients and to
misinform patients about treatment possibilities based on providers’ ignorance or prejudice. The
meaning of informed consent is described in s. 11(2) which states that reasonable information
must be provided and questions arising about treatment must be answered. The statute, however,
does not specify that information must be provided in a format or manner that the person can
understand thus creating gaps for anyone with cognitive or intellectual differences or who
communicates in a language other than English.363 The statute is clear that legal capacity to
consent to treatment does not consist of one blanket assessment. Each treatment decision requires
a new capacity assessment.364 For example, a trans youth might be found capable of deciding to
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start cross sex hormone therapy, but not capable of deciding to have a hysterectomy.365 Capacity
still appears to be linked to cognitive abilities and functional decision making in the minds of
many judges and clinicians.366 Because cognitive and functional capacity are the litmus test,
youth who feel voiceless and powerless over their health can be viewed as incapable by
clinicians when they refuse treatment.367 Trans racialized youth might struggle to demonstrate
their decision-making capacity. For example, this way of assessing capacity could work against
trans racialized youth who are English language learners unless they had access to a certified
language interpreter.
Advocates voiced concerns that vague requirements for regulatory colleges to explain the
legislation to professionals would maintain the status quo of large-scale misunderstanding of
health consent law at the expense of youth.368 The Policy Statement #3-15 from the College of
Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (CPSO) was designed for this purpose. The policy expands
requirements for doctors beyond the provisions of the HCCA. Overall, the document tells
physicians to “respect patient autonomy”, yet autonomy is not explained, and the assumption is
that patients have autonomy rather than framing autonomous decision making as a practice that
must be fostered through relationships and structural equity.369
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CPSO members are reminded that for consent to be informed the appropriate information
must be understood not simply provided. It advises that doctors consider communication
barriers. To this end members should vary “the plainness of the language used, the modality in
which the information is communicated, any literacy issues, etc.” and are cautioned against
automatically relying on family members as interpreters citing family dynamics or conflict as a
reason.370 This caution could certainly benefit trans racialized youth who are English-language
learners and accompanied by family members, an experience mentioned by my focus group
participants. The CSPO instructs doctors to chart all capacity and consent determinations with
details and references as to whether parents were consulted or not and a summary of the
information provided, and questions asked by the patient.371 Doctors are told to ensure consent is
provided by a minor even if parents/guardians are present.372 The policy does not specify who to
seek help from when capacity is hard to determine namely specialists in supportive collaborative
youth decision making such as community advocates or the Office of the Public Guardian and
Trustee.
The Supreme Court interpreted the common law and the HCCA on how mental illness
impacts capacity in Starson in ways that should benefit trans youth. Firstly, the Court was clear
that mental illness alone does not render one incapable.373 Secondly, when it comes to a
diagnosed mental illness, the patient must be able to recognize the possibility that they have
something resembling the diagnosed condition although they do not have to describe it as a
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negative or pathologized condition.374 Therefore, a gender dysphoria diagnosis, although located
in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders should not automatically make a
trans youth incapable, nor as I contend throughout this chapter, should they have to describe
themselves in pathological terms in order to meet the second part of the capacity test.
The Starson Court emphasized the cognitive and functional theory of capacity found in the
HCCA.375 If the patient shows an ability to consider the parameters of the treatment decision
including the nature and foreseeable risks of treatment; the available alternative courses of
action; and, the expected consequences of not having the treatment, it does not matter if the
patient's way of weighing the parameters is different from the doctor's. It is the ability to
appreciate consequences that makes one capable.376 Furthermore refusing to speak to one’s
doctor does not automatically result in a finding of incapacity.377 This legal framework
technically allows trans racialized minors and youth to make decisions on puberty blockers and
surgeries without parental approval. Clinicians must ultimately be able to keep the wishes of
guardians separate from those of capable minors and youth. They can do this by maintaining
confidentiality or where youth and family members are in open disagreement, provide
counselling supports for guardians who do not accept the capable choices of a youth rather than
allowing guardians who disagree to exert pressure on the youth to capitulate.378 Health
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practitioners are well protected from liability for administering treatments that may not have
been consented to, refused, withheld or withdrawn, as long as they believe "on reasonable
grounds and in good faith to be sufficient for the purposes of the Act", that their actions were
taken in accordance with wishes of a capable person.379 This provision should also encourage
physicians to support capable minors and youth in situations where they are at odds with their
parents or where the physician disagrees with the patient’s capable informed decision without
fear of civil liability or discipline for their regulatory College.380

Legislative Debate Over the Decision-Making Autonomy of Minors
It is clear from the record that the legislative intention was to recognize the decision-making
autonomy in health care of minors. Nonetheless the precise question of whether children and
youth should have the right to direct their own health was debated in the legislature on several
occasions.381 Minister Lankin and Minister Wilson’s original position was to set 16 years as the
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threshold for the presumption of capacity to make health care decisions.382 Through debate and
committee deputations from health care providers, social workers, and lawyers working with
youth, the age threshold was eliminated altogether.
During the Committee stages of the HCCA, parents’ rights activists, often with Christian
affiliations, made protectionist arguments to curtail the decision-making autonomy of minors.383
Bill 91 was introduced by Standing Committee on Justice member Frank Klees as an amendment
to the HCCA in November 1996.384 Klees identified the problem that:
The vast majority of Ontarians whom I speak to are not aware in the first place that
children in this province can receive medical treatment of any kind without the
knowledge of their parents, the only condition being that the health practitioner believes
in his or her mind that the child is capable of making a decision. The reaction, when I
discuss this with people across the province and in my constituency, is initially disbelief
that this is the case in this province. The second reaction is indignation.385

To rectify this widespread ignorance of the law, Klees argued for the HCCA to include agebased thresholds and mandatory physician consultation with parents over decisions made by
minors 16 years and younger. Confidentiality and options for supportive informed decision
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making with non-family members is crucial for trans youth who may disproportionately
experience heightened conflict with family members. Decisions about their health care have
implications on their physical and mental health, employment and housing options.386 This
amendment met with strong opposition from the Health Minister and the majority of MPPs and
health care providers.387 Justice for Children and Youth, a legal clinic serving youth under 18
years, testified in 1992 and 1996 about the importance of autonomous decision making for their
clients who were emancipated minors or youth in care. Staff lawyer Milne pointed out that youth
were vulnerable to coercion and pressure: “They are generally accepting of adult authority. The
image of the omnipotent adolescent refusing necessary treatment, although it exists, is not
representative of youth in general.”388 This sentiment was echoed by MPP Dominic Agostino:
I am not sure how you tell 15-year-old kids who unfortunately are living on Yonge
Street, in a blanket and maybe a couple of cardboard boxes, that to access medical
treatment they would have to somehow track down, or make an attempt to track down,
parents they may not have seen for a period of time or guardians who may not exist or
individuals in their lives who may have done nothing more than abuse them and scar
them for life. To force that prior to getting treatment I think is irresponsible. I think it's
taking away the judgements that family practitioners, physicians, can make today.389

Physicians who had institutional support and access to resources such as the Hospital for Sick
Children’s Youth Clinic were well informed of legal rights for youth in health care and keen to
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protect youth autonomy, which they described as supporting youth involvement in decision
making and confidentiality in accessing medical services. These physicians wanted family
involvement, where appropriate and recognized autonomy development as a gradual process.390
While family physicians appeared to have more trouble applying consent law due to their close
ties to parents or minor patients, clinic doctors recognized that youth often avoid family doctors
because of the fear of breach of confidentiality.391 Dr. Alan Goldbloom deputed:

As far as no age of consent, what that allows us to do, and in fact we have always
functioned this way, is to recognize maturity when appropriate. It allows us to say to
that 14-year-old, who either is very mature and appropriate or who may even be
independent of his or her family, we recognize that individual's independence. It in no
way prevents us from involving the family when it is appropriate to do so. In fact, the
majority of teens we speak to want their family involved and we're happy to do that. It's
in those circumstances when they don't and when family involvement may be an
obstacle to care that we need that opportunity.392

Redress for Findings of Incapacity
The HCCA and the Substitute Decisions Act (SDA) were designed to be implemented with the
robust protections of the Advocacy Act in place.393 The Advocacy Act, in its short life, provided
390
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case management, formal rights advice and systemic advocacy to vulnerable adults.394 While the
Advocacy Act did not offer advocacy services to minors, the overwhelming defeat of the Act in
1996 strengthened the overall role of family members as substitute decision makers of choice, a
move which I argue eroded autonomy producing conditions for trans children and youth who
were more likely to be at odds with their family members.395
Previously when any finding of incapacity was made a doctor had to give the patient
information about how to contact a rights advisor.396 As Bill 19 was introduced in 1995, former
Liberal Minister of Health, Elinor Caplan said, “I despair that this legislation removes all
advocacy services, removes all rights advice.”397 This was the formally funded Advocacy
Commission that provided public awareness about health care rights, enabling vulnerable youth
(but not minors) to advocate for themselves and benefit from collaborative decision making
when their families are unsupportive or unavailable. If doctors resent the considerable time
required to attend hearings at the CCB, they may not consistently inform patients of their rights
to contest findings or help them contact lawyers, actions which alone may not be effective if the
person is a minor, is not comfortable in English, uses ASL or is intimidated by lawyers.
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To illustrate this point through the operation of the HCCA’s own review tribunal, I examined
decisions from the Consent and Capacity Board (CCB).398 S. 32(1) of the HCCA gives a person
found incapable of making a treatment decision the right to challenge the health care provider’s
finding of incapacity before the Board.399 However, the HCCA only requires health care
practitioners to provide rights advisor information when the incapacity finding pertains to
psychiatric treatment. 400 Thus, the bulk of the patients challenging findings of incapacity are
psychiatric patients because they are the ones who are informed of their rights and the
jurisprudence reflects this imbalance in access to review. Four reported CCB hearings were
requested by youth diagnosed with gender identity disorder or gender dysphoria. While all the
youth were challenging their involuntary status as psychiatric patients under the Mental Health
Act, only two of the youth challenged findings of incapacity to make a decision to refuse
psychiatric treatment under the HCCA.401 No other formal evidence exists of trans youth
challenging incapacity findings under the HCCA. This suggests that trans youth do not often use
the CCB for redress. They then miss out on an autonomy- promoting process that could possibly
improve their health outcomes.402 Given that in the next chapter the focus group participants
share several instances of health care providers’ findings of incapacity that they disagreed with
but left uncontested in part due to unfamiliarity with their legal rights. This is troubling.
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Substitute Decision Making
The HCCA also provides a way to obtain a decision about health care treatment from a
substitute, for someone who is incapable of consenting themselves. The Act recognizes that it is
not always necessary (or expedient) to turn to an appointed decision-maker who has been
through the legal procedures of the SDA.403 For example, the person’s mental incapacity may be
only short-term or for one type of decision. Health care providers can automatically apply a
hierarchal list of substitute decision makers in which legal guardians such as parents are ranked
5th.404 Family members through blood, adoption and marriage ties are explicitly recognized
creating a prima facie preference for traditional family members.405 The HCCA requires an
application to be brought before the CCB under s. 33 by the incapable person or a person at least
16 years old who wishes to be appointed as the SDM of the incapable person. Trans people who
are at greater risk of estrangement from or conflict with biological family would have to apply to
have a chosen family member appointed as their SDM.406
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If an incapable person had appointed an attorney for personal care or a guardian of the person
under the SDA, those would outrank parents and all relatives by marriage or adoption.407 This
means that a person may use the SDA to designate, in advance of incapacity, the substitute
decision maker of their choice. This SDM must be capable and at least 16 years old.408 Although,
if youth are not aware of their rights and options for substitute decision making, they are very
unlikely to have created powers of attorney for personal care under the SDA. It would seem from
studies and focus group participants that where parents exist, doctors automatically refer to
parents and relatives.409 For example, some doctors misunderstood the HCCA hierarchy and did
not believe that trusted friends can apply to the CCB to trump higher ranking relatives.410 This
misunderstanding could restrain trans racialized youth’s ability to choose a supportive SDM.
As the HIV and AIDS Legal Clinic of Ontario pointed out to legislators in the context of gay
men and HIV+ people, incapable trans people might not want doctors to automatically appoint
family members to make decisions for them.411 The statute does not facilitate amending the
automatic SDM list. Enabling trans racialized youth to exclude unsupportive relatives from the
HCCA’s s. 20 ranked SDM list without having to create a power of attorney under the SDA
would mean youth could easily choose who would be in their circle of care for collaborative and
supportive decision making. The College requires members “where possible” to inform patients
of findings of incapacity and that an SDM will assist them in understanding the proposed
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treatment and be responsible for making the final decision.412 The decision making for incapable
people is explained as per the HCCA’s reliance on substitute decision making. However, there is
one reference to “collaborating” with patients and substitute decision makers that is never
explained.413 Where patients disagree with an incapacity finding or the highest ranking and
appropriate SDM, doctors must tell them about the CCB and take reasonable steps to assist the
patient, such as giving the patient the number for the lawyer referral service of the Law Society
of Upper Canada.414
Finally, in addition to selecting and contacting the correct SDM from the list, doctors must
take reasonable steps to ensure that SDMs are informed of their duties and acting in accordance
with the HCCA.415 Given that some doctors find it onerous to provide so much information
during a typical 20-25 minute appointment, there will be times when this dialogue is truncated or
adequate accommodations for a patient are not made.

Professional Awareness of the Law
Throughout the 18 months of debates it was clear that many health care practitioners did not
know the relevant common law, and this was attributed to cumbersome nature and legalistic
language of the CTA.416 Further evidence of this comes from MPPs, lawyers and doctors
themselves. Mr. Tilson (MPP Dufferin-Pell) stated:
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Most medical people, in fact I don't think there was anyone, any medical health provider,
who didn't come to me and say they were simply made dizzy by the proposals that were
being put forward as to the very topics you're talking about. They didn't know which
way to turn. They were worried about liability. They were worried about breaking the
law. They didn't even understand it.417

Dr Adrian Grek described his experience with the CTA as follows:
…perhaps because of my own inexperience in reading laws, but I did seek legal advice
on the question as well. I've been unable to fathom just where my authority as a
physician, as a psychiatrist in possession of such records, actually arises to release
information in all sorts of circumstances in this connection, and it's not at all clear to me
or to the lawyer who advised me.418

And finally, health lawyer Linda Bohnen commented that:
My experience with the Consent to Treatment Act includes helping to write a detailed
manual about it for hospitals, and I have given seminars about it to health professionals.
I can tell you from personal experience that the Consent to Treatment Act has been very
difficult to teach. Many health practitioners are simply bewildered by it. In my view,
the fact that it is so complex has been a very real impediment to its being
implemented.419

As focus group participants documented in Chapter 5, doctors often preferred to consult with
unsupportive parents even when no finding of incapacity had been made and the statute is clear
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that doctors are not liable for providing care when they properly have confirmed capacity and
informed consent.420
A study of Ontario doctors’ knowledge and attitudes to health consent law was conducted in
1996 just as the new HCCA came into force.421 The participants were 15 doctors who had
received a book on the new Act from the Ontario Medical Association and who worked in
adolescent medicine at major hospitals in Toronto. The surveys covered the following areas: i)
capacity to consent; ii) disclosure; iii) documentation in charts iv) addressing parent-child
conflicts; and, v) feasibility of compliance with the new Act.422
The physicians said they always disclosed the most detailed information to the adolescent
patients themselves not the parents, if parents were even involved.423 Less common was the
situation where a patient wants something that parents disagree with. Only one participant stated
that if the parents did not agree with the youth, the procedure would not be carried out. Most
participants felt that the new Act, because it had no age threshold, would pit doctors against
parents, since they did not have to succeed in helping parents and the child reach an
agreement.424 Eleven participants said they already disliked the time and loss of income required
to attend incapacity hearings before 1996. Some expressed frustration with legal processes
especially the involvement of lawyers. Other concerns expressed by doctors were mixed. Doctors
thought that the new Act made it easier to treat mature patients without their parents knowing or
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when parents were not available.425 Doctors also felt that compliance with the HCCA would be
harder because they found the consent process and the capacity process vague and six doctors
found capacity hard to determine since the new Act did not spell out the assessment criteria the
way the Consent to Treatment Act did.426 This pattern has continued despite recent statutory
affirmations of the common law position.427
While some doctors have embraced the greater decision-making autonomy afforded minors
and youth under the HCCA, others remain inadequately informed about the presumption of
capacity. For example, what to do when parents disagree with a minor or youth’s decision, make
capacity assessments and find a youth incapable for a decision.428 This inconsistent medical
environment leaves trans minors and youth in danger of reduced autonomy.

Mandating Public Awareness
Legal advocates for youth critiqued the draft HCCA and continue to point to its failure to
mandate how public awareness of rights would be achieved in an arena where ignorance of rights
has drastic consequences.429 Justice for Children and Youth testified that:
The legislation the way it's written now just applies to the health care providers. You're
not going to find a young person who's going to go and look up the act. You're not going
to find very many people who are going to go look up the act to see what their rights
are. They're going to be faced with a situation and told that there's a decision made, and
at that point, without knowing that there's a piece of legislation that governs them,
425
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without knowing that they have a right to appeal the decision if they don't like what's
happening, you can have all the plain language you want, but it's never going to be
read.430

Recall that the physician’s duty to provide rights advice and the required information itself
was stripped down between the CTA and the HCCA.431 Meanwhile the barriers to challenging
incapacity assessments remain very high for structurally vulnerable clients.432 For example, one
legal advocate cautioned that: “Without the requirement that the young person's rights be
communicated to them, we are going to just see young people's rights being run roughshod
over.”433
All things considered, the HCCA provides the skeleton for trans youth autonomy in health
care, and professional guidelines add some flesh to that frame. Autonomy-enhancing factors such
as trusting relationships with health care providers, knowledge of legal rights and the CCB
process can shift the finding from incapable to capable when a youth feels like they have a forum
in which to articulate and own their health care choices.434 And yet statutory aspirations and
regulatory cautions belie the intersectional realities of trans racialized youth in clinical and
adjudicative contexts causing legal advocates to describe the HCCA as “a step backward for
human rights and for personal autonomy.”435 What might happen when a trans youth makes a
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treatment decision to choose a treatment such as gender affirming surgery that will cause them to
be infertile for the rest of their life, or when their parents disagree about the decision to use
puberty blockers (whose effects are reversible). These considerations are at the heart of the cases
in the next section where the autonomy and health of trans youth are undercut by binary legal
gender categories or buried beneath their parents’ custody disputes.

Trans Youth in Jurisprudence

The decisions of courts and tribunals are an influential source in which the articulation of
legal norms and the application of principles about consent or capacity for trans youth can be
observed. Decisions also reveal evidence of adjudicators’ conceptions of gender categories and
transness. One challenge for my inquiry was that trans youth are absent from Canadian
jurisprudence up until the late 2000s when human rights complaints were made against
provincial ministries, private businesses and school boards.436 Moreover, the race/ethnicity of
parties is rarely noted, so with few exceptions I could not determine who is racialized, and how
that affects the decision maker.
To get at decision makers’ views about trans youth I had to broaden my scope from Ontario
case law to include cases from across Canada and the decisions of Ontario administrative
tribunals such as the Consent and Capacity Board and the Ontario Health Services Appeal and
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Review Board. The gender identity of minors is the focus of conflict in several child custody and
access cases examined here. This small body of cases is useful because it updates what we know
about judicial attitudes towards trans people since the 1990s marriage and social entitlement
cases involving adult trans litigants. More importantly, what this examination of custody cases
reveals is that trans minors’ health care rights under the HCCA are ignored, therefore,
suppressing the development of their autonomy practices. The experiences of older youth focus
group participants in Chapter 5 confirm the continuation of this unfortunate pattern of neglect of
their statutory rights and the diminished conditions of their autonomy in health care in Ontario.

Gender as a Legal Category

Despite the social changes and legislative reforms discussed in Chapter 1, gender remains
conflated with sex in legal decision making in Canada and is still considered a legitimate legal
category for everyone including trans youth.437 This judge’s comment about a youth’s request for
accurate pronoun use is one example of lingering legal cisnormativity:
She even requested that the Tribunal refer to her as a boy. It is with great respect that
the Tribunal explained to her that sex is also a juridical reality. The Tribunal should not
add to the confusion and will therefore treat a juridical reality as it is; which will not
prevent the president of the Tribunal of being empathetic to her difficult situation.438

The judge forces the youth to identify based on his understanding of legal gender categories
as fixed and binary, instead of revising the law to fit the youth’s expressed identity. Even in
decisions where trans litigants were successful in gaining legal recognition of their trans
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subjectivity, I argue that judges’ understanding of gender/sex is ultimately limiting.439 In the case
of C.F. v. Alberta (Vital Statistics) a trans feminine youth won her s. 15 Charter challenge to a
Vital Statistics statute that prevented her from obtaining a gender/sex accurate birth certificate.440
Justice Burrows writes a compassionate and progressive decision affirming that a trans person
should not be forced to have genital surgery just to prove they are trans and obtain accurate
official identification.441 Burrows rejects the Attorney General’s convoluted argument that trans
people should not be ashamed of their gender and hide by modifying their (bio)logic
identification, thus incurring discrimination and potential violence over mismatched
identification documents.442 The judgement emphatically critiques the genitocentric regulation of
gender in a way that forces trans people to out themselves as a “third sex” and suffer harms.443
However, there are two major problems with how Burrows theorizes gender/sex. Firstly, he says:
“Alberta’s response does not appear to appreciate that C.F. like everyone else accepts that there
are but two sexes. She does not consider herself a member of a third sex. She considers herself
female.”444 With this statement he declares his common-sense belief in sexual dimorphism and
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erases the existence of a gender continuum and the subjectivity of non-binary trans people.
Secondly, in relying on the medical evidence of C.F.’s commitment to her felt gender, he
repeatedly confirms her gender based on the permanence of her transition, and her desire to “be
full time in the female gender role for the rest of her life.”445 These statements deny the
possibility of a fluid gender that can change over the course of one’s life more than once. The
evidence that gender/sex can fluctuate is a reason why it is unsound as a legal category especially
for the purposes of identification.446
This type of legal reasoning is based on recognizing and repairing what Sharpe calls a
psychological cultural/social disharmony.447 This model is becoming more prevalent in Canada
where it has been increasingly applied by human rights tribunals since the turn of the second
millennia.448 This adjudicative move away from previous legal determinations of sex based on
natal sex and anatomical “correctness” is positive. The model instead accepts a plastic view of
sex/gender and allows for a social and relational understanding of gender/sex. For example,
when Waters challenged British Columbia’s provincial health insurance plan (MSP) for failing to
pay for his phalloplasty the Tribunal commented that:
What MSP did was to leave Mr. Waters in the middle of a surgical process: not being
totally a male in physical appearance and function and being unable and unwilling to
return to being a physical female. The dignity and self-respect of a person is most often
dependent on how he sees himself and how he is seen through the eyes of society. In
this case, Mr. Waters is not a complete and fully-functioning physical male. He is aware
445
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of this everyday. When he moves in the community, he is inhibited in what he can do,
namely being naked and urinating as a man without difficulty.449

Notably, the decision supports Waters’ desire for external affirmation of his gendered
selfhood, while at the same time colluding with traditional expectations of males and masculinity
and ultimately agreeing that Waters has the wrong body for a binary male.
Some legal commentators and scholars who agree that genitocentrism is based on faulty legal
reasoning and discriminates on grounds of sex and gender identity endorse this model.450 While
this model allows for greater acceptance of transgender and non-binary identities as opposed to
only “post bottom surgery” transsexuals, as Bettcher observes, this reasoning is still based on the
wrong body pathology theory.451 As a result, psychological and psychiatric evaluations continue
to hold disproportionate weight in judicial decision making. As Hooley writes: “It is time to
assert that there is no wrong body and that all bodies are alright whatever their state or genital
status. It is the power of the norm and of medicine and law which take the cultural meanings
made of biology as ultimate truth that sustains our deviant status, body regulation and
discrimination.”452 It is this disconnect between theory and practice, that I argue is mirrored by
law with respect to the lived experience of its trans youth subjects.
Against this backdrop of evolving change about some aspects of gender/sex in law I will now
turn to analyse four cases where the health consent rights of trans minors are trumped by family
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law best interest’s analyses where current and future health matters related to their gender
identity are central to both the conflict and the custody order.

Trans Minors’ Health Autonomy Rights Buried in Family Law

The cases examined in this section illuminate how judges interpret the applicability of the
HCCA’s consent provisions in custody and access proceedings. Justice Perkins frames the
conundrum as follows:
I have been struggling with how to balance or reconcile the powers and duties of the
court under the Divorce Act to make custody and access orders in the best interests of
the children, on the one hand, with, on the other hand, the children’s growing entitlement
to personal autonomy and respect of their views and preferences.453

Custody and access decisions result in orders that include directives about health-related
matters. Such directives are especially pivotal for trans and gender non-conforming minors who
have a greater propensity towards engagement in their own health care. Custody however is not a
monolith. It refers to a bundle of rights and responsibilities regarding a child which can be
separated and allocated to any person with custody of the child.454 Medical decision-making
authority is bundled with education in custody orders, however some orders involve specific
therapeutic directives which arguably engage the HCCA with its presumption of capacity for all
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persons. The best interests of the child analysis guide the custody decision, and I argue that
guide

health-related issues be construed broadly as treatment requiring corollary consent.455
With no clear appellate ruling on the applicability of the HCCA consent provisions to minors
in family court orders, lower court judges have taken different directions. There is obiter dicta
recognition that minors close to 18 years old need to consent for health-related orders.456 There is
also diversity of opinion in lower courts about the scope of the term “treatment” under the HCCA
because a broad interpretation increases the instances where a person’s consent is required.457
Furthermore, while the majority of judges favour paternalistic therapeutic solutions to family law
matters, some judges recognize that to foster autonomy means allowing capable minors to make
choices that courts and parents do not agree with.458
Lawyers have made arguments that health-related incidents of custody should be decided
under health consent law not family law. In N.K. v A.H., a British Columbia case, a father sought
to prevent his racialized 11-year-old child from transitioning by attempting to wrest custody
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from the gender-affirming parent.459 The father also wanted the mother and child to terminate
their retainer with barb findlay, queer activist lawyer, and to stop using other trans positive
services and resources. The father’s wishes would certainly have undermined his child’s ability
to access information about being trans, therefore thwarting conditions for autonomy
development for the child. Deciding the case in neither parents favour, Justice Skolrod identified
the ongoing conflicts as between the parents. As required by statute, the judge prioritized the
child’s best interests by making sure they had their own litigation guardian, so in a sense,
protecting their legal autonomy.460 That said, the judge ignored arguments made by the mother’s
lawyer that the urgent issues of the possible use of puberty blockers before the onset of
irrevocable pubertal changes pertained to health law not family law.461 The judge could have
rejected the father’s motion on the basis that the court cannot actually grant the father legal
authority to prevent the child from making medical decisions with their doctor by way of a
custody order.462 The judge did not consider that under s. 17 of the British Columbia Infants Act
the minor would have been able to make their own transition-related health decisions.463
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In Halton v. G.K, a Children’s Aid Society tried to apprehend two children from their mother
and place them in their father's custody with the Society’s supervision.464 The position of the
Society and the father was that the mother was forcing “S.”, a four-year-old child assigned male
at birth to behave and dress like a girl against the child’s wishes.465 The mother had been trying
to support the child in developing their autonomy skills by seeking out community-based
resources and other trans positive doctors.466
Justice O’Connell found discrepancies in both parents’ evidence regarding their four-year-old
child’s gender identity and gender expression.467 In that context, her ruling gave paramount
weight to the expert medical evidence provided by Dr. Joseph Bonifacio of the Gender Clinic at
the Hospital for Sick Children in Toronto.468
Dr. Bonifacio recommended providing the child with a variety of options for behaviour and
appearance without gendering such options and also reducing the number of medical
professionals treating the child sees to avoid shaming and pathologizing the child.469 The judge
was uncomfortable with the provision asking for either party to notify the Society if S.
“expresses the desire to dress as a girl” because the meaning of dressing like a girl was unclear
and seemed to incur negative consequences to S. if they did decide to “dress as a girl”.470
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Dressing like a girl was established as wearing skirts and dresses from the girls’ section of a
clothing store, not just wearing pink and purple coloured clothing. The judge amended the
provision to read: “Neither party shall unilaterally dress S. as a girl or force S. to take on certain
gender roles.” In the event that S. wanted to “dress as a girl” the party who had care of S. would
notify the other parent and the CAS to decide how to proceed.471 The judge’s exposition in this
case showed the artificiality of determining gendered behaviour for a child. The judge affirmed
that gender identity and social roles are binary, in other words distinct for girls and boys.472 The
order contained directives about treatment for the child by paediatricians and a family physicians
as well as the Hospital for Sick Children’s Transgender Youth Clinic.473 Yet despite the presence
of a gender specialist from a progressive transgender youth clinic, and ongoing medical
treatments contemplated, there was no mention of the developing autonomy in decision making
of the child who would eventually have the right, under the HCCA, if capable, to make their own
decisions about medical transition.474
In a third case where a non-binary 12-year-old child was the subject of a custody dispute
between their non-binary mother and their father, Dr. Bonifacio again provided expert
testimony.475 The judge’s opinion on the child’s gender identity was as follows:

The child’s decision to identify as gender neutral has been made, even if influenced by
the mother, what is relevant is which parent is best able to support the child. I am guided
by the evidence of Dr. Bonifacio who testified that the parents should just wait and see
and let the child function. I find that it is the father who is the parent most likely to just
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let N. be and explore his gender issues whereas the mother has difficulty letting N. be
his own person.476

Weight was given to the fact that the father was also attending a Gender Identity Group with
the child. Ultimately the father was granted full custody over the child as he was found to be
more responsible, stable and would cooperate with health professionals better than the mother.477
The child had seen a psychologist and both parents took the child to different therapists.478 The
custody order grants the father “sole decision making authority over all major issues regarding
education, religion, medical, healthcare and counselling decisions”.479 This may be standard
language for a custody order, yet nowhere else in the decision is there reference in obiter dicta to
the minor’s health consent rights under the HCCA, to alert the parents of the existence of such
rights.480
The last custody case is B.D v M.M. where the gender fluid child was nine years old.481 The
father, a middle-class engineer was unsupportive of social transitioning, let alone medical
transition. The mother, a worker at a sexual assault centre was supportive of the child’s gender
exploration. The child was comfortable expressing their gender with the mother and was upset
and repressed about their gender with the father. The father felt the mother outsourced her
parenting to professionals. In fact, the father’s central allegation in the case is that the child’s
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gender expression is scripted by these professionals and the mother and not a reflection of the
child’s true desires and wishes.482 Recall this idea of self-awareness as a concept key to
autonomy development of self from Chapter 2. Also, recall that this development is not status
and is informed by internal and external factors like culture, religion and social interactions.
In terms of final procedures for gender affirming decision making for the child who is nearing
puberty, the Judge ordered:
With respect to medical and psychological decisions or mental health regarding
Rosie/James’ gender non-conformity the parents shall follow the recommendations of
Dr. Stephen Feder, director of the Gender Diversity Clinic at CHEO or another doctor
at the clinic if Dr. Feder is no longer able to provide services for Rosie/James. If there
is a dispute as to those recommendations or their implementation, the parties are first to
attempt to resolve the matter through the exchange of written proposals. If the dispute
remains unresolved after the exchange of written proposals on the issue, it is strongly
recommended the parties attend mediation or retain the services of a parenting
coordinator to attempt to resolve the dispute, and share the costs proportionate to their
incomes. If the dispute remains unresolved, the parties may return the matter to Court
for determination.483

The above order is issued even though earlier the Judge held that:
As previously indicated, the parties’ ability to communicate, cooperate and collaborate
in order to meet the needs and interests of their children has become severely
compromised over the course of these proceedings. In fact, the conflict and dispute
between the parents caused the children’s doctor Dr. Kaplan-Myrth to withdraw her
services in February 2016. As of December, 2016, the parties had not been able to agree
on an appropriate replacement.

This again is a case where the judge does not show an awareness of a minor’s legal rights
conferred by the HCCA, perhaps because counsel did not argue it. Cis parents are becoming
aware of gender identity and gender expression and the treatments available for trans and gender
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nonconforming children. Indeed, the child and their parents would be best served to be informed
of such rights and cautioned that the child should be supported in making their own health care
decisions about transitioning.484
The language used by most judges in these four decisions and custody orders would not
disrupt a parent’s belief that they can exercise full control over their trans children’s ongoing
health care decisions. Furthermore, minors approaching puberty (4-12 yr olds), becoming aware
of their legal rights to health care decision making autonomy is crucial in the face of potentially
unsupportive parents and ignorant or intractable health care providers.485 And indeed, if both
parents agreed on not supporting a gender-variant or trans youth, and the child did not have
access to groups, resources, progressive clinics, the youth would likely not be able to transition
in the manner they wanted to because of ignorance of their rights. And as we have seen from the
literature and as the focus group participants confirm in the following chapter, this capability to
self-advocate is key for the autonomy of trans racialized youth in health care at any age.
Several of the decisions reveal attempts to grapple with gender and age-based roles for
children within the contested site of the family. Yet despite the relevance of informed consent to
treatment and the legal irrelevance of age in the HCCA, the judicial direction of lower courts is
towards consolidation of control over minors’ decision-making autonomy in the hands of
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parents. Conditions that foster autonomy for minors continues to be a determining factor later in
ensuring trans youth’s access to healthcare as we will see in the following chapter.
In summary, when it comes to the application of the HCCA to minors and youth in various
legal contexts, the two values of autonomy and protection continue to vie for precedence. As
Paré argues, while legislation ostensibly recognizes the principle of autonomy for minors, "the
protectionist approach remains integral to decision making".486 Autonomy, when referenced does
not incorporate relational autonomy, for example HCCA rights education, recognition of chosen
family or collaborative supported decision making. The conservative and paternalistic nature of
the judiciary is alive and well. We see this in terms of court-ordered therapy for minors and older
youth, circumventing the HCCA, and when it comes to enforcing binary gender and passing
health-related decisions over to the guardians of trans and gender-non conforming minors.487 The
data of Chapter 5 confirms that the trans racialized youth who are not minors still experience the
same treatment.

Part 2 The Regulation of Transness through Authoritative Texts

Doctors have the HCCA and the policy documents from their professional colleges to guide
them through legal issues of consent. In their dual role as health care providers and as
gatekeepers to health care they also reference nosologies and clinical texts. In this next section I
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examine the two most authoritative clinical texts applicable to trans racialized youth: the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) and the International Standards of
Care (SoC) issued by the WPATH. I contend that both texts work against the autonomy of trans
racialized youth in health care in two distinct ways. Firstly, the formula derived from the DSM
and absorbed by the SoC is coded to recognize and affirm normative gender roles, middle class
realities and is configured to white/Western cultural standards.488 Secondly, the SoC eligibility
requirements deselect racialized youth because of the SoC’s lack of intersectional and anti-racist
analysis. Then I explain the implications for trans racialized youth when these authoritative texts
are absorbed within insurance regulations. Finally, I provide a contrast by discussing a set of
local guidelines developed with trans community knowledge and input for primary care
practitioners. This brings us closer to Chapter 5, the phenomenology of four trans racialized
youth, who will deepen this inquiry through their own words and photographs.

Coercive Pathology

Psychiatric institutions in particular have made themselves experts on trans people through
professional committees that produce authoritative diagnostic and clinical texts such as the DSM
and the SoC.489 When governments sanction professional expertise through policy, physicians
then control access to trans health care. Furthermore, placing mental health professionals in the
gatekeeper role undermines trust in therapeutic relationships and reduces the benefits of therapy

Sarkisova supra note 329 at 262. I use the phrase “white/Western” as conceptualized by G. Mahrouse, “Raceconscious transnational activists with cameras: Mediators of compassion,” International Journal of Cultural Studies,
2008 vol. 11, no. 1, 87 at 91. With that phrase Mahrouse captures “the complex confluence of race (whiteness) and
nation (Canadian), geopolitical centre/margin location (Western) that produces the privilege that marks the work” of
in this case the American Psychiatric Association and the WPATH.
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for trans people.490 As I showed through the literature in Chapter 1, and as youth confirm in
Chapter 5 there is a formulaic narrative that trans people know they must recite when seeking
treatments. Sarkisova, encapsulates the dialogic process early described by Denny, Stone and
others in Chapter 1 into the concept of “coercive pathology”. 491 Sarkisova describes it as a
“pathologizing psychiatric narrative [that] narrows the possibilities for what it means or can
mean to be trans”.492 Coercive pathology ultimately concludes that the formula for diagnosis
mimics cisnormative narratives, desires and paths.493

The Nosology of Trans Youth
The SoC endorses the DSM, a manual of mental disorders, produced by the APA as an
authoritative classification system for the health conditions of trans people.494 The DSM authors
have been primarily white, male, middle-class, high-status psychiatrists.495 They determine what
constitutes a mental illness based on grouping symptoms of so-called abnormal behaviours.
Psychiatry is socially and culturally situated, thus the authors of the DSM operate within their
own social constructions of abnormality.496 Numerous studies have pointed to racial, cultural and
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gender bias in the creation of DSM diagnoses.497 Despite these critiques and resulting changes to
definitions of illnesses over decades, DSM authors continue to view nosology as atheoretical and
race and gender neutral. While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to recount the long and
turbulent history of trans nosology a brief summary of nosological evolution helps establish my
argument that the APA is a driving force in coercive pathological narratives for trans racialized
youth.498 From 1980 to 2013, the APA classified trans minor youth under “Gender Identity
Disorder in Children and Adolescents”. In 2013, the APA changed the classification to Gender
Dysphoria (GD) in the DSM-V. Currently GD describes a marked incongruence between one’s
experienced gender and one’s sex characteristics, how one is perceived and gendered in society,
respectively for more than six months and accompanied by “clinically significant distress or
impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.”499 Often during
adolescence, GD is worsened by intense distress about body image, and the wish to alter physical
and behavioural sex characteristics.500
Whereas distress over one’s physical and psychological incongruence could be partially
remedied by medical treatments, the phenomenon of transphobia also causes intense distress and
though widespread is not considered pathological.501 While the 2013 nosological change
certainly decreased the pathologization of transness and shifted the focus to the experience of
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distress over transphobia and gender incongruence, the diagnostic criteria for GD barely
changed.502

The World Professional Association for Trans Health Standards of Care
The WPATH SoC version 7 are the latest internationally prescribed clinical standards
regarding transition related care for transsexual and transgender people.503 They cover the
components of a gender dysphoria diagnosis, puberty suppression, hormone replacement
therapy, mental health assessment, requirements for surgery, surgical procedures and
postoperative care. The SoC are also the officially accepted protocols for provincially insured
gender affirming surgeries in Ontario. Ontario’s Ministry of Health and Long Term Care
(MOHLTC) adopted these standards when developing insurance coverage regulations for
surgeries.504 However, analogous to the widespread misapplication of health decision making
law in Ontario, it is reported that many health care providers apply outdated clinical standards
and believe that diagnosis is required for hormone replacement therapy instead of a less coercive
and less pathologizing assessment.505
The SoC have improved since they were originally released as the Harry Benjamin Standards
in 1979.506 For example, Version 7 incorporates harm reduction principles and explicitly
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acknowledges the North American and Western European research foundations of the SoC.507
Notwithstanding these aspirational statements and their improvement over previous standards, v7
continues to espouse the professional mental health medical model where individuals with a
disease require treatment. Additionally, they impose requirements that contraindicate against
access to treatments for trans youth of colour.
Cisnormativity, misogyny and pathologizing elements within the DSM-V and the SoC are
easy to identify because the language used is explicit, and indeed substantial critiques on these
topics exist.508 The SoC are most easily understood by and meant to be used by people who have
a medical or health education because of the abstract and psychiatric lexicon they deploy.
Frequently used terms like “patient”, “management”, “clinical” and “eligibility” are
pathologizing to a trans reader. Recalling that the SoC incorporates the DSM’s misogynist gender
binary, recently some have highlighted concerns that the SoC remains problematic for gender
non–binary, trans feminine people:509 a DSM-V diagnosis of the mental illness of Gender
Dysphoria; a one-year test of living in your felt gender role without surgery; a three-month
mental health screening and assessment before any type of treatment; an identifiable history and
narrative of cross-gender affiliation.
While racism is harder to pinpoint, the core required elements of the SoC are damaging to
trans people and gender non-conforming people of colour. The reader can recall the observations
of Stone and Ms. Major from Chapter 1 about the cultural whiteness of the HBGDA/WPATH
ideology of transness and the racism within the clinical encounter. The way that authoritative
texts affect trans racialized youth differently is seen through what is not acknowledged and in the
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application of the diagnostic and eligibility criteria. To illustrate the first point, there is no
mention of social determinants of health, intersectional identities, structural or systemic barriers
to care or the importance of community generated knowledge anywhere in the SoC. In a
reference about which youth are accessing treatment through gender clinics the SoC says:
The percentages of treated adolescents are likely influenced by the organization of
health care, insurance aspects, cultural differences, opinions of health professionals, and
diagnostic procedures offered in different settings.510

Beyond this vague comment, the SoC does not dig deeper into the different impacts and
experiences and clinical needs of racialized, disabled trans people. There is minimal
acknowledgement of white/Western research foundations and the continued white North
Americanness of the SoC Committee and International Selection Committees.511 And finally, the
SoC uncritically elevates mental health professionals especially psychiatrists whose field has
been critiqued for its implicit white/Western bias. Devoid of meaningful anti-oppressive critique,
there is no signal of awareness that racism, ageism, classism and ableism are embedded in the
culture of the APA or the WPATH, let alone action to change the practices.512
Application of the following SoC eligibility minimum criteria has a differential impact on
trans racialized youth: expression of a recognizable story, with familiar symptoms, signs of
physical and social commitment to the gender role, being stable, and having family support.513
As Pyne’s research suggested in Chapter 1, trans racialized youth are largely absent from the
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white middle class client base using Ontario’s progressive clinics and being fast-tracked to their
desired gender.514 In its section on the assessment and treatment of children and adolescents with
GD the SoC states that the best way to reduce distress for pubertal transgender adolescents (with
a GD diagnosis) is by taking puberty suppressing medication and gender affirming hormone
treatment.515
The adolescent specific section of the SoC is also problematic because the section
wholeheartedly accepts the highly contested clinical research by Dr. Kenneth Zucker and his
school of psychiatry.516 For example, in the section on the difference between children and
adolescents the SoC describes the higher rates of dysphoria continuing into adulthood for
adolescents over children, based on the 1995 research by Drs. Zucker and Bradley and
subsequent research by one other researcher.517 While there is no doubt that not all children who
show cross gender and gender bending behaviours are actually trans, relying uncritically on
methodological and ethically biased studies by Dr. Zucker undermines the credibility of the
SoC.518 Dr. Zucker was a proponent of using conversion therapy on minors, especially children
as the following passage shows:

The new early gender transition therapeutic approach stands in marked contrast to other
therapeutic approaches in which efforts are made to help a child feel more comfortable
with a gender identity that matches his or her birth sex, in part to avoid the complexities
of lifelong cross-sex hormonal treatment and sex-reassignment surgery. My impression
is that the early gender transition approach will result in more children persisting in
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their desire to live as a member of the other gender, which is, in effect, a rather
interesting social experiment of nurture.519 [emphasis added]

He equates the production of cissexuals and cisgender people with clinical success and
believes that early gender transition cannot be neutral despite being reversible. This thesis argues
that even the use of the word "persistence" with reference to gender dysphoria connotes
pathology to the state of being transsexual or transgender which is indeed a tension throughout
the SoC. For example, the SoC clearly states that it is now considered unethical to use
conversion therapy. Yet, it continues to require DSM-V diagnoses and mental health assessments
of trans youth by “qualified mental health professionals” before any kind of treatment
commences. And, the SoC relies on pathologizing research by Dr. Zucker who vehemently
opposed the banning of conversion therapy on minors in Ontario when Bill 77 was passed in
2015.520
While OHIP states there are no age minimums for surgeries the SoC sets recommended ages.
The SoC only recommends genital surgeries for minors after 16 years of age perhaps because
they are very hard to reverse.521 The SoC references “medical age of consent” for youth, which
very likely reinforces the validity and even existence of age-based markers for consent to
treatment in the minds of health care providers.522 For partially reversible interventions like cross
sex hormone therapy, 16 again is the recommended age for “medical consent” although the SoC
notes that parental consent may not be required.523 The concern is that practitioners with low-
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level knowledge of trans health, fear of law suits by parents or transphobic or ageist attitudes
may rely too heavily on the SoC rather than their own judgement and application of the HCCA.
In the past, WPATH had advocated for a three-month period of life experience in the felt
gender role prior to starting hormone therapy. This step was developed to establish coping
mechanisms for the abovementioned social stressors. The ‘Real Life Experience’ (RLE)
requirement has been shown to be especially stressful and frequently dangerous for trans
racialized people. By requiring racialized trans people to express a non-normative gender role
prior to acquiring any physical changes commensurate with that gender, increased their
vulnerability to interpersonal, public and state violence beyond that of cis racialized and white
trans counterparts.524 Several sources discussed in Chapter 1 provided evidence that racialized
trans people especially Black and Indigenous people experience disproportionate levels of police
violence, harassment and profiling.525
Fortunately, there is no longer a prerequisite for an RLE of any length prior to starting
hormone therapy. For surgical interventions such as genital surgery and gonadectomy a one-year
RLE is still recommended.526 For chest surgery youth are expected to have spent “ample” time in
a desired gender role and completed one year of testosterone treatment.527
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In addition to gender affirming physical modification, however, the SoC emphasizes the role
mental health professionals working with transgender youth have to fulfill and which concerns
should be canvassed as part of a holistic treatment plan.528 There are two factors to note here:
first, that North American and European psychiatry, psychology and endocrinology form the
foundation of the research the SoC relies on, and second, that the research is based primarily on
the white youth who are referred to gender clinics in urban areas accompanied by their
parents.529 As we will see below, these whitening factors shape the DSM and the SoC, which
claims to be universally applicable.530 Authors of both are overwhelmingly white, male cis and
North American and thus both documents define transness in white/Western terms.531 The SoC
v7 makes a brief acknowledgement that “much of the recorded clinical experiences and
knowledge in this area of health is derived from North American and Western European sources”
taking the analysis no further.532 The SoC v7 also explicitly tries to depathologize GD through
statements which are not followed through in the clinical guidelines. Because both documents
are endorsed by OHIP they have the greatest impact on trans racialized youth health autonomy.
Overall, while the SoC recognizes the dangers of abuse that can follow from withholding GA
treatments from youth, significant hurdles are maintained through reliance upon “colour-blind”
psychiatric diagnostic criteria, age thresholds, time limits and mental health assessments even for
HRT. Furthermore, a contradiction exists between declaring that there is nothing inherently
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wrong with being trans and that conversion therapy is unethical, but then adopting norms
entrenched in its white/Western cisgender psychiatric research foundations.533 As I will discuss
below, other agencies such as the Sherbourne Health Centre have collaborated with community
members to create a more autonomy enhancing approach based in primary care. Yet OHIP
coverage relies on adherence to the SoC requirements in approvals for subsidized surgeries with
its built-in coercive pathology, and gatekeeping role for physicians especially psychiatrists, thus
use of the SoC continue to erode trans racialized youth’s autonomy.534

Health Insurance Act Reg. 552 535

Access to Healthcare and Health Insurance Models
As discussed in my research portrait of trans health in Chapter 1, Namaste’s 1995 study found
that transsexuals and transgender people face a multitude of interpersonal and systemic barriers
in Ontario health services.536 They lacked health information, health rights information, safe
access to hormones, were mistreated by hospital staff, were denied entry to traditional alcohol
and drug rehabilitation programs and were refused access to shelters designated for youth,
women and the homeless.537 The very conditions necessary for autonomy in health care decision

Nicholas Matte, Aaron H Devor & Theresa Vladicka, “Nomenclature in the World Professional Association for
Transgender Health’s Standards of Care: Background and Recommendations” (2009) 11:1 Int J Transgenderism 42.
534
MHLTC SRS, supra note 274.
535
Health Insurance Act, supra note 8, Reg. 552, supra note 8.
536
Namaste 2000, supra note 75; for national coverage of GA treatments see "Publicly Funded Transition related
Medical Care in Canada" 2015 CPATH and United Food and Commercial Workers Canada
<http://www.cpath.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Publicly-Funded-Transition-Related-Medical-Care-in-CanadaExecutive-Summary.pdf>. The infographic contains information accurate to April 21, 2015 for BC and Canada, and
to September 11, 2015 for the rest of Canada.
537
Namaste documented lack of safe and supervised access to hormones at 166-169, mistreatment by hospital staff
at 157-169, denial of entry to traditional alcohol and drug rehabilitation programs at 184, refusal of access to shelters
designated for youth at 174, women and the homeless at 177, 182-183 and 189 in Namaste 2000 supra note 75.
533

135

making were attacked by government institutions, policies and attitudes of providers. And yet
subsidized health services are critical for the bulk of trans people who do not have employment
related health benefits, due to being disproportionately under or unemployed.538 Poverty is
racialized and gendered and employment access is shaped by English language proficiency and
citizenship status which puts many trans racialized youth at a disadvantage.
While OHIP adopted the superficially and recently trans-affirming SoC when developing
policies and regulations on insurance coverage for transition, related primary care coverage has a
checkered history and is still not comprehensive or easily accessible.539 Since 1978 Ontario had
covered “sex reassignment” surgery (SRS) meaning, top surgery for trans masculine people and
bottom surgeries for both trans men and trans women under Regulation 552 of the Health
Insurance Act and the Schedule of Benefits.540 Unlike many other insured surgical services, to be
eligible for SRS subsidies a person had to complete the psychiatric assessment program at the
GIC and be recommended for surgery by the CAMH GIC and the Ministry itself.
In 1998 soon after the HCCA came into effect, the Ministry under a Mike Harris government,
delisted SRS saying the move was part of broad cost cutting measures necessary to keep the
health insurance system viable. Yet, due to the GIC’s high rejection rate for trans applicants,
only about six people were recommended for surgery each year. In sum the cost of SRS to
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Ontario was a mere $123,891.83 out of the $30 billion annual health care budget suggesting that
gender-affirming care was less of a budgetary issue and more of a political maneuver.
Four trans people who had almost completed the real-life experience of the GID program
challenged the Ministry's delisting of SRS in Hogan.541 The majority for the Tribunal found
discrimination on the grounds of sex and disability for three out of four claimants and awarded
them amounts between $20-35,000 to reimburse them for the surgeries the province would have
covered prior to the date of delisting. The majority's decision relied on ss. 11 of the OHRC,
which refers to adverse discrimination or indirect discrimination.542
Several major changes in health insurance coverage have taken place since Hogan.543 The
same gender affirming surgeries were re-listed as insurable in 2008. Prior to 2015, Ontario
required that all subsidized gender affirming surgeries had to be recommended by the Gender
Identity Clinic at CAMH (run entirely by cisgendered staff).544 In November 2015, Regulation
552 was amended again to extend the surgical referral role to any medical professional, acting in
accordance with the SoC.545 This loosening of the CAMH GIC’s gatekeeping monopoly was
necessary because of the extreme hardships cause by their wait lists, delays and rejection rate.546
At least one human rights complaint had been filed over the wait times at CAMH and SBT cases
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mention the unnecessary hardship caused by having to travel to the Toronto clinic when primary
health care could be provided by local doctors.547 Currently, there is one letter of reference
required from mental health professionals for most procedures and two letters required for
genital surgeries.548 Trans people in major urban centres will likely have an easier time getting
referral letters though letters are not guaranteed due to barriers such as income, English language
proficiency, occupation, age, mobility and race/ethnicity.549
What has remained the same? The new regulations in Ontario continue to require that surgical
referrals need to align with the SoC which will create barriers for trans racialized youth who may
not be seen as stable due to lack of housing, income, family support, or having other mental
illness diagnoses caused by the impacts of racism. Furthermore, the general requirement that the
MHLTC pre-approve all gender affirming surgeries is an encumbrance not placed on other
surgical referrals, which causes delays and leaves room for physician errors.550 OHIP coverage is
marked by trans misogyny in terms of the number of services deemed unnecessary and therefore
not covered for trans women such as laser hair removal, voice and communication training,
facial feminization voice therapy.551 Ontario's new regulations ostensibly cover top surgery for
trans women (augmentation mammoplasty). However, service providers find the eligibility
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criteria impossible to meet.552 To obtain a subsidized breast augmentation, trans women in
Ontario are required to have taken feminizing hormones for at least one year and have
experienced zero breast growth (aplasia). Jordan Zaitzow, a Provincial Trans Health Coordinator
at Rainbow Health Ontario, has observed some clinicians try to assist their clients, by being
flexible on how they measure "no growth", but OHIP applies the Tanner Stage measurements for
secondary sex characteristics to evaluate their eligibility requirements. So far, all referrals
Zaitzow has heard of have been rejected.553
In addition, an unsuccessful legal challenge was made over what constitutes a "medical
necessity" in the context of trans women and laser hair removal.554 Currently, medical necessity
is defined by cis gendered standards – i.e. whether cis women who might receive the treatment
are publicly funded. However, this logic ignores the fact that their reasons for doing so are purely
cosmetic and does not deconstruct what we consider to be cosmetic and the different needs of
trans women.555

OHIP+: The New Youth Pharma Care Plan
Youth can receive coverage for drugs such as Lupron, estradiol, testosterone and antiandrogens if they are receiving income assistance from Ontario Works or Ontario Disability
Support Program, by submitting an Exceptional Access Program form filled out with the support
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of their primary care provider if they have one.556 In Chapter 5 trans racialized youth share their
experiences of attempting to navigate systemic access hurdles. Far fewer youth of colour will
access puberty blocking and hormone replacement drugs through the employee health benefits of
their parents for several reasons. This is because racialized families are less likely to enjoy
employee health benefits due to the precarity of their jobs that lack health benefits.557 Racialized
youth may not be on social assistance because they live at home. Youth whose parents do not
have employment health benefits but who are not themselves on social assistance, i.e., they live
at home, fall into the gap that the new OHIP+ program could resolve. Currently Lupron costs
$500.00 a shot making it unobtainable for working class and low-income families and youth
since it must be administered daily for 1-3 months.558 Youth who are not enrolled full-time in a
recognized post-secondary institution could also lose their entitlement to their parent’s plan if
they are over 18 years according to Green Shield and Great West Life.559
The Hospital for Sick Children’s Transgender Youth Clinic occasionally encounters patients
without any means to pay for drugs and has at least once approached the makers of Lupron
successfully for complimentary courses of the drug.560 A youth worker at Skylark Youth
Services in Toronto also mentioned employing the same approach for a youth whose parents
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refused to pay for their Lupron.561 This of course is not an approach to be used consistently but
speaks to the resourcefulness of some healthcare providers who are supported by their
institutions.
In June 2017 the Liberal government announced a pharma care program to pay for
prescription drugs for the province's children and youth.562 It remains to be seen what drugs will
be covered by the new plan and how pharmacies will respect the decision-making autonomy of
youth when they fill their prescriptions. Most recently, in 2018 the PC government announced
that children and youth will not receive free pharmaceuticals if they have private coverage
through their parents plans.563

The Sherbourne Health Centre Guidelines

This section analyzes the health guidelines for Ontario trans youth as found in the Sherbourne
Health Centre Guidelines and Protocols for Comprehensive Primary Care for Trans Clients [the
Guidelines].564 The Sherbourne Health Centre (SHC) is unique because it is located in a
neighbourhood with several other trans community service providers, and has at least one trans
doctor, and several trans nurses and trans health care providers on staff.565 Rainbow Health
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Ontario (RHO), a program of Sherbourne Health Centre, shares space in the same building. RHO
provides information, training and resources on LGBTQ+ public health across Ontario and has
delivered training about the Guidelines since 2011. The Guidelines provides a useful public
health contrast to the clinical psychiatry-led WPATH text.
Consultations were held in 2003 with trans communities who access the SHC.566 SHC staff
and interested community members met for discussion of needs and concerns. The group also
reviewed other protocols. Unlike the SoC, some trans input was incorporated into the
protocols.567 Trans community knowledge incorporates trans lived realities and health expertise
which has been sorely lacking in research on transness, and the creation of protocols for trans
health, not to mention general health policy that also affects trans people.568 As a result of
community input the Guidelines reflect a more collaborative and patient-directed approach that
recognizes trans community knowledge about health care.569
Unlike the SoC, the Guidelines relate gender affirming treatments to the provision of primary
care as opposed to automatically relegating trans needs to psychiatrists and endocrinologists.570
The 2015 edition was also adapted to better suit needs of non-binary clients.571 The purpose of
these guidelines is to expand the number of primary care providers who feel competent to see
trans clients by describing routine care practices tested by SHC nurses, nurse practitioners and
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doctors.572 This is evident in the Guideline’s description of dosages and monitoring for more
typical cases of HRT that would enable a trans client to obtain standard care from their family
doctor. This kind of precise information for local doctors would prevent an automatic consult
with an endocrinologist a process causing delays and likely the need to travel to an urban center,
often not possible for a trans racialized youth.573 Another notable practice example from the
Guidelines is the refraining from automatic referrals to psychiatrists or CAMH, encouraging
family doctors to make the diagnosis of GD listed in the DSM -V.574 While their public health
equity approach to the care of trans clients is a strength of the Guidelines the phenomena of
racism, classism and ageism as social determinants of health are not explicitly named. Still,
inclusion of access to health care tips for Ontario practitioners about navigating provincial drug
plans and health insurance policies to assist clients in accessing hormone therapy and writing
free support letters to obtain gender accurate identity documents would have a significant benefit
for trans racialized youth.575 The Guidelines include some inaccurate information about consent
to treatment law by claiming that there is no specific age of consent in Canada, when like all
health related matters, it is a provincial jurisdiction.576 They do not define capacity precisely,
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however they show confidence in primary care providers to make capacity assessments for trans
clients just as they would for any other clients, being mindful of cognitive abilities, age, life
experience and substance use.577
The health care provider’s role in assessing a client’s eligibility and readiness for HRT creates
an inequitable dynamic, with the provider acting as the ‘gatekeeper’ to treatment. In response to
this, the SHC practices the ‘informed consent model’ for hormone therapy which aligns with the
HCCA. In this model, the primary care provider focuses on obtaining informed consent as the
threshold for the initiation of hormone therapy, with less emphasis on meeting DSM-V diagnostic
criteria for Gender Dysphoria or requiring a mental health assessment unless significant mental
health concerns are identified.578 The primary care approach to mental health is more nuanced
and intersectional than the SoC’s reliance on clinical expertise, due to SHC’s reliance on
community based knowledge and community based research through research affiliates like
TRANSpulse offers methods for a depathologizing way of caring for trans people.579 However,
as doctors from Ontario youth clinics confirm, this informed consent model works best where
youth rely on their parent’s health care benefits not on OHIP which require the diagnosis for
coverage of surgeries.580
The primary care model developed by the SHC in collaboration with trans community
members incorporates social determinants of health and public health strategies making it a more
effective and autonomy enhancing system for those youth with in its catchment area, in contrast
to the medical model applied in other sites across Ontario.
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Conclusion

This chapter illustrated how taken together, Ontario’s expansive health statutes, policies, and
insurance programs have not actually expanded access to needed resources for trans racialized
youth and have in application intensified their exclusion from autonomous decision making in
health care. Legal sources I examined failed to explicitly recognize social determinants of health
such as age, race, class, and gender identity that affect access. Since access to non-trans specific
health care is racialized, then access to trans specific health care will also be racialized.
The cases that propelled the development of the common law primarily turned on refusal to
consent to life-saving treatments on the grounds of religion. With few exceptions, judges imbue
decisions about young people’s health, whether minors or not, with paternalism. Youth
autonomy is seen as undermined only by parents and by religion and not by systemic forces of
poverty, racism, citizenship status or cisnormativity. Decisions show that judges determine
capacity by evaluating the correctness of a young person’s decision especially if there is risk to
life or the body is modified significantly.
Courts have not addressed whether trans youth can make life-altering, and as some would
argue, life-saving medical decisions about transitioning. These discussions have addressed social
transitions or taken place in family courts where the tendency of jurisprudence from lower courts
is to ignore or to override the application of the youth’s right to consent pursuant to the HCCA.
And indeed, the Ontario Court of Appeal has yet to rule on this issue head on.
The erosion of gender essentialism has changed faster in statutory law such as human rights
codes and vital statistics acts than in the minds of judges where decades of gender essentialism
and binary gender have created precedents. Jurisprudence continues to promulgate ontological
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myths about binary gender even as decision makers recognize transnormative options for trans
legal subjectivity.
Even though the general objectives of the HCCA claim to support autonomy and it contains a
presumption of capacity for all persons, broad understanding of and compliance with the HCCA
remains a significant issue for health care providers. These claims remain aspirational because
the HCCA lacks the regulatory infrastructure required to create conditions that foster autonomy
namely: information sharing, redress for findings of incapacity, and non-automatic appointment
of family of origin as SDMs, collaborative decision making by youth and trusted advisors,
adequate trainings for professionals and regular intersectional public awareness aimed at youth.
The relationship between the DSM-V, the SoC and OHIP regulations cements the
white/Western bias of diagnostic criteria, into clinical eligibility standards for transgender
people, and subsidized health care. This is exacerbated in application by the gatekeeping role
assigned by all three texts to physicians, nurses and mental health professionals.
The triple threat structure produces diminished standards for autonomy: the coercive
pathology of diagnostic criteria rejects trans racialized youth selfhood; eligibility criteria
prevents them from accessing treatments and services, and gatekeeping diminishes the potential
for therapeutic honesty. Locally developed guidelines for primary care practitioners address
some of these problems in effective ways. I contend that replacing relational autonomy with
informed consent is flawed. Informed consent is an individualized process locked in a system
that does not adequately inform structurally vulnerable youth of their statutory rights.
Legislators though aware of equity-based principles and progressive legal norms, need to
enact education and monitoring into statutes so autonomy conditions can be fostered. This is
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critical since advocacy mechanisms were repealed and it seems that youth find internal equity
complaint programs and courts inaccessible.
As such, youth experience legal restrictions to their decision-making autonomy due to
inadequate health care rights knowledge and protectionist beliefs from their families, health care
practitioners, social workers and judges framed as questions about their capacity best interests or
through language and application of bureaucratic policy. Furthermore, phenomenological field
work data presented in the next chapter, confirm that trans racialized non-minor youth continue
to be subjected to arbitrary constraints on their autonomy in health care decision making.
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Chapter 5: Transcendent Bodies

Introduction

The question at the heart of this research project is: How do trans racialized youth experience
autonomy in health care decision making? To lay the groundwork for this, in Chapter 2 I
discussed a relational version of autonomy and distinguished it from the concept of agency. I
theorized that autonomy is the ability to act in a manner congruent with one's values, long-term
individual and collective interests, and in consideration of different types of personal, social and
political relationships.581 I developed a list of six factors conducive to autonomous decisionmaking for trans racialized youth. As Chapter 4 explained, Ontario’s health care consent statute
presumes that everyone can capably make their own health care decisions unless proven
otherwise. 582 In addition, I considered the meaning of legal capacity to make health care
decisions and the process of informed consent or refusal. Moreover, we saw how judge’s written
decisions act as a type of representation of the litigants’ experience and identity. Most judicial
representations reproduce and affirm medically-constituted notions of the essence of transness
that ultimately confine trans people to heterosexual binary narratives and fail to validate the
health consent rights of minors. Recall from Chapter 1 that critical trans scholars have long
critiqued these legal and medically-produced narratives as transnormative.
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Despite the current state of Ontario law where capacity, not age, is the crucial factor for
decision making, I have argued that racialized trans youth are still prevented from making health
care decisions autonomously by the attitudes of judges, legislators, health care practitioners, and
the barriers embedded in officially endorsed clinical policy documents. Integrating my earlier
discussion of theoretical concepts of structural vulnerability, intersectionality, selfhood,
relational autonomy and the analytical tool of disidentification theory I now present my focus
group results organized thematically. I then discuss participants’ responses to the barriers in
health care as: autonomy-enhancing, protective/agentic, and a mix of autonomy-enhancing and
agentic.

Results

The following results from my focus group with four trans racialized youth are organized
under two major themes: a) structural and systemic barriers and b) interpersonal, professional
and organizational barriers. Photographs were analysed using the rubric in Appendix 3 with a
modified typology of gazes.583 Interview transcripts were analysed using thematic network
analysis.584

Structural and Systemic Barriers
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Within this first major theme, participants described experiences relating to five structural
areas affecting autonomous decision-making: financial barriers, legal barriers, undermining
consent, gatekeeping, and the institutional nature of care.

Financial Barriers
Participants came from various economic backgrounds and had different income levels based
on whether they received financial support from their parents. This impacted their access to
health care. The major financial barriers they noted were the cost of pharmaceuticals, doctor’s
letters, ambulance fees, name change fees, binders, canes, and knee braces pointing to gaps in
Ontario’s universal health care coverage. Prior to 2018, pharmaceuticals, including cross-sex
hormones or puberty-blockers were not covered unless one was an Ontario Works or Ontario
Disability Support Program recipient.585 According to participants, the coverage for genderaffirming treatments under their parents’ employee benefits plans was limited and their access to
the benefits was controlled by their parents, therefore not confidential. There were no sliding
scales for drugs or doctors’ services that were not covered by OHIP. Three participants were
unable to benefit from one-on-one mental health services from psychotherapists586 or
psychologists relying on the OHIP covered services provided by social workers and
psychiatrists. This comment reveals Pogi’s (they/them) frustration with the interplay between
private insurance and ODSP drug coverages both requiring medical documentation:

And then I'm being penalized for being able to work because they don't believe I'm
disabled, but it's like nothing, it's contract work. I stopped taking T as well, because it
585
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was costing me too much. It's frustrating because I have to make money to survive but
by doing that I can't prove I'm disabled…So I live with my mom, and I was getting her
benefits before because I was in school and then I was bipolar, so I was getting benefits
because I was bipolar, but then the insurance committee decided to challenge that. So I
had to get a bunch forms, a psychiatrist to prove full time incapacitation. But I can't
because the doctor I'm seeing doesn't think I have bipolar, so I don't have benefits and I
can't apply for ODSP and then I don't even know...and then he's like, lithium is the
cheaper one...if I don't have bipolar why do I need medication?

Unlike service providers with lived experience of seeking gender-affirming treatments,
participants’ doctors appeared uninformed about the costs of drugs, or the ways to access drugs
through the Exceptional Access Program (EAP), drug plans and benefit schemes for youth who
had no private insurance.587 Sakura River (they/them) who was emancipated from the age of 16
described their challenges thusly:
Yeah, I don’t have coverage from work, I don’t have coverage from family matters, I
don’t have that coverage like other people might. And other people might have like,
family, who helps them get the hormones they want, helps them have things to help their
identity, my family was the complete opposite of that.588

This passage shows how financial barriers that work against youth with inadequate family
support exacerbated their specific situation, thus further undermining their ability to make
autonomous decisions in contrast to Participant #4 who lived at home and had some financial
support or Pogi whose parents were able to share private insurance benefits with them for a time.
Financial barriers to health care caused the participants a great deal of stress and increased the
pressure to make agentic choices to avoid health care.589
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Legal Barriers
Participants described legal barriers arising from the regulation of gender through identity
documentation, and the inadequate provision of information about and application of health
consent law. Participant #4 said that requirements “like having gender markers on identification
when in essentially every instance they aren’t needed” created a barrier.590
None of the participants had official identification with their chosen name or gender
markers.591 Furthermore, one participant reported that they could not afford to change their
identification documents to reflect current names and sex designations to reflect lived gender
such as, passports and birth certificates. For Sakura River, the major obstacle was being unable
to access a legally required birth certificate from their country of birth. They recalled:
I have like my legal documents for Canada, I don’t personally own it, my mum has
it…It’s very hard to get those, because she won’t let me have them…She doesn’t want
me to change my name. She is refusing to let me change my name on legal documents
as she’s like keeping them.592

This passage provides one example of how legal requirements for naturalized citizens and
parental control combine to prevent autonomous behaviour for emancipated youth.
Two participants recounted experiences of being misgendered upon presenting their OHIP
card to service providers.593 An MRI technician misgendered Participant #4 this way: “the person
was gendering me using like he/him pronouns, and then like I gave them my health card and they
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were like, ‘OH! You’re a girl!’ and I was just like, fuck this.” Sakura River shared another
example of insistence on legal names: “Every time I have to use health care, I tell them of my
identity and most just decide that I am a female and my legal name is the name they will use. It
creates a huge sense of incompetence in doctors as well and does not help my issues.”594
Sakura River’s photograph “UNH Invoice”595 captures their frustration with structural
barriers. It shows a torn Fact Sheet about changing one’s name on official documentation, and an
invoice from the University Health Network for an ambulance half-buried in a muddy puddle
strewn with cigarette butts. In my interpretation, this photograph and their quotes demonstrate
the delegitimizing power of regulatory documents and how difficult it can be to transition
legally. Sakura River also commented that the University Health Network was unwilling to
reconsider invoicing them for an ambulance fee despite their efforts to have the fee waived for
inability to pay.

Undermining Consent
Informed consent is central to the HCCA, however, results show that in application it was
undermined. The main tactics identified that contravened HCCA provisions and professional
regulations on informed consent were: inadequate information, coercion, breaches of
confidentiality, and failure to apply the legal presumption of capacity. Results suggest health
care providers deployed these tactics more often when the participants were under 18 years
old.596
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Lack of access to health rights information and health related legal remedies created a health
rights vacuum for the participants. None of the participants was aware of their statutory rights
with respect to consent to treatment in health care. On the first day of the focus group I had asked
them questions to assess their legal knowledge pertaining to making health care decisions.
Participants had never heard of the HCCA. They were unaware of their formal legal rights as
youth and rights they possessed as minors under the HCCA.597 They had never heard of the
Consent and Capacity Board and did not know that findings of capacity could be challenged at
that tribunal.598 Participants had not talked to lawyers or paralegals or community legal workers
about health care rights or problems.599 They had not encountered legal information about their
rights in health care settings or online. In contrast to the community knowledge they accessed
about treatments and providers, community knowledge circles such as friends and online groups
had shared no information about health care statutes or legal rights.600 They were unaware that
legal information could help them access their health needs, and of how to go about finding legal
information.601
Before they reached the age of majority, they all disclosed that their parents made their health
decisions. During the discussion they disclosed that they did not want their family members to
make health care choices for them if they were found incapable. They were not aware that they
could interrupt the automatic SDM hierarchy.602 Participants reported that health care providers
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had not informed participants that if they had any problem with family members acting as SDMs
participants could challenge decisions or ask for a new SDM to be appointed.
Participants who lived with their parents as minors and young adults expressed the most
frustration over doctors’ non-consensual involvement of parents in the decision-making
processes.603 Participant#4 stated:
As I continue to share residence with my parents my mother in particular has always
tried to make particular decisions around my health for me without my full
understanding or consent if at all. In my adult years I’ve tried to give her less space to
take up regarding my health, but she still often ends up taking the lead in those
conversations.604

Further evidence of breaches of confidentiality was shared by Sakura River said their family
doctor consulted their mother without asking for their consent. “My mum, at the time she went to
the same doctor as me, so in that time the doctor started listening to her side of the story about
how I was too confused to know if I was trans and the doctor stopped believing what I was
saying.”605 The consequences of such breaches were serious for Sakura River, “My mum took
me off her healthcare plan when I was 13, because I was trans and talked about mental
health.”606
Health care providers sometimes allowed caregivers to exert further control over decision
making when they accompany minors or young adults to their doctor’s appointments. Two other
participants described this experience. At one point, Participant #4 said, “so I go over, and my
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doctor of course misgenders me, ‘cause like I’m not having a conversation with her about this
stuff, especially since like, my mom is usually in the room when I go to the doctor’s office.”607
Pogi described how their parents took the lead in all health care discussions, and from a young
age they never remember consent being explained to them, it was just assumed by doctors after
talking to their parents.608
Two photographs evoked this frustration. Pogi’s photograph, “Think before you scream”,
shows a person with long curly hair and glasses sitting in a forest in front of a wire fence.609 In
the background is what looks like a high school sports field. The photograph is black and white
except for a bright blue loud speaker that the subject holds away from their mouth. Pogi
described the loud speaker as a symbol of urgent communication.610
Participant #4’s photograph, “The Ground is a long way down, but there is more than one way
to be grounded” was taken in response to prompts 1, 3, and 4 (Appendix );611 They used a
downward camera angle to force the viewer’s gaze downwards, literally putting the viewer in
their shoes. They incorporated a lot of empty space in the foreground of the frame, describing
themselves in relation to health care providers as their blackness and their transness being
invisible, while their access needs are highly visible but misunderstood. This participant wanted
the viewer to be unsure whether the turquoise fish-scale patterned object that points downward to
their feet, parallel to their front body is a stick or a cane.612 The participant wanted to portray the
discomfort of health care providers with trans racialized bodies and the negative impact of this
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discomfort on the iterative communication process so critical for decision-making autonomy.
Participant #4 said, “Yes, when I was younger there were many conversations about mental
health and cognition that were had with my parents rather than including me. I was started on
medication without consent, although I refused to take it anyways, and made to be monitored by
[sic] teachers via check-ins at my schools.”613 They explained how as a child and a teenager,
doctors spoke almost exclusively to their parents, and this discouraged them from learning how
to communicate with doctors.614 This photograph and quote demonstrate how doctors, parents
and teachers breached confidentiality failed to build trust, communicate information and support
autonomous decision making for this person as a minor.
One participant described an experience where a service provider practiced informed consent.
Sakura River mentioned two high school social workers who supported their autonomy when
they were hospitalized. The social worker asked Sakura River if there was anyone they wanted to
be contacted; Sakura River did not want their mother to be notified. The social worker respected
their wishes by contacting their cousin who was their main support person. Sakura River
described the impact of feeling listened to and cared about in the following way:
She understood that I was not close to my family and she knew not to call them. She
knew that and respected that fact so greatly. She was the first one to fully understand it
I guess you could say. I felt like super cared for at that time, when I needed it most.
Which was like the best ever, because she was just always there. And hospitals never
did the same, my own mom never did the same.615

During our initial discussions on the first day of the focus group about participants’
understanding of consent to treatment practices, Participant #4 said, “In my experience, consent
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hasn’t been made something explicit in medical spaces (specifically from service providers) but
is often instead implied.”616 Participant #1 said they thought that there was an age threshold for
receiving cross sex hormone therapy. Pogi thought there were age thresholds for surgery because
they had been given consent forms at the beginning of surgery approval processes with the ages
of 17 and 18 on them.617 One participant had heard of “DSM criteria”.618 None of the participants
knew the name of the HCCA, or were aware of consent, capacity or substitute decision maker
hierarchy provisions.619
As laid out in Chapter 4 another way that autonomous decision making is undermined is
through inadequate provision of accessible information about the HCCA. All of the participants
described a total lack of information sharing about their legal rights as minors when interacting
with health care providers and institutions. Pogi reflected on how knowledge of their rights
might have changed their experience at the CAMH GIC:
I don't know what would have happened if I was more honest and less rehearsed at the
GIC. If I researched more into and took more initiative into asking what I was looking
for and being more aware of my rights and the GIC's jurisdiction, if I was less emotional
and more practical.620

Pogi had been hospitalized at Sunnyside for bipolarity as a minor. Pogi said they were not
informed of the incapacity finding or told how to challenge that finding. This is troubling,
recalling from the previous chapter that the requirements for rights advice for incapable people in
the psychiatric context are more robust than in non-psychiatric findings of incapacity although
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not for minors. The doctor chose an SDM from the prescribed HCCA list but Pogi was not
informed of how this process worked. The doctor did not tell Pogi that they could ask for a
different SDM. Pogi was unaware that the SDM had to follow any prior capable wishes about
treatment Pogi had made at the age of 16. Pogi said that between the ages of 12-16, “I didn’t
even know I had a say in health decisions. I was taught that I was a minor, and it would be
doctors and parents discussing what to do then explaining what they were going to do.”621
The improper resolution of capacity issues was also cited as a reason for inadequate genderaffirming care. Pogi, Sakura River and Participant #1 were all initially found incapable to decide
to take cross sex hormone therapy as minors by family doctors in private practice. Participant #1
for example, did not want to disclose their significant anxiety due to numerous experiences of
being found incapable simply for having mental health issues and being a minor.622 They did not
want to delay starting feminizing hormones so they eventually chose to temporarily take
unprescribed hormones by taking a friend’s birth control pill.623 They explained that they had not
been able to find a doctor or nurse who they could work with because so far, at the age of 18,
several health care providers told them they were not old enough to make this decision on their
own.624
At another time a health care provider who acted non-consensually in an emergency, placed a
youth in a difficult financial situation. Sakura River depicts this situation in their photograph,
“UHN Invoice”. They staged this photo by crumpling up the invoice for an ambulance that was
sent to their home against their wishes. The invoice lies in a muddy puddle with a pen and half of
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a cigarette. Sakura River had spoken to a Telehealth nurse about an undisclosed health issue. The
nurse thought they had to send an ambulance, despite the fact that Sakura River insisted they did
not want an ambulance. Their main reason for refusing the ambulance was the prohibitive cost of
ambulance service. Sakura River received many notices to pay this invoice and eventually the
fee went to a collection agency.625 Sakura River used their agency to attempt to refuse the
ambulance to avoid the fee despite the fact that it was in their best interests to take the
ambulance. They eventually took the ambulance because they were told they would be charged
regardless. They placed the capped pen and the cigarette butts in the photograph to symbolize
their blocked capability to act autonomously.626
All the participants lacked formal opportunities to practice autonomous decision making as
they approached the age of majority. This was heightened for two youth whose families were
very engaged in their health care as minors. Pogi had experienced parental control over their
health decisions up to age 16 and felt suddenly unprepared when doctors began asking their
parents to leave the room. Pogi explained it this way:
Yeah, it’s weird because like something happens after 16 where the doctors like ask
your parents to leave the room. And it’s like what? Doctors talk to you directly and ask
what I think. I also noticed soon after turning 18 and all up until 21, health care staff
seemed to reinforce that I was an adult now, and ‘it’s your choice, but I...’ kind of
statements. It was noticeable over time, like I felt and still do, like I’m in autopilot with
my health. It’s like all of sudden I have this autonomy over my body that I’ve never
practiced asserting, or even understanding what that meant.627

The ways that health care providers undermine autonomous decision making are amplified
by the gatekeeping role that health law and policy assign to these professionals. This
625
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combination negatively impacts a trans racialized youth’s self-image, and as participants
describe, forces them to engage in agentic strategies such as performance, avoidance of medical
care and hiding.

Gatekeeping

As shown through analysis of authoritative texts in Chapter 4, health care providers perform
gatekeeping functions by making diagnoses, and approving trans people for gender-affirming
treatments. Participants named other gatekeeping actions such as selecting which treatments to
propose, sharing medical and legal information, prescribing hormones, and making referrals to
specialists. In addition, the participants felt like they had to say yes to whatever the doctor
wanted simply to get the diagnosis. Three participants described psychiatrists as having the most
direct gatekeeping power because of their power to diagnose Gender Dysphoria. As Pogi
complained: “Psychiatrists don’t know anything. You spent 12 years, and this is what you got?
You have so much power! From insurance, to benefits, letters for id docs, all that trickles down
and service providers and judges will take whatever you say here…”628
Participant #4 recognized that: “…for some people doing diagnosis based is really important,
it’s like necessary. To be able to access different services, to get things subsidized. And like I
think some service providers will sprinkle language around willy nilly.”629 The health care
professional’s gatekeeping role to diagnose and provide evidence in the context of disability
income support meant that, in Participant #4’s own words:
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I did and still continue to avoid getting diagnosed for things that are necessary, like
accessing ODSP for example; but even when in a medical space I still have a difficult
time trying to convey any issues I'm having, leading to me being, underdiagnosed, made
to wait, disbelieved, or ignored.630

Paternalism manifested through gatekeeping and capacity assessment when Pogi tried to find
a doctor who would prescribe them testosterone. Pogi’s family doctor considered them too young
and would not prescribe. Then their doctor tried to put them on the CAMH GIC waitlist in 2014.
They were waitlisted for the GID youth clinic at CAMH in 2015, and eventually was called for
an appointment in 2016. By this time Pogi said, “… I was referred to a St Mike’s clinic nurse
through Pieces to Pathways who was reputably trans-competent. Three weeks after that I started
taking testosterone.”631 This quote shows that Pogi received more timely access to care from peer
trans youth workers who run Pieces to Pathways, a substance use program for LGBTTQ+ youth
who were better at facilitating access to hormones for low-income youth and emancipated trans
youth. This access was facilitated in part, by the provincial by-law change in March 2017 that
allowed nurses to prescribe controlled substances like testosterone, after taking some additional
training thus reducing the reliance on doctors.632
Referrals from family doctors were needed to get appointments with specialists, however
participants struggled just securing or maintaining a relationship with a family doctor for primary
care. Doctors are also required to sign approval forms for treatment. Participant #4 said they
were seeing their family doctor, “but only really for a medical referral”. After months of
searching for a doctor who was seeing new clients, getting on waitlists at recommended clinics,
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“talking to different representatives who would give me different information,” Pogi recalls how
“desperate I was to start HRT”. They said after trying to access HRT “that was incredibly
charged with emotional energy, I felt drained and depressed with each phone call.” Finally, being
refused testosterone at the CAMH GIC, Pogi said: “I was confused to what the point of the GIC
was and why my doctor had referred me here if she could had prescribed me HRT. The GIC is
busy, if I had ['lot] schedule to see these people consistently before getting a referral that would
take months on top of the medication.”633
Furthermore, participants named three health categories explicitly used to block access to
gender-affirming care: disability, body weight and mental health. The insurance company that
administered Pogi’s parent’s employee benefits program wanted proof of disability to cover them
for hormones. Pogi was reluctant to frame themselves as disabled for being trans and bipolar.
Furthermore, proving disability would have required even more meetings with doctors, so
instead they chose to pay for their hormone therapy out of pocket, as he was not on OW or
ODSP. Through a discussion of their photograph, “Reading between the Signs”,634 Pogi shared
that their bi-polarity diagnosis became a gatekeeping issue to be either hidden or presented as
appropriately managed before they were seen as stable enough to access gender affirming
treatments, a policy which matches the requirements in the DSM-V and SoC v7. About being
assessed at CAMH GIC Pogi said: “So like I had to be distressed about how I was unable to
physically transition but not so distressed I was mentally unstable.”
Doctor’s preoccupation with weight frequently arose as a type of gatekeeping for Participant
#4. Participant #4 believed that doctors used their size as a way to dismiss other health needs.
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They had been told by doctors, “you have to lose ten pounds before I’m gonna do any other
treatments.”635 Participant #4 was motivated to address this experience visually by taking
pictures of their belly. They said, “weight and being plus size doesn’t need to be an access to
health care issue but it is,” and:
…you enter the room and it’s like, ‘Well you could lose some weight’ and I think that’s
a particular experience of doctors doing that to either women or people perceived as
women…and that’s a gatekeeping method for doctors.636

Results demonstrated the gatekeeping role law and health policy assigns to doctors in
particular. We now look at what participants said about the health care system overall.

Institutionalization of Care

Despite the closure of the CAMH clinic and the passage of legislation banning the use of
conversion therapy on minors, two participants expressed a lingering fear of retribution if
opinions about doctors or institutions such as CAMH were made public. Pogi talked about not
wanting to vilify CAMH through their photo, “Building on Health Care”, as they had attended
the GIC there when they were 20 years old. They depicted through both “Building on Health
Care” and “You Change” that CAMH had a psychiatric environment where being trans felt like a
disease compared to the affirmative trans-led community care he now received. 637
They also described undergoing multiple mental health assessments at the GIC, “When I
went to the clinic, I met with two people that each did an evaluation with me. I think the first one
was a psychiatrist and the second was a psychologist. I was nervous.” In their photo Pogi used
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the angle of the camera and the high contrast lettering of a blue and white sign to give a
directional sense of industrial growth to an image. A person of colour in a dress wearing
sunglasses to hide her identity, points with a single finger to the lettering on the sign. She seems
marginalized because she is literally at the edge of the frame, yet she also seems deliberate and
aware. Perhaps this editorial gaze is Pogi’s recognition that while CAMH has a negative
historical connotation for many trans people across Ontario, due to its practices, its low referral
rates for surgery, and its waiting lists, there are some people who would say they benefitted from
CAMH services.638
Both Pogi and Sakura River shared that they had been institutionalized as minors and as
young adults. Both created photographs that evoke the unsettling control and invasion of
surveillance and knowledge production.639 Pogi’s photograph, “Building on Health Care”,
displayed their perception that CAMH prioritized institutional budgets and research goals over
the needs of consumers. They called the structure the “medical industrial complex”.640
Meanwhile, Sakura River gave two examples supporting Pogi’s opinion. The message of their
Bloody Glove series on neglect in health care was emphasized by their choice of alleyways in
close proximity to CAMH as the location:
I’ve been to hospital so many times for either suicide watch or something, or panic
attack, I was never given the health care that I needed at that time, because the hospitals
either didn’t believe me, or didn’t care.641
Unfortunately, when I had issues with my mental health I was in hospitals, they never
seemed to understand me as a person of trans experience as I continually asked to be
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called my preferred name and pronouns but was never shown the courtesy in situations
with ER [emergency room] professionals. I always say quotations of professionals.642

Despair comes across as a resulting sub-theme in Sakura River’s Bloody Gloves series where
black-hooded figures loom in graffitied alleyways wearing bloody medical gloves. Sakura River
depicts feeling neglected and disbelieved in part because of sounding articulate and assertive and
in part because of experiencing health care as an impersonal bureaucracy.643 While other factors
such as unsupportive family members and poverty were named as barriers by Sakura River, what
two participants emphasize here as a partial reason for inadequate mental health care is the
frightening impersonal institutional nature of mental health services in hospitals.

Interpersonal, Professional and Organizational Issues

This next thematic section digs deeper into the results, offering a meso-level analysis of their
experiences with health care provider organizations, and the practices, behaviours and attitudes
of health professionals. Sub-themes include inaccurate assumptions by doctors, racism, negative
attitudes from a variety of health care providers, and lack of service provider accountability.

Doctors’ Inaccurate Assumptions about Trans People

Two participants shared a common experience of being slotted into the white/Western
medical model of linear transitioning discussed in Chapters 1 and 4. Participant #4 noted that the
assumption held by doctors they encountered who had some familiarity with trans patients is that
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everyone aspires to medical transition with hormones followed by surgeries. They also met
doctors who work with trans people who immediately assumed medical transitioning was the
point of the visit: “Sometimes a trans person may want to visit a service provider for needs not
directly related to their transness, but service providers may want to focus on the transness
anyways.”644 As Pogi said friends warned them about doctors’ binary beliefs about gender: “Like
don't talk about nonbinary or genderqueer identities. Don't mention any sort of hesitation or
confusion about identifying with the opposite gender you were assigned at birth.”645 Participant
#4 recounted an experience at a clinic near Toronto’s gay village where, “in sort of my
experience visiting this doctor I was like, ‘hey I don’t really know what’s up, I don’t wanna visit
my regular family doctor, ‘cause like I can’t talk to her and blah blah blah’, so he was like ‘so
you want to start T right?’ And I was like ‘Nooooo’, and he’s like yeah, ‘but T?’”646 Participant
#4 was clear that they were not currently interested in medically modifying their body although
their social and personal transness is very important to them.
Two participants also identified doctors’ assumption that all of a trans person’s medical
needs are transition-related when in fact, as Pogi commented, “Trans people have a butt load of
health needs that are no different from cis people’s, like skin and feet etc.”647 This assumption
made it difficult for them to obtain referrals for other health issues such as dermatology and
physiotherapy.
Furthermore, a common experience for participants was that straight and cis health care
providers assumed that as trans people they were also gay based on their appearance or having a
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“girlfriend”.648 As Participant #4 pointed out, transphobia and homophobia are codified at many
levels, “It goes as deep as standardized checklists, that has [sic] the wrong questions, male,
female, other, or like ‘who are you having sex with?’ that doesn’t even ask what kind of sex I’m
having.”649 Assumptions made by doctors then limit the information and choices that are
presented to LGBTQ youth eroding full expression of their own gendered and racialized
selfhood. Participant #1 said: “I guess to them there are certain ways of being trans, like a lot of,
I don’t know, if you can’t really be anywhere on the spectrum, like non-binary identities, and a
lot of other identities, a lot of POC trans folks are just excluded from this.” Participant #4
described being offered limited information about reproductive health because the doctor
assumed they would not want to become a parent.650 They said, “And that sort of gets into like
family building stuff because I think there's a particular perception about particular queer and
trans communities that having kids isn't a thing they'd be interested in.”651
All participants expressed the overarching critique that doctors expected that medical needs
should be visible and able to be communicated in language that a cis straight and often white
doctor could understand. For example, Pogi explained the dissonance of using technical and
emotional language to get their GD diagnosis, “I just felt like I had to use language I wouldn't
normally use? Like I had to figure out how to communicate all these things I had never properly
articulated out loud to myself.” Participants were disappointed that doctors did not try different
methods to elicit information from them after establishing a trusting clinical relationship. As
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Participant #1 put it, “doctors don’t start by building trust they just start by asking a bunch of
hard questions.”652 Similarly, Participant #4 commented:
And so like, there needs to be better ways for healthcare professionals to be like getting
this information, and I feel like part of this is just like ‘Oh no, it’s taboo to talk about
unconventional things’ and so doctors want to navigate it in a weird way, maybe don’t
feel awkward about it but they feel like the patient might feel awkward about it and so
they’re trying to like keep it on the down low or something…653

Inaccurate assumptions presented challenges to care, and as results suggest below,
participants showed variety of responses.

Racism

Participants identified race/ethnicity as a determining factor in health care in several ways.
Participants had all used queer and trans youth group programs at some point. They found that
white youth dominated queer and trans spaces and group discussions at community centres and
community health centres.654 Three of the participants pointed out that accessing programs,
services and treatment appeared easier for white trans youth because of their greater numbers.
Participant #1 described being lumped “together with white and binary youth”. The consequence
of majority white spaces was as Sakura River observed “a lot of the spaces in which it’s for trans
people and other people like that, it’s a lot of Caucasian or white people who speak over
everyone else.” Regarding the whiteness of a queer drop-in space Participant #1 said:
Because you need someone who knows what it’s like to be racialized and have not have
that passing privilege. And just the fact that they didn’t have that at all, or recognize that
they needed like one counselor at least, just for those folks. It was very upsetting. And
652
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then the space quickly became much more like white, because it’s just like, you don’t
seem to value the racialized communities coming here, so it’s not safe.655

Despite the supportive presence of some BIPOC facilitators running groups like BQY (Black
Queer Youth) and Transfusions Crew, the Sherbourne Health Centre’s Supporting our Youth
programming and EGALE’s Youth Drop-In were mentioned as spaces where white dominance
and racism were consistent.656 In terms of how race influenced the geographic placement of
funded services for trans people, Participant #4 said, “I think specifically in the context of
Mississauga, there’s a lot of people like, “Of course there’s no queer and trans services in Peel
because there’s so many racialized people.”657
According to participants, therapists and counsellors they encountered rarely demonstrated
anti-racist approaches to therapy and sometimes displayed culturally inappropriative behaviour.
Participant #1 described their search for a trans positive therapist this way:

Like when I was like really new I was looking for counsellors, and I guess the first place
seemed like a, like it seemed really good on the outside, then like my counsellor started
like teaching me yoga, and all these appropriated methods to like be in the now and she
started saying namaste a lot and it just got to this point where I was like, no. And I was
here, looking all over town for like a counsellor who was POC who had immigrant
experience, who was queer you know, and like it was really hard.658

Two participants agreed that trans and gender terminology are culturally defined by white
people. Participant #4 commented on how the diagnostic standards reflect this whiteness stating:
I used to have this joke in the queer community where like ‘what does a non-binary
person look like’ a skinny white person with like the side-cut and like they wear plaid
button ups and rippy jeans and doc martens. This is what a queer looks like. Not just
655
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what does it look like, but what does it mean to be this way. This is how we summarize
what the experience is. They have just the right amount of dysphoria and this is how
they do relationships and who they do relationships with. And this is not all people’s
experience, and this is erasing a lot of people's experiences.659

Results demonstrated that despite the struggle to find other trans racialized youth and antiracist service providers, the participants at least had a desire to connect with BIPOCs instead of
assimilating into whiteness.

Attitudes of Health Care Providers
From participants’ experiences other health care providers like nurses, and emergency
medical staff as well as technicians and receptionists appeared to be as racist and transphobic as
doctors. Participant #1 described the attitudes of health care providers, “I feel like health care
service providers get particular images in their learning, that’s centred from media, because
they’re also immersed in popular culture too.”660
One of the participants’ worst experiences was the constant misgendering and outright refusal
to use trans inclusive language in public hospitals and in the emergency room. Despite gender
dysphoria being an official mental health diagnosis, two participants encountered mental health
professionals who refused to respect that diagonosis by using correct names and pronouns.
Regarding the trans competency of technicians Participant #4 recounted this story:
I took an MRI once and the person, and I was like there in like…this was forever ago
when I used to bind so, the person asked me if I was like wearing a bra or whatever and
I was like ‘Nope’ and the person was gendering me using like he/him pronouns, and
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then like I gave them my health card and they were like ‘OH! You’re a girl!’ and I was
just like, fuck this. Good thing I don’t have to talk to you ever again.661

This experience also shows the long-term impact on Participant #4 and their resulting sense
of futility in addressing and educating the MRI technician who appeared to be cluelessly
transphobic and urgently needed some trans inclusivity training.
Sakura River created their unsettling “Bloody Glove” photo series to depict how health care
professionals destroyed their autonomy in health care decision making with their neglect, cruelty
and shaming.662 Their triptych was shot in a graffiti covered alley in close proximity to CAMH
using their cousin and partner as actors. In the first picture, a black-clad figure faces the viewer
and pulls off a bloody medical examination glove. In the second picture, the clad figure has their
back to the camera, as they hold a glove in their blood-covered hands. More bloody handprints
move diagonally across the bottom right of the frame towards the creepy figure ending in a
second discarded bloody glove. In the third picture the black clad figure chases another person in
the alley. The images intended to show the fear and pain Sakura River experienced in almost all
their experiences in health care:

I wanted it to evoke strong emotions on people. It’s more so the neglect part, from the
healthcare system. I just wanted to portray a very ominous mysterious, upsetting feeling.
Uncomfortable feeling. When dealing with healthcare professional quote unquote.
When dealing with them, they haven’t understood most of what’s going on with mental
health issues or things related to my gender, and this represents the neglect that I felt
with the healthcare system, see he’s turning away and just leaving a trail. Like, doctors
have done this to me a lot.663

661

Ibid.
Sakura River, Bloody Glove Series 1 (April 2017), Bloody Glove Series 2 (April 2017), Bloody Glove Series 3
(April 2017).
663
Day 2, supra note 607.
662

172

Two participants mentioned that non-medical staff in doctors’ offices and hospital clinics also
displayed transphobic, racist and ableist attitudes.664 Another example of corollary office staff
displaying oppressive attitudes was shared by Sakura River who had been extremely “excited
and terrified” on Day 1 about an upcoming appointment with “a trans mental health friendly
doctor, that I’m going to and finally I can be like, heeeeeeeeey doctor that can help me!”665
However on Day 2 they reported back that because they were late for the appointment due to a
panic attack they were told, by the receptionist they could not have another appointment.666 It
appears that the receptionist for a mental health doctor would not accommodate patients who
were tardy due to mental health issues. This incident suggests that the doctor’s office did not
adequately accommodate non-neurotypical trans racialized youth like Sakura River.
Health care providers that the youth encountered were not adequately trained about trans
health care needs, which are not always different from cis people’s health care needs. That said
Participant #4 also said that service providers need to become more knowledgeable about trans
people’s experiences and their specific health needs.667 Participant #4 expressed the need for
health care providers to see heterogeneity within social groups of people without simply relying
on what they may have learned in a trans 101 training:

I used to people watch a lot. What kind of music does this person listen to? What does
their bedroom look like? Who are they talking on the phone to? And how we never
know and make all these judgements because we see people as background characters
in our stories instead of their own people with huge microcosms of stuff going around
them.668
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Participants’ discussions and their photographs reveal that their reactions to health care
providers’ attitudes and behaviours ranged from dissatisfaction to trauma. And yet it is to this
group of people that participants had to turn to for primary and gender-affirming care. In the next
section will look at how well management took responsibility for addressing these deficiencies
of health program delivery.

Lack of Accountability from Service Providers

Participants expressed dissatisfaction that organizations they visited for health care were not
responsible to them about the quality of services provided in several ways. For example, some
organizations did not explain programming changes and staff turnover in a transparent manner.
Participant #4 suggested that the level of neglect is even higher when dealing with racialized
communities in East Mississauga.
Like the community health centre’s mandate was that it was supposed to be like,
prioritizing newcomers and like trans folks and racialized folks, but that’s not actually
what was going on… And then for an example they had a lot of people being accepted
as new patients, most of them weren’t newcomers or racialized folks, and they were
doing that on purpose, and no one was willing to say anything about that.669

Participant #4 referred to the implosion of services for queer and trans BIPOCs at East
Mississauga Community Health Centre in 2015 when management’s transphobia and racism
resulted in the firing of non-binary POC workers and the loss of doctors serving trans patients
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but “they didn’t tell patients that he had left” and “they haven’t actually addressed the shitty stuff
they’ve done…so it’s like how are you expecting folks to come back to your space when you’re
not willing to adjust the shit that you did in the past.”670 Participants experienced staff turnover
and programming changes intensely because of their great vulnerability when faced with
unknown health care providers.671 Similarly, Participant #1 spoke of feeling a loss when
competent and racialized counsellors and workers of colour staffing the EGALE youth drop-in
disappeared with no explanation when their services were deeply appreciated by trans racialized
drop-in users.672
Participants wanted organizations to take responsibility for properly training their staff to be
adequately informed and comfortable with BIPOC trans people.673 Furthermore, participants
suggested that regular mandatory intersectional anti-oppression training needed to be provided
for front desk staff and health technicians.674
Supporting our Youth (SOY) programming at the SHC was described as more responsive to
trans racialized youth than other locations because they allowed for involvement of supportive
family members through Gender Journeys program and the existence of two anti-racist trans
facilitators. However, two participants mentioned the majority whiteness of the group’s
participants as an alienating factor.675
CAMH was considered useful because for many of the years it was the only place operating
subsidized services. However, only Pogi tried to use the CAMH GIC at age 20. Pogi said, “I was
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looking for other ways to start HRT”, and they simultaneously attempted Planned Parenthood, “it
was confusing for me to navigate” and the Sherbourne Health Centre, “there was the factor of me
not living close enough”.676 Ultimately it was Pieces to Pathways who facilitated their gender
affirming care through effective referrals to doctors.

Impacts of Barriers on Participant Mental Health and Access to Care

All of the participants described experiencing some type of anxiety related to the structural
vulnerability of being a trans racialized youth Most significantly participants expressed anxiety
about entering health spaces, for instance Participant #4 said:
I believe my mental health is linked with anxieties around being misgendered or not
respected because of the ways I’m visibly racialized or that I’m fat. I have a lot of
anxiety about entering new spaces and needing to start from scratch with people; doing
all the explaining and going through the steps of physicians pathologizing my identities
or straight up not believing me like they’ve done in the past.677

And Pogi said for example they consider “navigating potential services that won’t be trans
friendly and being mindful of white dominated services” and spent energy “gauging how to
present and if I can deal with the stress, impact, of uncomfortable conversations, confrontations.”
Sakura River identified another way they experienced anxiety:
So, the doctor decided to believe her [mother] over me when I was in the hospital one
time, and I needed something to calm down my system because I was stuttering for six
hours. But for the longest time the doctor was just like, ‘well you just need to eat better,
you need to sleep better’ blah blah blah. ‘How’s your school life? How’s your family
life?’ blah blah blah. And this continued on for every single doctor I’ve tried to have
help with anything. They’re always like, ‘oh eat better.’678
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Participant 1 said: “Those things are also usually small moments in passing that like, it’s not
that it doesn’t affect you, because sometimes it does it like hits and then it’s there for like days
and weeks and months afterwards. But for that person it’s just a moment in time and like…”679
Finally, two participants made the choice to protect their mental health over addressing physical
health. Pogi said: “I have been prioritizing mental health over physical, because navigating
spaces semi-aware of my backgrounds is too much.”680 Sakura River said that their health
concerns were “a lot of mental health things’ cause it controls my life”.681 This shows their
struggle for autonomy to recognize and seek help for all their health issues. They have had to
make the choice against their interests to leave aside physical health concerns because they felt
their mental health had a greater urgency. These thematic results suggest that structural,
systemic, professional, organizational and interpersonal barriers had a lasting impact on
participants whose anxiety often kept them from accessing care in a timely fashion or at all.

Protective Strategies

Participants described agentic decision-making practices in health care to mitigate harm in the
face of barriers. This next section unpacks those results.

Performing Identities
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As discussed earlier in Chapters 1 and 4, a gender dysphoria diagnosis is technically required
before clinicians approve a trans person for puberty blockers or hormone therapy. Participants
shared how gender role performance was required to convince gatekeepers of one’s gender
dysphoria as Pogi explained:

I really wanted to get on Testosterone, and I had heard that when it comes to CAMH
there’s not a lot of room for exploring your gender if you want to get HRT or surgery
anytime in the next three years. So, I had to develop and practice a narrative of gender
dysphoria. I also was diagnosed with type one bipolar disorder, so there was some
gatekeeping. I had to adhere to an image, and I still do, in order to get on T after three
years and now to access medication. This is what the photograph Dick Pick is about.682

Pogi further described their gender performance in order to get cross sex hormones:
I just mean I had to do the typical FTM trans man, I've always known that I was this
way, I'm a man trapped in this body so like I go in there and I'd never act feminine, my
voice would be monotone. I had to play dude.683

This is a perfect example of the simulacrum – the fraudulent imitation that comes to represent
authenticity.684 These passages show that emancipated youth regulated their behaviour especially
when attempting to obtain gender-affirming or mental health services. They had to repress
feelings of anxiety, fear, anger and frustration when in front of health care providers thus being
read a certain way and not having their underlying stress seen/heard or believed.685
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Besides gender performance, youth identified a second type of identity related performance.
Participant #4 described carrying their cane at all times so people acknowledged their disability.
They explained using performance to access accommodations through the photo “Grounded”.686
Sometimes like people’s inferences as to what that means um, like, makes different
reactions. and yeah, like it’s a really really big thing about like talking about navigation
and accessibility and like performance and stuff like that. Like this isn’t a thing that I
literally need, all the time, every day, but I carry it with me, all the time, every single
day, because one, you never know, and two, people get what this *Taps cane* means
usually.687

Participant #4 also tried to convey the performance of marginalized identity through the
photograph “Discarded, Forgotten Hidden and Sometimes Compartmentalized”.688 In both
photographs the cane is disconnected from the person holding it and it is not positioned in a
typically recognizable way. In “Discarded” the cane lies on the ground like garbage making the
viewer wonder about how it got there. In the photograph “Grounded” the cane is more assertive
as it points to the feet of the person holding the cane as though to ground them.689 In both
photographs I interpret Participant #4 as trying to share different internal and external meanings
of themselves as a physically disabled trans racialized youth using the cane in different scenarios
to signify disabling physical and social structures.
Participant #4 also said they could still be disbelieved while using their cane. They recounted
an experience of taking public transit with a group of BIPOCs who were all using mobility
devices. Other transit users asked if their collective use of mobility devices was part of a trend.
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Participant #4 thought that being racialized also contributed to people invalidating their access
needs.690
Three participants described how they were not believed and therefore not diagnosed by
mental health service providers because they were not demonstrating recognizable indicators of
“crazy”. For instance, Pogi recounted that:

A psychiatrist doesn't think I have bipolar. Because I haven't had a manic episode in like
3 years. Because I've been presenting very calm. I think it's the Asian in me that's like I
have to put on my best face for this adult. Like “yes I’m stressed I do mindfulness
yoga.691

They explained that as trans racialized youth they did not feel safe entering emergency rooms
or clinics in states of obvious distress.692 Generally the participants were adept at switching from
one set of representations to the next in order to best succeed in obtaining what they needed. Yet,
in the mental health context they did not reveal their distress, or perform crazy to get a diagnosis
because they were afraid of the consequences such as being found incapable and being
institutionalized.693 Performance so far has been explained as a way to obtain medical services
and treatment; however it can also be a disidentification practice to resist the imposition of
dominant categories, which I will turn to next.

Disidentifying with the Gender Binary
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In their image creation process trans racialized youth infused their awareness of the influence
of dominant social categories into their photographs. This act engaged what bell hooks calls the
“visual politics of seeing” which goes beyond participants just packaging up good or bad images
of themselves.694 Results showed different types of transphobic behaviour relating to
experiencing gender dysphoria; here results reveal the impacts of overly rigid gender boundaries.
Besides “trans” participants used terms like “gender non-conforming”, “non-binary” and
“gender-weird” to describe themselves.695 Participants showed how they manipulated the gender
binary imposed by law and medicine Pogi’s photograph “Dick Pick” depicts the act of resisting
the gender binary while existing within the gender binary.696 At the centre of the photograph is a
person’s hand holding their dick between their thighs. The viewer’s eye is drawn to the corridor
formed by the person’s thighs leading to the row of clothes hanging across the back of the
photograph. The row of clothes is divided into two sections. One section is masculine, and one
section is feminine/gender neutral. The creation of this image is a disidentificatory act, because
Pogi is aware of the falsity of the gender binary system and knows they must exist within it.
Therefore, when in public they will choose their way of playing with this falsity. In addition to
considerations in terms of finding the right biracial-shaded prosthesis, they are also choosing
what type of clothes to wear from each side of the closet where their differently gendered clothes
hang.697
There were many situations when participants had to decide how to navigate spaces where
they are not out as trans and they may not fully pass to cisgender people as a recognizable
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gender. Pogi mentioned a time when at the dentist, they pretended to be sick to mask the way
their voice changed once they started taking testosterone. As with other health service providers,
they described gauging how binary female or male to look depending on how stressful being
read as either gender identity would be for them in that space.698
Disidentification behaviour could also manifest as deliberately trying not to pass as a binary
gender. Participant #4 illustrated their strategy of wearing wigs in photo “Who goes out? Who
gets to be seen? Who am I to you?”699 The photograph shows an open closet door on which three
long-haired glamorously styled pink, purple and copper coloured wigs hang. The bright wigs
contrast with the white closet door and the blue walls of the room. The caption and the empty
closet ask the viewer to consider how much their own perceptions and experiences determine
how to read a person they might see, because as hooks wrote, the way we see is overdetermined
by our location.700 Participant #4 emphasizes their bodily absence by placing wigs against an
empty closet in a room they said they barely use.701 They disliked their current hairstyle, and
used hats and wigs. They also said they do not leave the house that much, and when they do, they
wear sweatpants and clothes that conceal their body and gender.702 In this way, “Who goes out?”
questions the viewer’s way of seeing the subject without the subject present. In fact, it functions
as Participant #4’s distanced self-reflection.703 The photograph could also be read as way of
showing the artifice of gender through the long-haired brightly coloured wigs and the limitations
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of trans bodies to push the boundaries of gender. Participant #4 describes the use of tactical
misrecognition:
There's a YouTuber I really like who did a video talking about finding your new normal,
and she's disabled but she looks able bodied, and in her videos, you see her like dancing
around but that's not how she looks all the time. People don't like talking about
performance in this way. Like today I decided to wear knee braces even though they're
ugly and obtrusive, and how that changes how movement is physically and socially. 704

In “Reading Between the Signs”, Pogi disidentified with the cis medical gaze by demanding
that the viewer identify with an unfamiliar aesthetic.705 Pogi took a full-colour picture from
across the street facing a small park near the CAMH facilities on Queen Street which they noted
was spruced up in the last few years as part of a neighbourhood gentrification project.706 The
viewer’s gaze is directed to a brick wall at the back of the photograph painted with the large
white block letters “YOU CHANGE”. The rest of the photo shows the empty park with a
recycling receptacle in the foreground. Pogi talked about how the park featured benches that had
been designed to prevent people from sleeping on them. Pogi deliberately created the directive
phrase “YOU CHANGE” by positioning of the camera in such a way as to block the last (and
missing from the photo) letter “D” with a street sign. Pogi said that one meaning in this image is
that the cisgender doctor requires the trans person to change in a familiar and recognizable way
so that the cisgender doctor can approve of the trans person’s identity.
Both Participant #4 and Pogi used photography not just to depict their own reality for the
viewer’s consumption, but editorially to make the viewer think about how they see other people
based on pre-existing categories and familiar narratives. In Pogi’s “Reading between the Signs”,
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I saw Pogi using gentrification as a metaphor for the cisgender expectation of transnormativity in
health care settings. By changing the mural for this photograph, Pogi defamiliarizes the cis gaze
and thus forces the viewer to see the park, the trans person and themselves in a new way. I liken
this editorial gaze to a disidentification with the cisgender viewer’s gaze.

Avoidance of Medical Care

None of the participants was accessing all of the health care services they needed and wanted
however they described different degrees of access and for varying reasons. Of the four youth
participants, two of them avoided medical appointments with doctors, nurses and health
technicians because of prior experiences of transphobia and racism. The other two were dealing
primarily with mental health issues that were not, in their opinion, solely trans related. Of the
latter two participants, one had already secured their cross-sex hormone replacement therapy and
wanted to be approved for top surgery once they had been on testosterone for the required length
of time. The other participant was trying to socially transition before trying to access cross sex
hormones which they had been refused more than once.
Participant #4 was one of those who experienced multiple layers of oppression in health care
settings and exercised their agency to avoid health care altogether. Their photo “We Spend Some
Time Together and Avoid the Medical Gaze” shows a person from the neck down facing the
viewer, wearing fitted brightly coloured clothes.707 The person is holding leash attached to a
small dog that is standing on a low small wall as if around a pond. The lighting comes from
natural sunlight. This picture showed a protective response to the total stress and exhaustion of
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going to their family doctor for tests, a doctor who misgendered them and told them to lose
weight. Rather than start looking for a new doctor, they went for a walk with a friend and their
dog. Participant #4 is not even in the picture, implying their own desire to disappear in the face
of the doctor-induced stress. They remarked:
The theme for these pictures is Me Avoiding Going to the Doctors.’ because, it’s
[laughter] a real thing that’s happening right now, where I went to the doctor recently
and the doctor was like ‘Okay we have to take a bunch of tests’…and then I was trying
to get the doctor to like write a referral to me to get an assessment for a thing and she’s
like, ‘I can’t write an assessment because we need to do these tests first, and also I lost
some of your information because you haven’t been here in however many years’, and
so, I was just like ‘This is me not going to the doctor’ because I don’t wanna do the
hassle. 708

Participant #4 stated that their health care priority was: “Feeling safe in accessing spaces
regardless of how much they’re needed is extremely important to me and I cannot enter into a
space without that understanding of safety from service providers.”709
Sakura River also described attempting to avoid emergency medical care for financial
reasons. They tried not to go to the emergency room after a fall at work: “And my brain
immediately went to my finances, what if I have a concussion? What if I have to go to the
hospital? WHAT IF I HAVE TO GO TO THE HOSPITAL?”710 Their boss insisted they get
checked out and subsequently, their experience at the emergency room could be characterized as
several hours of being continuously misgendered by each staff person they encountered even
with their partner there to advocate for them.
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In this thematic area, trans racialized youth participants described making agentic choices to
protect themselves from further negative experiences with health care providers despite wanting
medical attention for a number of health care issues. The way that Pogi described their mental
health strategy was either to put off formally dealing with concerns until they had passed the
thresholds for obtaining desired gender affirming treatments or to delay their medical transition
until they felt their mental health issues were less of a priority. This is a very difficult decision
for youth since gender dysphoria causes significant psychological distress.

Hiding

Participants used hiding as another agentic protective response to feeling a lack of autonomy
in relationships and in relation to their own health and well-being. Participants hid in different
ways and to different degrees. Whether they hid at home, from society, the medical world or
their family of origin. This was due to the need to psychologically recharge from the multiple
layers of oppression they experience daily. Hiding from doctors was best expressed above by
Participant #4 in the photograph “We Spend Some Time Together and Avoid the Medical
Gaze”.711
Sometimes participants used baggy clothes to hide birth-assigned gender or as a response to
fat phobia. While fashion was an extremely important interest of three of the participants, two of
those who loved fashion often did not want to wear body conscious clothes that garnered
attention when going to the doctor, for example. As Participant #4 described in an earlier quote
how tight clothing exacerbated gender misrecognition problems at the doctor’s office. Sakura
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River also said they wanted people to know they were gender fluid however in many situations
they said they hid their gender identity like a “trans ninja” for their own safety.712
For Participant #1, discomfort with public attention caused to them not to take pictures
outside in a crowded street during the Day1 training shoot. They said that because they were
already subjected to a lot of public scrutiny they did not want to take pictures in public.713

Resilience Strategies and Autonomy Practices

Through focus group discussions and photo analysis the following practices emerged:
integration of self, self-advocacy, intentional social networks.

Integration of Identities into Selfhood

All of the participants referred to themselves intersectionally and strongly resisted being
compartmentalized by single issue or identity. Participant #4 was adamant that the sum of their
vulnerabilities made their experience of health care uniquely alienating: “being plus-sized person
being BIPOC and crip and trans and all these things influences …experiences that happen and
what I get in health care spaces because of a lot of fat phobia and racism.”714 In a similar vein,
Participant #1 said: “…it’s not like cis people just see me as a Paki, or just as a feminine person,
or non-binary. They [doctors] see me all at once; I mean they don’t ‘see’ me they ‘read’ me
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through my clothes, my accent, my makeup.”715 Their desire to integrate their identities into their
unique selfhoods is beautifully captured in Participant #4’s photograph “Discarded, Forgotten
and Hidden. Sometimes Compartmentalized”.716 In this photograph, a cane lies askew in a
parking lot near garbage and recycling bins. The cane symbolizes their experience of being
disabled and of being read by others as disabled.717
At first Sakura Rivers expresses the difficulty of their interlocking identities: “It is difficult to
represent myself as a trans BIPOC person as well due to my having mental health issues, many
don’t seem to want to believe that I do, most likely due to my being gender fluid as well as
Hispanic.”718 Still, two of their photographs show their integration of identities as resistance:
“Flags” and “Light after Dark”.719 In “Flags” Sakura River stands in full colour in centre frame
addressing the viewer with their confident gaze. They might be riffing on the practice of flagging
mentioned in Chapter 2 where a queer person reveals their queer identity using signals that only
other queer people will notice. They signal their various identities and group memberships using
referents such as the Pride flag, the Transgender Pride flag, and the Pikachu hat. In “Light” they
captured a rainbow in a pink streaked sky from an apartment balcony. The rainbow arcing
through the middle of the frame could represent Sakura River who incorporates several different
elements in one charismatic personality. Sakura River seems to recognize that their interlocking
identities and oppressions are key to their survival. Through these photographs and interviews
participants express experiencing forms of violence in health-related contexts that cannot be
reduced to silos of transphobia, ageism, racism, fat phobia or classism. Results show that the
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phenomenology of selfhood in health care is fundamentally intersectional for trans racialized
youth.

Selfhood and Representation of Self

Self-image can be described as the way a person perceives themselves including their
abilities, their physical presentation, and their mannerisms. It is the visual aspect of selfhood.
Self-image can be especially revealing through photographs. Participants were not asked to take
pictures of themselves but asked about how they tell their stories and their identities in health
care contexts. As explained in these results, participants conveyed their self-image through
images, symbols and omissions of themselves.
Being photographed and even taking photographs was not a simple activity for focus group
participants. For example, Participant #4 refused to take pictures of their face: “I like actually
didn’t want to take any pictures of myself, I think I took one picture of my face and I was like,
fuck that because I don’t like looking at pictures of myself”.720 At first, I perceived they had a
negative self-image from internalized negative messaging. In reflection, I considered hooks’
essay on Black relationships to image production and aesthetics. hooks theorizes:

Reflecting on the way black folks looked at themselves in those private spaces, where
those ways of looking were not being overseen by a white colonizing eye, a white
supremacist gaze, those images created ruptures in our experiences of the visual. Thy
challenged both white perceptions of blackness and that realm of black-produced image
making that reflected internalized racism.721
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In addition, I considered Prosser’s statement that for trans people looking at their images
could be both grounding and alienating depending on many different factors.722 The absence of
their face in photographs seemed to say, “I don’t want to know how others see me.”723
Participant #4 said: “And it’s just like, I don’t wear wigs most of the time, but I also don’t leave
the house most of the time. So…”724 With these three observations in mind then, I saw that for
this participant, who struggled with internalized racism, fatphobia and transphobia, creating and
viewing self-portraits had the potential for painful self-criticism. And yet while their pictures
contain no headshots they do feature legs, feet and belly shots because they felt their “tummy is
important” and “powerful”.725 Through the “private space” of the focus group, they exhibited
simultaneous negative self-image and resistance to it based on their understanding of internalized
oppression.
We see Participant #4 stake their claim to beauty and self-love through the photo titled “I
never said I was ugly. It doesn’t make me sick”.726 In the photo their naked belly dominates the
frame, within its own dark-skinned subjectivity. Their belly addresses the viewer directly as
though it has its own gaze. “I was specifically talking about how people are like ‘oh, I'm so fat’
or ‘Oh you're so pretty!’ like those are totally different things. No, I can be both fat and
pretty.”727 This is an act of tactical misrecognition. Participant #4 is fat Black trans and disabled.
They know that society tells them they cannot be pretty and yet they use the word “Ugly” to
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show the viewer they reject that label. That same participant shared their hope and self-love in
captions for other photographs. They captioned their cane, legs and feet shot “It’s a long way
down, but there is more than one way to be grounded”. I take this as a description of a resilience
strategy, where what could be disabling becomes affirming. Thus, the act of taking and curating
images allowed Participant #4 to disidentify with mainstream beauty norms and to see beauty in
their self-image despite always having to buffer society’s negative framing of their identities and
their bodies.
Several of the youth’s resilience strategies were related to physical appearance. Participant #1
said: “the way we present ourselves can be a form of protection. Like, I wear a lot of makeup
when I’m really anxious, and you wouldn’t think that, but I find the process very calming. It’s a
buffer, femme armour.”728 Sakura River, Participant #4 and Participant #1 placed a great deal of
attention on what they and others wear, even when they are purposefully hiding. Sakura River is
part of a specific femme fashion community in Toronto. Clothing was also important to Pogi in
the way that clothing is mined for gender clues by other people. In their photo “Dick Pick” Pogi
is playfully deciding who to be, and how to look based on the feminine and masculine clothing
on either side of their “dick” which acted as the barometer for the way their gender needed to
switch. Participant #4 is an accomplished seamstress who makes and sells cosplay costumes for
large and trans bodies and yet Participant #4 said they normally wore shapeless sweatpants to
hide their body when they left the house.729 They may have been hiding themselves, but they
balanced their love of theatrical fashion by making costumes for other people.
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In order to represent themselves as a trans BIPOC person, Sakura River created the
photograph entitled “Light After Dark”730 to depict how they move through the world as gender
fluid and how they try to “make light of dark situations”. Sakura River took the photograph from
an apartment balcony overlooking a grey urban landscape juxtaposed against a rainbow-hued sky
after a storm. They described themselves as a “special snowflake” and explained that it is very
challenging to remain positive in a world that did not like them due to being Hispanic, trans,
poor, having mental health illness and being a youth.731 Their self-conception involved beauty,
positivity and playfulness. Despite daily attacks on their autonomy from structural inequity and
their family of origin and they constructed their self-image by using contrasting colours,
evocative lighting, multi-dimensional location and an optimistic caption.
Sometimes participants chose to show their self-image by using a self-referencing object
instead of placing themselves in the photograph. Participants used props such as canes, wigs,
prosthetics, knee braces hats, megaphones, rainbows and birds. Pikachu shaped cosplay hats
appealed to Sakura River because Pikachu is a cheerful creature due to its yellow colour and
smile. Thus, it was an appropriate self-reference to them as a small but powerful being. Pogi on
the other hand, liked Pikachu because it is the genderless mascot for Pokémon and its image is
energetic (it can shoot electric sparks) but not intimidating. The use of Pikachu is also a selfreference in “Alone Together” because Pogi is masculine but rejects stereotypically masculine
aggression.732
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Other people appear in participants’ photographs such as the person in Pogi’s “Building on
Health Care” and the person in Participant #4’s “Medical Gaze”. In both of those photographs
the subject’s face is hidden. In “Building on Health Care” the subject is a feminine presenting
woman of colour wearing sunglasses.733 There is toughness about her signified by her nonsmiling expression and her leather motorcycle jacket. She could be a version of Pogi’s feminine
side that is openly challenging the medical industrial complex in a way that Pogi would not do as
them self. Then there is the person photographed with a dog on a leash by Participant #4 in
“Medical Gaze”. That person is the opposite of how Participant # 4 describes themselves and
wears body conscious bright coloured clothing. The person is also Black and full-figured and is
not hiding from the world. What participants choose about other people could also reflect what
they like or do not like about themselves, and what they feel internally but do feel like they can
externally embody in a photograph or in their daily lives. Photography then, has the potential to
be a world-making act where hidden or aspirational elements of selfhood can be shown and
therefore actualized.

Self-Advocacy

Youth outside parental control exhibited higher levels of self-advocacy and self-regulation in
order to be seen as capable with respect to health-related decision-making activities, however all
of the youth sought out health information and advocated for themselves which they found tiring.
Participant #1 and Sakura River experienced the least family support. Participant #1 said:
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It just feels like there’s so much more self-initiative that you need, when you don’t
necessarily have support. So it’s kind of counter intuitive, like okay, I need people to
support me because I can’t support myself, like I don’t have these people and the only
way I can get to spaces that can support me, I need to be able to like, have enough selfcare to do it.734

Pogi and Sakura River and carried out the most self-advocacy, and also were accessing more
health care than Participants #1 and #4. Participant #1 remembered being discounted this way:
This happened when I had to get a reassessment for ADHD for school, and I was
stressed so dressed really fancy that day. I wore like a weird outfit. So, I was talking
about how I'm shy and socially awkward. And she was like, you don't seem like you are
and it's like what the fuck, I'm telling you and you don't believe me.735

Sakura River related this experience:
So as soon as like I started showing mental health issues, my mom she gas lighted me
the entire time, no you don’t have these issues, blah blah blah, and when I went to the
doctors for them, I tried my best to communicate what was going on.736
Assertiveness and informed self-advocacy seemed to confuse health care providers who
had specific expectations of trans or neurodiverse youth. To put it in Pogi’s words: “they
[health care providers] don’t seem to have an awareness that people will present
differently in different situations.737

And finally, Participant #4 said regarding health care offices:
But you can’t really go into that space without being informed. Because often they don’t
know anything, so you have to come in and like bring a stack of paperwork. But if you
come with a stack of paper work they are suspicious because you know too much.738

Intentional Social Networks
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Family of Origin
In the literature, family or adult support is established as a protective factor for trans youth.
In this sample, participants did not mention family members as a source of support. Sakura River
was the exception. Despite being estranged from their nuclear family, they were very close to
their cousin who picked them up from the hospital, supported them and took part in the
Photovoice project.739 Family relationships were not conducive to autonomous decision making,
which would have required: respect for boundaries, demonstrating self-awareness, sharing
information, and practicing decision-making skills.740
We know from the recent research reviewed in Chapter 1, and from anecdotal evidence from
Drs. Bonifacio, Kaufman and Marasella that white trans youth and their families enjoy clinical
and social service supports that BIPOC trans youth and their families do not.741 Two participants
described their families as transphobic; still, participants were not aware of any resources for
families of trans racialized youth. Participant #4, a Black trans youth observed, “I think there’s
also an assumption from outside of BIPOC that because x person is from whatever racialized
group, of course their family is going to be more queer or transphobic.”742 Participants also
identified the same barriers noted in Chapter 1 by Dadui and Pyne that prevented BIPOC parents
from supporting them as trans youth.743 The barriers for racialized families were English-only,
culturally white uninsured services, with job precarity making it near impossible to take time
from work to support children and youth with extra health needs.
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Community
On the other hand, all participants expressed the rewards of belonging or participating in
community made up of friends, lovers, partners and acquaintances. Reliance on community is
depicted in the photographs “Medical Gaze” (Participant #4), “Community Family Chosen or
Otherwise Taking On The World Together”744 (Participant #4), “Flags” Sakura River and “Alone
Together” Pogi. The photograph “Community” shows a group of ducks in a river under some
hanging trees. Participant #4 compared the grouping of the ducks to members of their
community where not everyone likes one another but people still try to help and support each
other. Above the ducks, in the trees overhead, there is a large falcon that Participant #4 described
as the common enemy. Eventually the ducks all made a big noise and stayed together and scared
the falcon away. With this photograph they wanted to capture the dynamics of navigating
difference and conflict within family and community groups and also collectively facing the
common enemy who views all the ducks as the same.745
In “Flags” Sakura River is centred in the frame. Their body takes up the height of the frame.
They are outdoors in a public field. They refer to several strands of their identity by using flags
and a hat. They wear their Pikachu rave hat, the rainbow pride flag and the blue and white
genderqueer flag. They proudly show their membership in three communities as part of their
sense of self and the act of belonging appears to be validating and dynamic because of the
movement of the flags in the wind.
Three of the participants were deeply engaged in cosplay communities. Sakura River and
Pogi describe cosplay as an activity where they dress up in Japanese manga and anime costumes
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with other similarly dressed players. Both use Pikachu hats in their photographs “Flags” and
“Alone Together”. Sakura River describes their cosplay community as “caring, kind and funloving people” and says: “They respect me no matter what gender I present as or feel. They use
all the correct pronouns, plus my preferred name…”746 Finally in “Alone Together”, Pogi shows
themselves and a friend sitting on a log in the woods with their backs to the viewer, both wearing
Pikachu hats.747 Friendship is depicted as a place of solace.

Peer Support Work
Peer support is a relational practice that involves people with a shared experience supporting
each other through life challenges, validating each other’s feelings, sharing information, and
building community. Two participants found being members of peer support communities to be
fulfilling. Pogi worked at a youth mental health services organization. Sakura River was a peer
support volunteer at an organization run by LGBTQ+ youth. They said, “There are other people
who are POC like me who I’ve found, like me…but I don’t have that group of people to be all
like, ‘You’re doing it! You’ve got this!’ except with [name of peer support group]. That’s the
only people who like, understand the stuff I’m going through mostly.”748 Participant #4
repeatedly mentioned that they coordinated a monthly QTBIPOC youth meet up in a communitybased health organization outside Toronto. In those youth spaces there was mutual information
and skill-sharing, community-building and reciprocal peer support.
Finally, two participants made the choice to prioritize mental health over physical health. Pogi
said, “I have been prioritizing mental health over physical, because navigating spaces semi-
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aware of my backgrounds is too much.”749 Sakura River said that their health concerns were “a
lot of mental health things cause it controls my life”.750 This shows their struggle for autonomy
to recognize and seek help for all their health issues. They have had to make the choice against
their interests to leave aside physical health concerns because they felt their mental health had a
greater urgency.

Discussion
Participant’s interviews and photographs resonated with the challenges of existence within an
impersonal capitalist society characterized by systemic hetero/cisnormativity and precarity of life
outcomes. They felt that health care provision and discourses limited the full expression of their
identities.751 This was in part as a result of the widespread use of versions of the acronym
“LGBTQ” in health and social service fields lumps several sexual orientations and gender
identities together for ease of service provision. As Han pointed out the resulting social grouping
however ignores non-binary people, and Two Spirit people and forces straight identified trans
people to obtain services in queer spaces. In addition to racism and transphobia, participants
experienced differential access to care based on social determinants of health such as age, ability,
body size, where they lived, citizenship status, class, income, and family support which supports
Lee’s recent work on trans racialized youth.
Their desire for gender autonomy and integration of their identity categories deeply affected
their mental and physical health. They described a range of health care related activities beyond
giving informed consent that constituted the exercise of decision making. Participants spent time
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and care considering their gender identity related options and making decisions to minimize
harm. They assessed providers, programs and physical spaces for safety and levels of racism,
ageism and transphobia. Participants’ responses to the barriers fall into categories of short-term
protective/agentic or longer-term autonomy-enhancing.752 Their agentic strategies were
performance, disidentification, avoiding medical care, and hiding. Individual and collective
autonomy-enhancing activities included integration of their identities, controlling their own selfrepresentation, self-advocacy, participating in community and sharing information amongst
peers.753
Participants preferred to make decisions with assistance from supportive and informed trusted
people.754 They were afraid that doctors would allow unsupportive relatives to make health care
decisions for them. When there were no trusted informed supportive adults to assist in decision
making trans racialized youth relied on peers and community workers. They benefited greatly
from safer, confidential and barrier –free health care services where they saw themselves
represented.
According to participants, health care providers routinely failed to abide by informed consent
rules when dealing with patients of all ages. This concern relates partly to the lack of access to
rights-based legal information about the HCCA raised by Justice for Children and Youth in the
previous chapter, and also to health care providers’ insensitivity to issues specific to the
autonomy of trans youth in decision-making such as hiding one’s gender identity from family or
being estranged from family.
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Health care providers frequently breached confidentiality by seeking parental consent without
a finding of incapacity and the resulting required notification process. Health care professionals
held a number of pathologizing clinical stereotypes with respect to trans youth which worked
against racialized and non-binary youth. Furthermore, participants knew that sometimes people
do not want a physical change or that they cannot medically transition for physical and mental
health reasons.755 Still others cannot medically transition for religious reasons.756 Participants
were aware that medical transition was not approved for homeless or under housed youth, or
those without the money for doctors’ letters, unsubsidized travel out of province or who lack
support for pre-and post-surgical care.757 These results support the proposition that eligibility
criteria deselect for structurally vulnerable trans racialized youth.
Therefore, participants regarded doctors less as sources of support and information and more
as gatekeepers. Clinical stereotypes and eligibility criteria coerced participants to implement
agentic tactics. They described themselves to health care gatekeepers in terms matching the trans
simulacrum in order to obtain diagnoses, hormone prescriptions and approvals for treatments.
Doctors did not know how to broach topics of sexuality and gender e.g. safer sex practices with
them. Participants also indicated that better listening skills and a patient-centred approach were
needed to foster great autonomy in their decision-making. Their experiences suggest that the
doctor’s gatekeeping role undermined true practice of autonomy and the related activity of
informed consent.758
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While the participants had differing levels of insight about their own physical and mental
conditions and the types of gender affirming treatments and services that exist in Toronto, they
lacked important rights-based information about how to carry out the range of activities required
for autonomous practice.Yet, in contrast to their lack of legal knowledge about health care
consent and capacity, participants were well informed through peer community knowledge
transfer about gender-affirming treatments, had adequate knowledge of services and had
developed some strategies to address systemic barriers. Community knowledge transfer came
through working and volunteering in peer support groups as well as participating in social
communities that came together for art and performance. Others were compelled to self-advocate
from a young age due to family conflict.759 Self-advocacy often was held against them, as it was
not congruent with diagnostic criteria and paternalistic stereotypes that did not recognize the
survival strategies of trans racialized youth and their families.
All participants used photography as a method of world making and self-validation. Art
allowed them to employ the concept of disidentification by taking mainstream concepts, images
and messages and reinterpreting them to be able to reflect themselves and critique those cultural
products by making new ones. Sometimes not appearing in photos stemmed from participants
discomfort with seeing themselves visually represented. In this Photovoice study the participants
had complete control over what to show, what to share and what to release to me to use. So,
while participants used hiding as an agentic strategy in Photovoice, in daily life that did not mean
they wished to remain hidden. Hiding was a survival strategy that thwarted their autonomy.760
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Health care providers and their organizations could have instead helped foster a sense of safety
and appreciation for youths’ integrated selfhoods.
The ability to perform a clinically recognizable gender identity to gatekeeping professionals
was an essential skill for youth who need subsidized gender-related health services.761 Put
another way, the participants all donned the simulacrum of medically approved trans markers to
access care. All the participants reported constantly feeling disbelieved by health care providers,
which they attributed to a number of factors: the pathological combination of being trans
racialized youth and in one case fat and with a physical disability and, in two cases due to mental
illness. Furthermore, one participant said they deployed a stereotypical disability performance
during interactions with most health care providers to counteract being disbelieved. Yet, while
they perform, they do not necessarily conform. Their photographs show their critique through the
disidentification process.
Self-acceptance was a conscious goal and a practice for all participants. This came across in
many of their pictures. Pogi’s “Reading between the Signs” and “Dick Pick” both reflect back
agency and autonomy for what Pogi wants by questioning the normalcy of cisgenderness and
declaring that gender is both relational and essential.762 Sakura River’s “Flags” exudes pride and
unapologetic self-love in their engaged facial expression, direct gaze and confident posture.763
Flags is a clear message of adaptability and optimism in the face of struggle.764 Participant #4
resists internalizing racist, fat phobic and transphobic messages in “Ugly” and “Grounded”. As
the photographer, they reframe images of their fat, Black, disabled trans body showing the
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viewer constructions we may never have seen before but also forcing us to question our own
application of mainstream beauty and ability standards.
As this phenomenology chapter attests, the participants were less concerned with producing
positive visual representations and instead demonstrated a sophisticated cultural understanding of
the politics of representation that challenged me as the researcher/viewer.765 The participants’
marginalized positionality and their awareness of their own structural vulnerability compelled
them to disidentify with dominant legal and medical narratives and mainstream aesthetic
representations of them as trans racialized youth. They avoided reproducing stereotypes of
authenticity that legal and medical constructions of autonomy would have ultimately painted
them with.
In addition to self-advocacy and self-representation, participants used several collective
strategies to increase their sense of calmness, relieve stress, alleviate depression and reduce
isolation resulting from their intersectional and structurally vulnerable daily lives. These
strategies allowed participants to bounce back from their experiences with health care providers
and health systems.766 These strategies were also local autonomy practices because through them
they shared knowledge, increased their sense of security, validated participants’ selfhood and
nourished their supportive relationships fostering interdependence.

Particularity of the Research
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Broad generalizations about trans racialized youth in health care cannot be made on the basis
of this research. The results are specific to the experiences of youth who live in the biggest city
in Canada in a province where health consent has a presumption of capacity. The focus group
data was contextualized, transparent and rich because of the qualitative methods I chose and the
research team’s success in building rapport and trust with the participants. Qualitative research
does not aim to make empirical generalizations from field work, but rather, as in this study, to
generate a phenomenology of autonomy in decision making by this group of four youth. These
kinds of findings can be useful to other people as the findings can transfer new understandings to
other people’s lives without universalizing to a whole demographic.767 The results offer
transferability in part because of the research validation strategies I utilized at all stages of the
process.

Conclusion

This chapter illuminated the intimate decision-making experiences of four trans racialized
youth through an analysis of their written and visual narratives. Their phenomenology revealed a
dismal picture of health care for trans racialized youth in Ontario which contrasts with beliefs
held by legislators about the autonomy-enhancing nature of the HCCA. They did not feel legal or
medical practitioners or social service systems affirmed their autonomy. These findings are
consistent with broader relational autonomy scholarship that points to the duty of government to
actively support rights as relationships. Participants experienced autonomy as a process not as a
Chérie Moody et al, “‘Without this, I would for sure already be dead’: A qualitative inquiry regarding suicide
protective factors among trans adults.” (2015) 2:3 Psychol Sex Orientat Gend Divers 266 at 277; Jonathan A Smith,
Michael Larkin & Paul Flowers, Interpretative phenomenological analysis: theory, method and research (Los
Angeles: SAGE, 2009) at 51.
767

204

moment of arrival based on turning 18. At times, their sense of powerlessness over traumatic
health care services caused them to avoid health care altogether. And as a result, some did not
feel adequately prepared to exercise autonomy when they reached the age of 18. Policy changes
are needed at systemic and professional and organization levels to push societal and
interpersonal awareness of barriers and how to eliminate them. This research also concludes that
greater respect and attention be given to youth’s own autonomy-enhancing practices.
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Chapter 6: Final Reflections and Recommendations

I begin this conclusion by returning to my research question: How do trans racialized youth
experience decision making in health care in Ontario? The short answer is - with great difficulty
but showing deep resilience by relying on both agentic strategies and autonomy-enhancing
practices. The long answer requires more space to synthesize the results of my thesis and to
reflect on its findings. I applied the central insights of relational theory’s critique of traditional
autonomy to paternalist concerns about health equity law, family law, and the formal
gatekeeping role played by health care providers in Ontario. In addition, I brought a
multidisciplinary methodological approach to the foreground of pluralist legal inquiry. This
meant facilitating Photovoice focus groups, conducting empirical research, and analysing the
results through transfeminist and performance theory in order to assess Ontario’s intersectional
health care environment for decision making.
Specifically, I examined the Health Care Consent Act, Regulation 552 of the Health Insurance
Act against decisions from the CCB, the SBT, the HSRB and all levels of courts where trans
minors and youth were present. I also contrasted the DSM- V’s psychiatric diagnostic criteria for
Gender Dysphoria and the WPATH SoC with non-medical models of transness and communitybased primary care protocols from the Sherbourne Health Centre. A practical contribution of this
research is its in depth analysis of the relationship between the consent, capacity and substitute
decision making provisions of the HCCA in intention, on paper, and in application with OHIP
coverage criteria for their combined impacts on the health care of trans racialized youth.
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I asked corollary questions embedded in legal philosophy guided in part by Spade’s pluralist
lens of laws as tactics.768 How do statutes interact with real life experiences? How do rights work
across different areas of law and place where law happens? Are statutory rights effective if
affected groups barely know about them? I found that the rights of minors to make their own
decisions were ignored in family law custody and access cases. Even when the gender identity of
a capable minor child was central to a conflict between parents, and medical testimony and
future treatment plans were determinative, judges dismissed the HCCA rights of minors to be
informed, to consult and to decide. This dismissal undermined the autonomy development of
minors. My research illustrated the lingering paternalism of decision makers, especially judges,
which manifests in cases involving mature minors and carries over to non-minor youth. Minors
and youth are already largely unaware of their rights. This study found that judges tend to
consolidate decision-making authority in legal guardians. Legal paternalism is especially
dangerous for gender non-conforming minors and youth who might have greater need for
medical interventions than cis counterparts and greater likelihood of conflict with guardians over
gender identity.
Demonstrating the benefits of interdisciplinary research methods is the third significant
contribution this work offers. I stated my affinity for the frameworks of legal pluralism and the
transformative paradigm early in my research process.769 Therefore, I considered the words and
actions of legislators, lawyers, doctors, parents and administrators about health autonomy for
minors and youth. I added the key phenomenological ingredient from discussions and
photographs produced by trans racialized youth as legal actors themselves. This qualitative
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aspect provided a unique angle on how statutes, case law, interviews and photographs intersect
calling forth a richness and heterogeneity of data that is not typical of legal scholarship. Clinical
texts and Hansard archives unfolded as subjects, which were intertwined with the first-person
narratives of the participants. To further my methodological aim to share my own privileged
access to legal information as a researcher, I provided participants with health rights legal
information sheets in plain language.
Indebted to the insights of critical race theory - my use of intersectionality extended beyond
race and gender because my recruitment methods and analysis included factors of gender
identity, disability and body size. Still, systemic and structural racism is extremely hard to prove
and to isolate in health care when multiple oppressions are also at play. My findings provide
usable evidence of the racism implicit in health care and law with specific references to diverse
jurisprudence and several different authoritative clinical and diagnostic texts. I demonstrated
what many trans people understand experientially: that the diagnostic criteria for Gender
Dysphoria in the DSM-V and OHIP’s endorsement of the WPATH SoC v7 eligibility criteria
have differential impacts on racialized youth due to their structural vulnerability. This work
supports the scholarship on trans necropolitics and answers trans of colour scholars’ call to
acknowledge the besieged material conditions of non- normative trans lives.770
I gave current Canadian and Ontario context to the pioneering work of Singh, Gill-Petersen
and Kwon in Child and Youth studies by showing the ways that law and medicine combine to
create additional barriers for trans racialized youth beyond what white counterparts
experience.771 These barriers continue beyond the traditional age of legal adulthood.
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Furthermore, this research suggests that the legal age of majority has now become outdated as a
marker for attaining adulthood status especially given the heightened obstacles that trans
racialized youth must navigate in terms of health systems, professionals and service provider
organizations.
My work confirmed the findings of Pyne, Lee and Dadui in Trans studies, that trans racialized
youth perceive themselves and their families as intersectional and distinct from white trans
counterparts.772 I went beyond studies looking at barriers to health care access for trans youth to
theorizing organic responses to coercive pathology from the perspective of agency and
autonomy. Pathologizing medical models of transness were determinative in legal decisions such
as ODSP appeals made by youth diagnosed with gender dysphoria especially where appeals were
successful. I concluded that transphobia and lack of access to gender affirming care due to health
care provider incompetence or gatekeeping, and related issues of geographic distance and wait
lists were key contributing factors behind appellants’ mental health disabilities rather than simply
being trans.
I argue that the agentic or protective strategies used by participants in my study confirm
findings from other studies about trans (such as Trans PULSE) and structurally vulnerable
people’s decision making in health generally.773 As Sherwin notes, self-doubt and inability to
challenge systems of oppression characterize their agentic strategies.774 These short-term
strategies were marked by the kind of ambivalence towards power that Butler theorized:
performing identities, disidentifying with the gender binary, avoidance of medical care, and
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hiding.775 Participants may have performed to meet diagnostic and eligibility criteria but did not
conform. My findings also revealed participants carrying out the following autonomy-building
practices: self-advocacy, intentional social networks, self-representation, and integrated selfhood.
I engaged with questions central to health equity law: How does the HCCA measure up in
practice to its aspirations of autonomy for all capable people and streamline substitute decision
making? Is health policy responsive to the wishes, bodies, and families of trans racialized youth?
In answering these questions, I did not position “autonomy” and “informed consent” as
synonyms. And rather than seeing the decision itself as the most important outcome of decision
making, I applied Nedelsky’s relational autonomy theory.776 I agreed with her conception of
rights as relationships that create duties for governments. Policy makers and health care
providers cannot magically grant autonomy but can, and should, foster autonomy-producing
conditions. I found however, that Nedelsky’s autonomy-producing conditions did not adequately
theorize what trans racialized youth experienced. Autonomy is a socially and politically enabled
practice. My findings support what Roberts and other feminists of colour have observed which is
that justice is a crucial process that fosters autonomy.777 Therefore, my list of autonomy–
enhancing factors are information sharing, access to justice, transparency of power in
relationships, personal responsibility, self-awareness, and interdependence. From this belief in
justice and my desire to do justice by the courageous and resilient focus group participants I
propose several recommendations.
Based on the combination of my legal research and qualitative methods I have identified the
following list of actions and policy interventions. I assert that these actions would greatly
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improve the exercise of autonomy for trans racialized youth in health care decision making in
Ontario.
•

Change OHIP’s policy so as not to require health care providers to strictly apply the
Standards of Care v7 in order to approve subsidized treatments.

•

Broaden health care coverage for services affecting trans women the most such as
electrolysis, voice therapy, and improve the coverage for top surgery.

•

Facilitate changing identification documents to match name and gender for those born
outside Canada.

•

Amend the Health Care Consent Act to allow young capable people to exclude specific
family members from the automatic substitute decision maker hierarchy (s. 20) and allow
for use of a community organization, or chosen family using a Power of Attorney for
Personal Care (POA).

•

Mandate public legal education and advocacy support for youth about health care rights.

•

Do not repeal OHIP+ pharmacare for youth 25 years and younger who are covered by
their parents’ private health insurance plans.

My research findings in terms of heath consent statutes and jurisprudence are Ontariofocused. Some issues however, such as the conflicts between family law and health law are live
issues in British Columbia as well and will likely continue to be litigated across Canada until an
appellate court sets a precedent. Furthermore, findings related to my focus group are urban and
Greater Toronto Area specific and therefore not applicable wholesale to remote or reserve
community youth experiences. In addition, I found the ability to consult with lawyers
challenging these cases in three different provinces extremely helpful to understand what
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arguments were made by counsel and rejected by judges. Therefore, an avenue for further
exploration of progressive legal arguments would be through court transcripts in cases involving
health rights of trans youth rather than just the final written decisions of judges.
This project marks new directions for community-based research including how to design and
deliver public legal education for minors and youth about health rights; more specific work to
understand what doctors know and believe, and how to teach health care providers an
intersectional approach to fostering the conditions of autonomy is needed. This further research
is critical in the face of recent political acts to remove information about gender identity and
sexual orientation formerly provided to elementary school minors through health curriculum.
Curtailing health information sharing in schools means an even greater reliance on health care
providers and other trusted adults to raise awareness that could save the lives of trans racialized
youth. This research followed the path of possibilities for nourishing autonomy in decision
making over the long term beyond just the assertion of rights.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Pre-Group Questions for Focus Group Participants

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

What kind of role do health care professionals and social services workers play in
your life?
How do you tell your experiences in order to access health care? Use words and
images.
How would you describe the relationship between yourself and the communities
you feel a part of /take part in?
How would you describe and navigate the burden of representation of self as a
marginalized person?
What health services do you use?
What health services do you need but do not have?
Which services are transition-related, and which are not?
What barriers exist for you in getting the health services you want?
What solutions would you propose to policy makers?
What solutions would you propose to service providers?
How best would you like to receive, review and exhibit the results of the focus
groups and research?
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Appendix B: Photography Prompts for Participants

The following prompts were used on Day 1 and left with the participants for their image creation
week culminating in Day 2:
1. How would you describe the task of representing yourself as a trans bipoc person?
2. How would you describe the relationship between yourself and the communities you feel
a part of /take part in?
3. What kind of role do health care professionals (doctors, nurses, therapists) and social
services workers (OW, ODSP, CAS) play in your life?
4. How do you tell your experiences and your identity in order to access health care? Use
words and images.
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Appendix C: Photograph Analysis Rubric

•

What do we see/don’t see?

•

What is shown?

•

What do we feel?

•

(How) do we relate?

•

What does what we see/don’t see signify about us?

•

How would we use this picture?

•

What is the context for the photographer?
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Appendix D: Discussion Questions for the Member Checking Session

1.

What elements did you emphasize in telling your story to health professionals?

2.

What did you hide or change when telling your story to health professionals?

3.

Did you manipulate (your understanding of) diagnosis to get what you needed? If
so how?

4.

Were you allowed to make your own decisions or did someone else make
decisions for you? If someone else made decisions, what did you think about the
process?

5.

Have health practitioners consulted with your parents or other decision makers
about your healthcare?

6.

When you were under 18 years did this happen and if so how?
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Appendix E: Focus Group Agenda
Consent and Coercion in Health Care Decisions
2 Day Art & Discussion Workshop with Trans Racialized Youth April 2017
Flexible Itinerary
Day 1 (6.5 hrs)
11:00-11:15

Intros of participants and ice breaking exercises

11:15-11:30

Overview of project themes of consent and autonomy in health care decision
making (recorded)

11:30-12:15

Consent and confidentiality forms distribute supportive resources list with time
for discussion of pre-focus group questions (recorded)

12:15-1:00

Digital ethics exercise/games; include photo-composition, lighting, editing,
consent, privacy (recorded); distribute and explain the consent form for photo
subjects.

1:00-1:45

Meal and fresh air.

1:45-3:30

Sign out cameras using serial numbers; photography exercises in pairs with
prompts

3:30-3:45

Break

3:45-5:30

Health care decision making autonomy discussion (recorded)

5:30-6:00

Checkout using photos. Sign out cameras, honoraria and tokens.

Day 2 (6.0 hrs)
11:00-12:30

Check-in and review of consent issues and forms; look at art that people created

12:30-1:30

Enjoy meal while participants present their art

1:30-3:30

We link art to the themes of consent, representation, coercion
(recorded)

3:30-3:45

Break and snacks

3:45-4:30

Discussion of creative solutions to health barriers (recorded)

4:30-5:30

Review of next steps such as member checking session
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Appendix F: Information for Youth about Consenting to Treatment in
Ontario
According to the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, c. 2, sched. A, (HCCA) there is no fixed age of
consent in Ontario when it comes to health treatments. Even children under the age of 12 can
make decisions about their health care as long as they can demonstrate the capacity to make an
informed decision. Ages of consent are different in each province.
To ensure you make an informed decision, your doctor must tell you the following things in a
manner, and using language, you can understand: types of treatment options, benefits, risks,
short- and long-term side effects, and consequences of not having the treatment. Your doctor
must also tell you about your right to a second medical opinion.
Who determines if a person has the capacity to make a decision? Only a doctor or a health
professional can find you incapable of making a decision.778 They must tell you if they make this
finding. Social workers, teachers and parents cannot determine your capacity to make a treatment
decision.
Incapable means the doctor believes, after speaking with you, that you are not able to understand
all the information about the treatment and/or you are not able to understand what might happen
if you take or don’t take the treatment.
A finding of incapacity does not act like a blanket covering all future treatment decisions. If you
are found not to have capacity for a particular decision at a particular time, then the doctor will
ask a Substitute Decision Maker (SDM) like a parent or caregiver, partner or Children’s Aid
Society Worker to decide for you. You have the right to choose your SDM from a list of eight
categories of people listed in s. 20 of the HCCA. Social workers, doctors and foster parents are
not on that list, although they can help you to make the decision.
Having a disability or being disabled does not automatically make you incapable.
It does not matter if the SDM thinks your wishes are unreasonable or undesirable by their own
standards.

778

The list of health professionals who can find you incapable is found in the Regulated Health Professionals Act
1991. The rule is that a health doctor can only find you incapable of making a decision about a treatment they
themselves can recommend. For example, a dentist cannot find you incapable of deciding to take a puberty blocker
drug. That said, if you take a holistic view of your health you may find it useful to speak to different specialists
about how the pieces of your healthcare fit together.
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The SDM must be led by your values and your perspectives. If you are 16 or over the SDM has
the additional rule to follow what your wishes were when you were capable, by checking what
you wrote down or said to the SDM or other people.
If you want to challenge your doctor’s finding of incapacity you can apply to the Consent and
Capacity Board (CCB). The CCB can also change your SDM to a person of your choice, if that
person agrees to that role and both of you are at least 16 years old. You will need to contact the
CCB. Once you tell them why you are contacting them they will provide you with forms to fill
out and sign in order to start your application. It is a very good idea to speak to a legal clinic or a
lawyer about applications to the CCB.
Creating a document called a Power of Attorney for Personal Care (POAPC)
is another option for supported health care decision making. It does not require a court process.
You must be at least 16 years old to appoint an attorney for personal care and do it while you are
capable. The attorney that you give power to does not have to be a lawyer, and they should be
someone you trust who knows your values and beliefs. The POAPC document requires your
signature and signatures of two witnesses. If you are found incapable for a particular decision,
the person you choose as your attorney for personal care would automatically become your
SDM, trumping relatives and CAS workers. When you are capable again, the attorney does not
make decisions for you.
Speaking to a lawyer about the role of an attorney for personal care is highly recommended
because their duties are quite a bit broader than those of an SDM and includes other areas of your
life such as housing.
If you want to cancel the POAPC, you can revoke it by writing down that you revoke the
POAPC and have two witnesses sign that they watched you sign the revocation. All of you
should include the date that you are signing. Keep the original POAPC and the revocation
documents together in a safe place.
Useful Resources
College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario
Phone: Public Advisory Department at 416-967-2603 or 1-800-268-7096, extension 603
Website: http://www.cpso.on.ca
Contact them if
• you have questions or concerns about how your doctor communicated with you, the
information they kept or shared with others, the treatment you received, or how your consent was
given or not given for treatment
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Consent and Capacity Board
Phone: 416-327-4142 or 1-866-777-7391 (toll-free in Ontario)
Website: http://www.ccboard.on.ca
Contact them if
• your doctor has said you are not able to make a treatment decision and you disagree
• you are at least 16 years old and want to change your Substitute Decision Maker
Justice for Children and Youth
Phone: 416-920-1633 or 1-866-999-5329 (toll-free)
Blog: http://jfcy1.blogspot.ca/
Website: http://www.jfcy.org
Contact them if
• you want information or legal advice
• you are looking for a lawyer to represent you in court or at a Board hearing
Office of the Provincial Advocate for Children and Youth
Phone: 416-325-5669 or 1-800-263-2841 (toll-free)
Website: http://www.provincialadvocate.on.ca
Contact them if
• you have questions about health care rights
• you feel that someone is violating your health rights
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Table of Photographs
Table 1. List of Photographs (see p.viii)
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Creator

Full Title

Pogi

Think Before You Scream
(Photo has been pixelated to protect identifiable features)
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Creator

Full Title

Pogi

Reading Between the Signs

240

Creator

Full Title

Pogi

Alone Together
(Identifiable features in the photo have been blurred)
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Creator

Full Title

Pogi

Dick Pick
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Creator

Full Title

Sakura
River

UHN Invoice
(Photo has been pixelated to hide identifiable features)
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Creator

Full Title

Sakura
River

Bloody Glove Series 1
(Photo has been blurred to hide identifiable features)
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Creator

Full Title

Sakura River - Bloody Gloves Series 2
(Photo has been modified to hide identifiable features)
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Creator

Full Title

Sakura River - Bloody Glove Series 3
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Creator

Full Title

Sakura
River

Flags
(Photo partially blurred to hide identifiable features)
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Creator

Full Title

Sakura
River

Light After Dark
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Creator

Full Title

Particip
ant #4

The Ground is a long way down but there is more than one way to be grounded
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Creator

Full Title

Particip
ant #4

Discarded, Forgotten and Hidden. Sometimes Compartmentalized
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Creator

Full Title

Particip
ant #4

Community, Family, chosen or otherwise taking on the world together
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Creator

Full Title

Particip
ant #4

I never Said I was Ugly, It doesn’t make me Sick
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Creator

Full Title

Particip
ant #4

Who goes out? Who gets to be seen? Who am I to you?
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Creator

Full Title

Particip
ant #4

We Spend Some Time Together and Avoid the Medical Gaze
(Photo has been blurred to hide identifiable features)
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